FREE WORLD

A Monthly Magazine

devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

VOLUME VI, NO. 4 **October, 1943**

Drawing . . . . . Alfred Gordon Draper 294
To Build Again . . . . . Dorothy De Zouche 295
The French Underground and the Third War Loan 296
Editorials:
Second Anniversary 297
The Mackinac Conference 298
Two Free World Congresses 300
Democratic Italy of Tomorrow . . . . . Carlo Sforza 301
Time for America to Speak . . . . . Carl A. Hatch 303
What Do We Mean by Victory? . . . . . Archibald MacLeish 306
Drawing . . . . . B. F. Dolbin 312
The Mathematics of Death . . . . . Atwood H. Townsend 313
Where Is China Going? . . . . . Li Yu Ying 321
The Deliverance of Tunis . . . . . André Gide 323
An Economy of Abundance . . . . . Will Arnold Forster 327
Dreams Under Dictatorship . . . . . C. Beradt 333
Round Table No. 19: The Future of American Democracy 338
World Scene in Washington . . . . . Ernest K. Lindley 354
The Walls Turn Outward . . . . . Lian Shairo 357
Central Europe After the War . . . . . Fritz Kaufmann 359
Plans for the Future:
The League's Report on the Transition from War to Peace Economy . 364
Underground Reporter:
Danes Say No to Germany . . . . . Pierre Dupont 370
United France Awaits the Allies . . . . . Georges Buisson 373
Moral Indebtedness . . . . . Orson Welles 375
The Secret of Russia's Success . . . . . V. Voronin 376
Books:
Foreign Correspondents on Global War . . . . . Burnet Hershey 378
A Radio Commentator Reviews History . . . . . Quincy Howe 381
Italy, Testing Ground for Allied Policy . . . . . J. Alvarez del Vayo 382
Other drawings by De Pauw, Tom, Theodore Brenson, Stan Fraydas, Kraus

FREE WORLD is owned and published monthly by FREE WORLD, INC., 8 West Fortieth Street, New York 18, N. Y. Board of Directors: Li Yu Ying, Chairman; Hugh Moore and J. Alvarez del Vayo, Vice-Chairmen; Wousaofong, Secretary; Frederick C. McKee, Treasurer; Louis Dolivet, Freda Kirchwey. 40 cents a copy; $4.00 a year; $7.00 two years; $9.00 three years; Canadian and foreign postage $1.00 a year additional. Volume VI, Number 4, October, 1943. Copyright, 1943, by FREE WORLD, INC. All rights reserved; reproduction in whole or in part prohibited without permission. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. FREE WORLD is printed in the United States of America by Charles Francis Press, Inc., New York City. Entered as second class matter September 17, 1941, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TO BUILD AGAIN

What shall we give to build a new sweet world,
A coin, a loaf, a moment lightly flung
From all our years,
From all the little days we hoard?
What shall we give against men's bitter tears?

"Can we not give a benefit, a ball?"
I hear one say.
"Oh, not for them, for us. But all
The money shall be used for them.
Rent here, fuel there; you know the kind I mean;
A good warm coat. These January days
The wind is keen."

The wind is keen,
But sharper far
The icy gale that blows from some white star
Between men's lives,
Beating to eastward one, to westward one.
The wind is keen . . .
And somewhere down its gust
A young voice cries:
"Unbind the eyes!
Let not the thought that bread is in our hands
Be quick
To ease your minds.
For bread shall mould
And turn the spirit sick,
Sick unto death.
And if the spirit shall lie dead,
What does it matter
That meat is on the table, or that bread
Is plentiful, or wine
Is poured, and all the candles lighted?
The pity
Is not that the room is bare, but the heart bare, too.
Go to your ball, but keep your foolish gold.
The coat you fling us will not shed the cold."

What shall we give to build a new sweet world,
A coin, a loaf, a moment lightly flung?
Oh, lift the hands before the guilty face,
And turn in slow disgrace.
Until the heart has learned
A better way,
Until the mind has burned
With fierce new understanding, let the dark
Close in upon the foolish, futile hand.
When men are kind,
Doubt not there will be light upon the land.

Dorothy De Zouche

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The French Underground Backs the Third War Loan

THE Free World Association is proud to have established contact with the French Underground and to have obtained from it a message addressed to American workers.

We quote the relevant paragraphs from the address Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, delivered on Labor Day in Detroit over the Mutual Network:

"I got in touch with Louis Dolivet of the International Free World Association and asked him to get a message for me from France. I think it will tell you how working men over there feel about our invasion, and about the Third War Loan. It's a message from the working people of Occupied France to the working people of America—a cablegram signed by the authentic representatives of the entire French underground movement, who—I think you will be amazed to know—are now united, and so well organized that they are in almost daily contact with representatives of the United Nations.

"Here is the cablegram:

'Address to American Working Men: On the occasion of September 6, Labor Day, we address our grateful and fraternal greetings to the American working men, whose ever-increasing efforts we hail in this war which will liberate all peoples from oppression.

'In France, betrayed and enchained, the workers are carrying on the same combat as you. In their clandestine action they are braving arrest, death and torture. Having risen fiercely against the Nazi enemy, by sabotage and by strikes, they are opposing, at the risk of their lives, the enemy's war effort; they are destroying his tools and his economic system. Against the deportation of French workers to Germany, they have brought about the union of all French people who wish to regain their freedom. They stand firmly beside all these hunted young men who, taking refuge in the forests and the mountains, are standing out against those who want to enslave them.

'It is thus the same combat which in different ways, brings together for the liberation of the world from the evil forces of barbarism and dictatorship the working people of America and of France.

'Brothers of America, we are counting on you to continue with all your might, intensifying by all the means within your power, that effort which will bring liberation.

'By your conscientious work in the war plants, by subscribing to the war bonds which will help the American Government to forge arms and equipment, you will give the world a noble example.

'Until the common victory is won we shall perform our duty. The people of France are resolved on sacrifices at your side for this act of redemption.

'Tomorrow, victory having been secured, they will find themselves again with you in the struggle necessary to build a free world in which justice will reign.'

"The cable is signed by all the leaders of the French Underground, leaders inside and outside of France.

"This is what your War Bonds will pay for—the freedom that victory will bring."

Henri Laugier, rector of the University of Algiers, who was most helpful in obtaining the message from the Underground, sent a wire to the Treasury Department underlining the historic importance of this document.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITORIALS

Second Anniversary

WITH this issue, FREE WORLD enters its third year. The first two were full of fight and hardship but they were also full of heartfelt satisfaction. During April 1941, when the idea of this magazine and of the Free World Association was conceived, democratic hopes had reached a very low ebb—the end of the war and of fascism seemed so far away. But not for a moment did we cease to believe in the ultimate triumph of our cause.

Thus, undaunted, we met and worked together: men and women from more than thirty countries throughout the Americas, Europe, and Asia. And never, not on a single occasion, was there any conflict among us along national or racial lines. May this most happy collaboration serve as an example to peoples everywhere!

But this is no time to celebrate anniversaries; and we turn again, therefore, to the military and political battlefields.

The grave events which took place in Italy at the very moment when it looked as though our side had achieved a great triumph should serve as a lesson to all of us.

First of all, the developments in Italy have shown that the enemy is as determined as ever to hold out until the last moment, and that there can be no relaxation in the military and production efforts of the United Nations until an utter destruction of the Axis has been accomplished. Second, events in Italy have again underlined how essential it is for us to take quick advantage of a favorable situation and to press the enemy relentlessly in his moment of weakness, without giving him a chance to recover. Third, Italy should have taught us an important political lesson: that in any Axis country we move into, the immediate and complete destruction of the fascist machinery is absolutely indispensable—that, in fact, such destruction should be one of the conditions of any armistice our side grants.

Our natural allies in any such country are the people and not the miserable remnants of the old regime or of those who have tolerated it. For example, if at the moment of Mussolini's downfall a democratic revolution had been encouraged in Italy and had triumphed, we can be certain the new popular government would not have taken more than a month to disrupt the alliance with nazi Germany. On the contrary, it would have opened the whole of Italy to us immediately and would have called on the people to take arms against the Nazis. Instead of a procrastinating opponent, we should have had an active ally.

We should not, of course, minimize the immense advantages accruing to the United Nations in the surrender of Italy and, particularly, in the sur-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

render of the Italian fleet. However difficult the temporary situation may be, there is no doubt that the Axis, so far as Italy is concerned, has been shaken to its very foundations; nor any doubt that with the naval and territorial advantages gained, we shall be able to strike harder blows at the enemy. In these new assaults, popular revolution against the Axis and its satellite regimes can be of the greatest help to the United Nations' armies. It must, therefore, be our preoccupation to wage the political war with the utmost energy. To that end we must translate the doctrine of the United Nations into popular terms, so that it may become the program for this democratic revolution of Europe.

The ideas Vice-President Wallace set forth in his Chicago speech seem to us best adapted for use as a point of departure for intensified political war. Mr. Wallace has really spoken the language of the common man everywhere. He has not confined himself to pointing out the urgency of the complete destruction of fascism; he has given positive goals for the political and economic aspirations of the people of the world. More than anyone else, he realizes the desire of the common people "for jobs, opportunity, health, and security." The eighth point in Mr. Wallace's speech—"Free enterprise demands freer travel between the nations and less passport, visa, and customs foolishness. We need more free moving, enterprising business men and fewer secret agents and monopolists"—will especially please Europeans, because so many boundaries and barriers have heretofore hampered their freedom of movement.

The recognition Secretary Hull accorded to the international aspirations of the people of the earth, in his speech broadcast over NBC, is also an important contribution. He emphasized that each nation should "submit differences arising between it and other nations to processes of peaceful settlement, and should be prepared to carry out other obligations that may devolve upon it in an effective system of organized peace." This statement satisfies another urgent need, felt particularly on the European Continent—it points the way to security from aggression, to a guarantee that all nations will join to crush any eventual aggressor.

But all these texts need to be transformed from speeches and statements into a concrete program of the United Nations. They need to be translated into conventions and treaties between the United Nations' governments. We are convinced that people everywhere will ratify them with the utmost willingness.

The Mackinac Conference

THE declaration made at Mackinac Island has been hailed by sincere internationalists as an indication that the Republican party has finally reverted to the true Republican foreign policy of a James G. Blaine or an Elihu Root. In fact, a long road seems to have been traveled within the short period since August 25, when Mr. Kelland outlined his imperialistic, "impregnable United States" program for Mackinac. He called on this country to convert the Pacific into an American lake by holding all the necessary islands; to take Iceland, Greenland, Dakar, Casablanca "by treaty or occupation"; he demanded cession of the European possessions in South America and the Caribbeans; a five-ocean navy, an air force capable of standing alone,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the like. At the same time, Mr. Taft, in denouncing the Fulbright and similar resolutions, asserted that "we are not engaged in any crusade for democracy or for the four freedoms." But at Mackinac, the party's statement that "we must do our full share in a program of permanent peace among nations" was endorsed by Taft and his friends, and "responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world" was voted unanimously.

This is, indeed, a gratifying development. However, the declaration contains a number of ambiguous restrictions, limitations, and clauses. These require some clarification if we are to eliminate any possibility of their being interpreted as mental reservations around which surviving isolationist tendencies might some day cluster—and if we are to avoid seriously encumbering international machinery by opening the road to similar reservations on the part of other countries.

One possible restrictive interpretation has already been challenged by one of the participants at the Mackinac Conference itself. Governor Sewall said he wanted it definitely understood that the declaration's wording of "cooperative organization *among sovereign nations*" did not mean a refusal by this country to give up a degree of sovereignty in effecting an international peace-keeping organization. "Sovereignty involves the solemn right to give up sovereignty by our own action," Senator Vandenberg, head of the committee on international affairs, replied. "That of itself would be an act of sovereignty."

From this it would appear that the Republican party (so far as it is committed by the Mackinac declaration) would support a government ready to surrender a "degree of sovereignty"—through an unconditional commitment to submit to the majority decisions of an international political body or a world court of justice. Unfortunately, the concept of "sovereignty" is coupled with a reference to "constitutionalism" which, in the terms of the declaration, "should be adhered to in determining the substance of our policies and shall be followed in ways and means of making international commitments." This adds another element of obscurity. The statement might simply lead to a certain diminution in the effectiveness of international machinery, since every step taken by the American representatives at the international assembly could be rendered void by congressional opposition. But it could also mean that any international agreement involving American sovereignty would have to run the gauntlet of the extremely complicated procedure provided for amending the Constitution (including ratification by three-fourths of the states). Such an interpretation could easily deter the American Government and its prospective partners from entering into any international commitments.

The most important limitation seems to be the provision that "both the immediate and remote consequences of every proposition" involved in an international obligation must be considered with "careful regard for its effect upon the vital interests of the nation."

Students of the history of the long, hard struggle for the peaceful settlement of international disputes will remember, with discomfort, the sad role that "vital interests" have hitherto played in preventing an effective reign of law and justice over relations among nations.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two Free World Congresses—in New York and in Montevideo

THE Third Free World Congress of the Free World Movement will take place in New York from October 28 to October 31.

This Congress comes on the eve of great events on the continents of Europe and Asia. It comes on the eve of final offensives against the Axis. No period in history is more important than the one through which we are living at present. Since it is in these times that the fate of the peace to come will be decided, the third Congress is of the utmost importance to all freedom-loving people everywhere.

Delegates representing private organizations from more than thirty countries are expected to be present at the Congress, which will work out a Charter of Human Rights and of World Organization.

But the Congress in New York is not the only one that FREE WORLD will be holding during this year. In Latin America, too, the Free World Movement has grown by leaps and bounds in recent months.

The two main tasks with which the Free World Association has been confronted have been, first of all, to counter nazi propaganda effectively by cementing into a solid bloc the democratic elements in the various countries; and, second, to lead the Latin republics to participate in a vast world plan for the establishment of a durable peace. To this end, three editions of the magazine, MUNDO LIBRE, have been created.

As a parallel development, Free World Association was launched in Latin America. Under its impetus, significant things are happening. Chili's President, Juan Antonio Rios, has sent Vice President Alberto Guani of Uruguay, who directs the Free World movement in Latin America, a letter announcing his adherence to the goals of the forthcoming MUNDO LIBRE Congress. This Congress will meet in Montevideo at the beginning of December and will be devoted to a study of Latin America's wartime responsibilities toward the United Nations and to an exploration of the role Latin America should play when the war is won. To give ampler expression to his interest in post-war problems, President Rios has just appointed the Chilean National Commission for Post-war Planning. One development, however, overshadows all others: the formation of a great national democratic bloc, embracing all shades of party affiliation within Chile—from Catholic to communist—within the framework of the Free World Movement.

Dr. Artucio, professor of philosophy at the University of Montevideo and well known to our readers for his many illuminating articles on the South American Nazi Underground, is touring the fourteen countries of the Southern Hemisphere to organize the Montevideo Congress. Great numbers of noted democratic leaders have already accepted the Free World Association's invitation; such men as the Mexican Foreign Minister, Padilla; the Mexican Minister of Defense and former president, Cardenas; the former President of Colombia, Santos; the Argentine opposition leader, Taborda; the president of the Latin American Federation of Labor, Toledano; the former Governor of Sao Paulo State, Brazil, de Salles Oliveira; the former Foreign Minister of Brazil, Mangabeira, and many others. The Congress cannot but live up to its greatest potentialities.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEMOCRATIC ITALY of Tomorrow

BY

CARLO SFORZA

ITALY'S supreme need, following the ignominious fall of fascism and Badoglio's capitulation, is a universal movement of renovation such as took place in France in 1789 when, during the night of August 4, a member of the privileged classes, the Vicomte of Noailles, proposed the abolition of *"les restes odieux de la féodalité"*—the hateful remnants of feudalism. Up to now—or at least up to the sudden and general awakening of northern Italy in July and August, 1943, after Mussolini's disappearance—such a renovation had not yet taken place in my country.

During the seventeenth century, in the south, the poorest people of Naples, Masaniello's crowds, rose against the intolerable Spanish tyranny. During the eighteenth century, the Genoese of Balilla rose in the north against the Germans. But in both cases, the nobles and the bourgeois kept quiet. Just the opposite was true during the Risorgimento, in the nineteenth century: the nobles and the middle classes gave thousands of heroes in their struggle against Germans in the north and Bourbons in the south. But the masses remained passive: among their many followers, Garibaldi and Mazzini had hardly any peasants ready to fight and to die.

Now that fascism has become a putrefied corpse, the best promise for the future of free Italy is the fact that all classes—aristocracy, bourgeoisie and peasants, intellectuals and workers—have alike shown their joy over the disappearance of the shameful Mussolinian gang.

The great captains of industry—with the exception of two or three highly honorable names—have behaved so abjectly in their currupt relations with fascism that in the free Italy of tomorrow they are not going to mean anything: Italy sees in them not only a group of corrupters, but—what is even worse—of stupid corrupters. On the other hand, the long fascist adventure has revealed to forty-five million Italians—even to those who are labelled uncompromising *"conservatori"*—that the supreme treasure is one and only one: freedom. Everything hangs on freedom. It is significant that during the second year of the war declared by Mussolini on the United Nations, Benedetto Croce wrote in his book, "Il carattere della filosofia moderna": "When the necessity of a union of moral forces and economic forces is proclaimed, this can only mean—not the submission of the former to the latter but just the opposite: the hegemony of moral forces over economic forces. . . . It is inadmissible that economic forces determine moral forces—as when, for example, some try to establish relations of dependence between freedom (which is moral life) and certain economic systems, between Liberalism and Manchesterian free enterprise."

Gramsci, a young and heroic philosophical thinker whom Mussolini killed in one of the worst of the fascist jails, wrote

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that "Croce is the secular pope of Italian thought." If this is true—and to a great extent it is true—it is vain to seek in any other country, from any thinker equally known for his aversion to all forms of socialism and communism, an equally forceful and disdainful declaration of the complete unimportance of so-called "economic freedom"—vis-à-vis freedom, simply freedom.

On the other hand, the Italian masses want fundamental agrarian and economic reforms—but they also want these reforms to help make Italy stronger and more united. One of the main errors of the socialist leaders in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth—when they did so much to advance the workers—was their failure to realize (prisoners as they were of dead Marxian formulas) that our people deeply loved our country—and desired greatness for it.

During the French Revolution the peasants, from Normandy to Provence, enlisted with enthusiasm to fight for a France which had changed them into happy landowners—from the *"animaux farouches et affamés"* described by La Bruyère two generations before. The French peasants owed and owe everything to the Revolution: that is why (parenthetically) even now—a century and a half later—they are still so mistrustful, in their hearts, of the noble in his chateau and of the abbot in his abbey, those distant holders of too many fields and of too many woods. In Italy, on the contrary, the peasants gained nothing from the destruction of the old monarchies in 1859 and 1860. It is true that in certain regions—like Piedmont, Venice, Tuscany—they were already much better off than in the France of the "ancien régime." But this was not so in the Latium, in the south, in Sicily, in Sardinia. That is why one of the most important problems for free Italy will be to make the peasants feel that the State is no longer a machine in the exclusive service of white collar citizens—be they conservative or liberal or socialist. The Italian peasant—even when he is serious and mournful as in the Basilicata where the soil itself seems hostile—is among the most engaging human beings: so philosophical, so deeply civilized. Nothing will be easier than to get him to adopt an ethical conception of agrarian socialism—making it possible to avoid a Marxian or pseudo-Marxian bureaucracy. It is not impossible for mediocre agitators to stir up workers; it is impossible with peasants. A St. Francis of Assisi, with his eyes turned a little more toward the soil and a little less toward *"frate Sole"*—brother Sun—will transform the minds and warm the hearts of our millions of peasants more easily than a hundred Lenins.

The agrarian problem is the main moral and economic problem of Italy—at least of southern Italy and of our islands. But those who think to solve it by following Russian examples will never succeed; and the peasants will not believe those who dream that a few lines of law are sufficient to abolish the big properties. The peasants will believe only those who explain to them that the problem is complex: that the point in question is a gigantic transformation of the Italian soil—an authentic transformation and not a comedy like the one Mussolini staged in the Pontine marshes to cheat rich American tourists (only too eager to be cheated because the "miracle" had been worked by a "dictator"). Our peasants will believe only those who explain that an agrarian reform is the most urgent and sacred duty facing Italy—but also one of the most difficult and complex, since it is probably linked with a series of gigantic hydroelectric works.

For the rest, the problems are all minor—including those of Italy's institutions. There is much greater curiosity about the fate of the monarchy outside Italy than among Italians. After all, the history of our Middle Ages and of our Renaissance—which to us is simply yesterday—should tell the world, as it tells us, that art, culture, an individualistic spirit, even heroic adventures such as the Fourth Crusade, were richer and deeper and more frequent aspects of our daily life before the Italians were brought under kings and dukes.

As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, when our republican freedoms began to be endangered, Machiavelli answered those timid souls who feared the disorders which freedom occasionally drags along with it: "I maintain that those who find fault with the quarrels between the Senate and the people of Rome condemn the very origin of liberty; that they have

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

probably been more impressed by the cries and noise these disturbances occasioned in public places than by the good effect they produced; that they fail to consider that in every republic there are two parties, of the nobles and of the people; and that all laws favorable to liberty result from the opposition of these parties to each other. Nor can we regard a republic, where so many virtues have been seen to shine, as disorderly. For good examples are the result of good education, and good education is due to good laws; and good laws in their turn spring from those very commotions which have been so inconsiderately condemned by many. For anyone who carefully examines the result of these commotions will find that they have caused neither exiles nor any violence prejudicial to the general good, and will be convinced that they have given rise to laws that were in the interests of public liberty. And if it be said that these are strange means—constantly to hear the cries of the people, furious with the Senate, and of the Senate declaiming against the people, or to see the populace rush tumultuously through the streets, close their houses, and even leave the city of Rome—I reply that all these things can alarm only those who read of them, and that every free state ought to afford the people the opportunity of giving vent, so to speak, to their ambition—those republics, above all, which on important occasions must avail themselves of this very people."

TIME *for America* *to* SPEAK

by
Carl A. Hatch

NO greater problem will be presented to this generation of Americans than the question of our country's policy in the post-war world. Upon the proper determination of the issues involved may well rest the destiny of our own and other countries of the world. I wish the American people could speak their own voice on this subject without interpretation by me or anyone else. For under our system of government, the voice of America is the voice of her people.

THE complete victory we missed twenty-five years ago, because the statesmen of the world failed to carry through and achieve the goals for which our men had fought, must not be missed this time. Regardless of the cynic, we fought the last World War in an honest hope that it might mean the end of war. I, for one, was not ashamed of that ojective then. I do not apologize for a similar objective today. My shame will be if we in our weariness of the hardships, suffering, and sacrifice of war forget the ends for which we fight and content ourselves with mere victory on the battlefields; for surely, if our purpose is to win military victory alone, men will fight and die today for only a temporary gain, and not long hence another generation of America's manhood will fight another war which should have been avoided.

OUR task today is to make the victory of our fighting men complete. We members of Congress carry a special responsibility in the search for methods for the ultimate establishment of law and order among nations. Realizing that some way

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must be found to prevent war if our civilization is to survive, several Senators have sponsored a resolution that at least tends toward that end.

FULLY conscious of the difficulties and obstacles lying in the way, we declare that *now* is the time to begin. The security of mankind from the waste, the suffering, and the desolation of war cannot await the end of battle. We draw no rosy picture of Utopia. Coldly and realistically, we face the world as it is and not as we wish it were. We propose to utilize the strength the United Nations are today using in waging war, to prevent war in the future.

SENATE Resolution No. 114, as introduced by Senators Ball, Hill, Burton, and myself, first declares that the entire military and economic resources of all the member nations must be used to prosecute and win the present war. The war is not yet won, notwithstanding present successes. The full devotion of the complete strength of the United Nations to the winning of the war is as necessary on the home front as on the battlefield itself. The battle of the assembly line, of food production, of war bonds, of behind-the-lines defense must continue unabated. The enemy, in coalition against us, has asked for total war. Total war let him receive—from the *United Nations*. Such is the meaning of the first declaration in the resolution we sponsor.

SECOND, the resolution suggests the establishment of temporary governments in the Axis and occupied nations until the people of these countries can choose for themselves the kind of government they desire. This simple clause merely provides a regular method for accomplishing what we are already doing by improvisation—for what must be done if utter chaos is to be prevented.

THIRD, we say that administering economic rehabilitation to the occupied and devastated nations of the world is a United Nations' task. We know that this country of ours is going to do (as it has always done) everything possible to relieve the want and suffering of weak and oppressed peoples wherever they may be; but our resolution declares that this should be done by the United Nations. It should not be done by America alone. Whatever assistance we give should aid the impoverished nations to help themselves in their own rehabilitation. That help must be rendered in a businesslike, orderly manner through the regular organization of the United Nations. Relief should not be extended as charity by any one nation when the problem is one for all. There are too many dangers of conflict in haphazard relief policies—and we should not throw away so many opportunities for nations to learn to work with and for each other in concerted action.

THE fourth and fifth clauses provide for the establishment of procedures and machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes among the nations of the world and for military force sufficient to suppress military aggression by any nation. Here lies the heart of the resolution. Unless some method of settling disputes among nations according to principles of justice rather than by military might is found, the world is without any hope of peace.

SOME men say that because war has always existed it must always continue to exist. Such philosophy denies any hope of human progress. It condemns mankind to the constant horror of war, with all its pain and anguish for guilty and innocent alike. It is the doctrine of defeat, disaster, decay, and death.

WE admit no such destiny for men. Because a small minority of the people of the earth organize for war, and with ruthless brutality subject the whole world to bloody battlefields and bankrupt treasuries, peaceful nations do not weakly have to permit such conditions to prevail in a world that predominantly hates war and longs for peace. No! The United Nations have it in their own hands now to organize for peace as powerfully and as strongly as Germany, Italy, and Japan organized for war. This is why we so earnestly demand such an organization now, with military force sufficiently strong to prevent military aggression by any nation in the future. Did

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

you get those words, "A military force sufficiently strong to prevent aggression?" That is what we propose, and nothing more. "To prevent military aggression by any nation" is the language of our resolution, and that language was chosen with care.

THE heart of the resolution calls for plans for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, without recourse to war. It also provides for sufficient military force to *prevent aggression*. This military force has been best described by Senator Thomas of Utah, who names it "An International Peace Force." Well does he name it, for it is a "United Nations Peace Force to Prevent Aggression." Should we of the United Nations be less specific in the declaration of our aims? Are not these things the hope of the vast majority of all men, regardless of race, creed, or color? Why use generalities, meaningless words, or deceptive phrases susceptible to any twist or interpretation by any person? Do we dare even to think of weaker aims than those we have stated? Then why not say so now, and that without equivocation?

OUR resolution calls for no detailed plans for the post-war world. We advise the formation of no superworld state. We do strongly and vigorously insist that the Senate, which has an equal share in the treaty-making power, declare now in favor of some plan to prevent war. Since people today hate war with all the intensity of their souls, is it not time that we take some constructive step to attain that end for which they are so devoutly praying and hoping at this very hour and moment?

WHAT does the voice of America say to this proposal? By spoken and written word from almost every part of the country, I am convinced the people of America wholeheartedly approve of such a course. The Chicago *Sun* of August 11, in mentioning the resolution we four Senators have sponsored, says, in part:

> The military speedup on the battle fronts has made the crystallization of opinion more urgently desirable than ever. Abundant evidence shows that the American people in all sections support the general idea of international cooperation after the war. Now it is time to make that generality specific by giving Congress a mandate for the immediate passage of a resolution along the lines of that sponsored by the four Senators named above.

The editorial is right. Now is the time for America to speak and give Congress that mandate that will correctly express the will of her people.

LET not our day of opportunity be lost, lest it not return again until some other generation faces and fights an even more deadly war than we face and fight today.



PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What do we Mean by

VICTORY?

By

Archibald MacLeish

IN most wars, whatever else is uncertain, the definition of victory at least is sure. You would know your victory if you met it. It may be near or far off, doubtful or assured, but its face is not in question. Victory will be achieved when your independence is won or when the territory in dispute has been conquered or when the invader is repelled. No one has any doubt whatever as to the appropriate moment for the ringing of the bells and the tearing up of the telephone directories.

In this war, however, the definition of victory is not sure. Nor does its *shape* become more apparent as we approach it. On the contrary, the more certain of victory we become the less certain our victory appears. The long and unresolved debate over the so-called "political" aspects of the North African campaign is one expression of that paradox. The current discussions of similar aspects of the Sicilian campaign and the Italian surrender are others. Those debates and discussions are not, as some of our fellow citizens would like us to believe, irrelevant difficulties raised by frivolous and irresponsible people who can't keep their minds on the fighting. They are very real and very honest difficulties raised by conscientious and intensely serious people who insist on remembering what the fighting is *about*—what the fighting is *for*. They are difficulties raised by people who cannot see how you can win a victory in a war unless you know what your victory will be.

The question as these people see it is a practical question. Will we consider the war won when our enemies are convinced they cannot win it and are ready to say so? Or will we not consider the war won until the armies of our enemies have been defeated in the field? Or must we wait beyond that until our enemies have been altogether disarmed and their war industries obliterated? Or is the definition of our victory more rigorous even than that? Does the definition of our victory involve the destruction by force of the civil governments which created and employed this military power, and the destruction by force of the political organizations which produced these guilty governments? And, if so, how far must that destruction go: to what limit?

These questions, say those who ask them, are questions for now, not questions for afterwards. They are questions for the war, not questions for the peace. They are questions of how long you are going to fight, not questions of what you are going to do when the fighting is over. They are, to be specific, questions of how long and to what end you are going to employ force and at what point you are going to cease to employ force and let the consequences follow. They are questions, therefore, which the American people must answer for themselves, now, while the fighting still goes on. It is all very well to think of victory as a symbolic winged figure without face or arms, an abstract, soaring shape of military triumph, to be followed by the dull business of negotiating peace. But a soldiers' triumph cannot serve a people's war. The people wish to end their wars, not merely win them. And the victories that end the wars are not the headless marble victories of winged fame. The victories that end the wars have human attributes. Those who

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

win them—those who deserve to win them and so win them—are those who dare to look them in the face, however dark that face may be, and so to recognize them, and so to recognize no other.

We citizens of the United States and our allies in Great Britain and elsewhere have not learned to recognize the face of the victory we mean to win to end this war. We have not answered the questions which must be answered. And the consequence is the curious anxiety, the strange concern, with which we move toward victory. We are like a man running a race with all his determination, all his reserves of energy and strength, who does not know whether the race will be won when he passes his adversary, or when his adversary drops out, or when he himself reaches a given mark—and, if so, where that mark is fixed. He sees his adversary tiring. He is certain his adversary can be defeated. But he does not know in what way the race itself is to be won or whether indeed it can be won at all. He only knows that he has no choice but to run this race and that he dare not lose it.

Why we find ourselves in this state of inconclusiveness it is not difficult, I think, to say. We have waited for the war itself to define our victory by yielding it. We have been unwilling to face the essential, the elementary fact, that this war, unlike some other wars, does not carry in itself the measure of its failure or success—that we ourselves must invent, must create, that measure—that only by an affirmative act of purpose and of will can we determine what the measure of success will be. In this war the beginning does not define the end. We went to war because the entire security of our lives, moral and physical, was threatened by an armed attack first upon our neighbors' lives and then upon our own. But we are not fighting merely to defeat the attackers in their effort to overrun the world. We are fighting to establish the future security of the moral and physical life for the defense of which we took up arms. Which means that the war which was at first defensive on our part has now become offensive. Which means, in turn, that we ourselves must fix our goal and our objective—that we ourselves, by an act of will, by an act of decision, must determine what the end will be. This we have not done.

And for reasons which, I think, are fairly obvious. For one thing, the war was presented to us so emphatically at the beginning as a defensive war that it would have been difficult to readjust our thinking to its offensive character even if we had been told that its moral as well as its military character had changed—and we were never clearly told that its moral character had changed.

Again, the change in the moral character of the war from defensive to offensive has been consistently obscured and denied by a powerful propaganda within the United States intended to make us believe that we are fighting not to create a future but to defend a past—not to achieve a true security forward for a free man's life but to return to the front porch and the comfortable chair—and begin it again as we began it again in 1920. Those who tried to make us believe before we entered the war that the war was none of our business are trying to make us believe still that the war is none of our business—that it is none of our business what human hope gets out of the war so long as we ourselves get out of it safe with a whole skin and pancakes for breakfast.

Finally, we have been officially discouraged in any attempt we might make to determine our objectives in this new offensive war by those who have urged us to leave these questions to the soldiers for the time being—those who have told us that principles play no part in the war at its present stage—that military expediency must be permitted, for the present at least, to determine military objectives in military terms and under cover of military secrecy—that there will be time enough to talk about principles when the end of the war is in sight—that there will be time enough, in other words, to talk about principles when the accepted principle has become expediency.

But the controlling reason for our failure to define the victory we propose to win is not official apologetics or isolationist propaganda. It is not because we have been seduced to neglect the most urgent decision of our generation by full-page advertisements of the world the way it was, or because we have been scolded into leaving

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

civil matters as well as military matters to the soldiers. The principal reason is considerably simpler and considerably nearer home. The principal reason is this—that we are aware, consciously or subconsciously, of the fact that to win this war,—to win this war in such a way that the war will truly be won, will truly be ended,—we must attain not military objectives alone but moral ojectives as well. And we have found it difficult to translate these moral objectives into military terms so that a definition of military victory can comprise them. We have found it difficult to express, in terms of the conditions precedent to a military victory, ojectives which would change not only the balance of the world's military and political power but the balance also of the power of its ideas.

Our realization that moral objectives are involved—that ideas are involved—in any final victory has increased as our understanding of the war has widened. A great majority of Americans accepted without question the President's statement in his message to Congress on the State of the Union on January 7, 1943: "It is clear to us that if Germany and Italy and Japan—or any one of them—remain armed at the end of this war, or are permitted to rearm, they will again, and inevitably, embark upon an ambitious career of world conquest. They must be disarmed and kept disarmed, and they must abandon the philosophy, and the teaching of that philosophy which has brought so much suffering to the world." A great majority of Americans accepted also the President's statement to the press at the close of the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, a statement made in the presence of the Prime Minister of Great Britain and on behalf of both nations, that German and Japanese war power must be totally eliminated—that the only terms the United Nations would accept at the conclusion of the war were unconditional surrender—that this, however, did not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan but that it did mean the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other people.

But though most Americans agree with these statements—agree that we must destroy not only the armed power of our enemies but the philosophy which raised that armed power and threw it against the peace of the world—there is little or no agreement as to the meaning of that conclusion in terms of the winning of the war. We are convinced, as any observer of recent history or indeed of any history must be convinced, that it is not only the armed power of the fascist nations which makes them dangerous to us but the philosophy of subjugation and conquest which persuades them to use that power to our injury. A gun in the hands of a policeman whose purpose is to maintain the peace is not a menace. A gun in the hands of a hoodlum whose purpose is to kill you is. It is the purpose of the mind which is the real danger or the real protection, not the gun. All of us, therefore, or almost all of us, agree that our enemies must, in the President's words, "abandon the philosophy, and the teaching of that philosophy which has brought so much suffering to the world." It is not enough, as this generation well remembers, merely to disarm a people whose beliefs and purposes are dangerous. The disarming of the German people following the war of 1914-1918 had no effect but to drive the hateful purpose inward to fester in the impotence of fifteen years of pretended peace and, six years after that, to produce a second war more dangerous because more hateful and more evilly intentioned than the first.

But though we are agreed upon all this, we are not at all agreed upon its meaning in terms of the definition of the victory we propose to win. We can define that victory to ourselves in terms of the President's first requirement that our enemies should be disarmed. We will certainly refuse to accept any offer of surrender which does not strip the German people and the people of Japan and Italy of weapons, and we will fight until that end can be attained. But we have not yet defined our victory to ourselves in terms of the second requirement —the requirement that our enemies should abandon the philosophy which has brought so much suffering to the world—the requirement that the philosophy must be destroyed. How shall it be destroyed? How is a war to be won which has for one of its objectives the destruction of a philoso-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phy? What is the definition of victory in such a war?

We find it difficult even to consider such a question and the consequence is that we do not consider it. We repeat the President's assertion with approval but we refuse to ask ourselves what it means or how it can be brought about. In a nation in which we insist, or used to insist before the *dies Dies,* that our next-door neighbors have a right to think as they please, the proposal that we should attempt to alter the thinking of men and women beyond the two great oceans of the earth seems strange indeed—so strange that even men in positions of responsibility shrug the unanswerable questions off with impatience and irritation.

But history has little time for those who refuse to think of problems they cannot solve, and destiny does not cease to ask because men decline to answer. We may find it preposterous to be asked what we propose to do about the beliefs of the Germans and the Japanese, but we are asked notwithstanding. We are asked by the mouths of innumerable men and women who have been destroyed in two wars within a single generation because the people of Germany believed the strong should inherit the earth—believed it so violently that when they were disarmed they created for themselves out of their hunger and their poverty new arms more dangerous than any they had lost before. We are asked by the mouths of boys who have rotted in jungles and perished in prison camps and been murdered on hospital litters and suffered physical torture and spiritual indignity because the people of Japan believe they are a superior people entitled by right to conquer the world and to do what they please with whatever opposes them. We may find it preposterous to be asked what we propose to do about the belief of the people of Germany and the people of Japan, but we know, if we know anything, that it is the belief of the German people and the Japanese people which is dangerous to us—not their armies or their industries or their ships or planes. For the malicious purpose can create the arms and armies out of nothing as we ourselves have seen, but the arms and armies without the malicious purpose are no more dangerous than Canada's across the open border—less dangerous, for farther off.

If we are honest with ourselves and with what we know, we will not refuse to face the truth because it is difficult. We will not pretend to ourselves, what we know in fact to be false, that this war can be won—which means that this war can be ended—by the defeat of armies in the field alone. This war can be ended only by destroying the will which made it, as well as the weapons with which that will was armed. We will never believe again—if we are honest with ourselves we will never believe again – that when the weapons are destroyed the will is destroyed also. We know better. Or if we don't we have only ourselves to blame.

Neither, if we are honest with ourselves, will we exaggerate the difficulty of the destruction of the fascist will. The fascist will can be destroyed, as the President said, by destroying the philosophy on which it rests. And the destruction of a false philosophy is neither more nor less difficult than any other cleansing labor. Because those who have attempted to destroy philosophies by suppressing them, or by persecuting those who hold them, have failed and rightly failed, it does not follow that the philosophies which mislead the world are indestructible. There is one unfailing method by which even the most powerful, the most persuasive, of the false beliefs can be destroyed:—by discrediting their claims to truth. What persecution cannot do and suppression cannot do, the naked truth can do when men are made to see it. The methods of the Spanish Inquisition had little effect upon the European mind, but Erasmus, by discrediting the pretensions of the Schoolmen, altered the thinking of the Western world for generations.

We can win this war in terms not only of the disarming of our enemies but in terms also of the destruction of their philosophy, if we win it in such a way as to discredit that philosophy—in such a way as to demonstrate to the people of Germany and Japan, and to those in other countries who, secretly or openly, have emulated Japanese and German beliefs, that these beliefs are false and, worse than false, contemptible. But this we must do, if we are to do it, in the act of winning the war and as part of the winning of the war.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No one seriously believes that the United Nations will undertake the de-indoctrination of the German and Japanese people by a generation's supervision of German and Japanese schools. But no one can doubt either that what cannot be taught in a generation of school-keeping can be taught, if we mean to teach it, in a single military defeat. It is when we think of the destruction of the Nazi philosophy in terms of a peace to be negotiated and enforced after the war that the problem becomes insoluble. It can be solved only by thinking of it in terms of the war itself, in terms of the victory which we mean to win. For the philosophy of our enemies is a philosophy exceedingly vulnerable to precisely such a refutation as our victory can be made to give.

What must be destroyed in the philosophy of our enemies—what is hateful and menacing in that philosophy and must be destroyed—is not its aspiration to power. The desire for power is a very ancient and a very general human desire and one which has produced in its time both good and evil. What is hateful and menacing in the philosophy of our enemies, and what must be discredited in the defeat which brings them down, is the contempt for humanity, the contempt for human life, the contempt for the human life of individual men and women, which makes their aspiration to power a brutal and horrible aspiration, destructive of every human decency, of every human basis for a common life. The principal evil Nazism has done—an evil far greater than the nazi bombing of undefended cities and the nazi strafing of unprotected civilians—is the nazi destruction in millions of young German minds, and in the minds of other millions in other countries who are susceptible to the nazi infection, of belief in humanity, of respect for man. Mr. Roosevelt was profoundly right when he told the Congress last January that "The issue of this war is the basic issue between those who believe in mankind and those who do not—the ancient issue between those who put their faith in the people and those who put their faith in dictators and tyrants."

That *is* the issue. It is an issue, moreover—and this is our great good fortune if we wish to use it—which the outcome of this war can go a great way to adjudicate. Had our enemies won, they would have employed every means at their disposal to drive home the corollary that governments which put their trust in the people, governments which represent the people, governments which are the people, cannot survive in competition with governments which govern the people, governments which "discipline" the people—governments, in brief, which despise the people. Now that it is apparent that our enemies will not win, we can, if we please, drive home the very different lesson which our victory can be made to demonstrate. We can make it clear to the whole world, and not to the Nazis and the Japanese alone, that the people won this war against the despisers of the people—that the people's governments and the people's armies were more powerful, and always will be, than the armies of the slave states and the tyrant dominions—that belief in the people is a strength not to be gainsaid, and contempt for the people an inevitable and a fatal weakness—that those who live by contempt for the people will die by contempt for the people—that it is the people and not the enemies of the people to whom the future really belongs.

We *can* do this. But we can do it only if we mean to do it. It will not follow automatically from our military victory alone, however overwhelming our military victory may be. It will not be accomplished by any application of the simple smoking-room proposition that "this time we will march to Berlin." Where we march is less important than the way we march there. We can only prove that our victory is a victory for the people by making it a victory for the people. And words will not supply the proof though words will help. There should be words now—there should have been words before now—declaring again and again that this is no longer a war of resisting nations against aggressor nations—that this is a war now of the people's governments against the tyrant governments, of the people's armies against the slave armies, of the people's belief in themselves against the Fascists' contempt for the people—that what is at stake in this war is a great principle, the principle won in the people's revolutions of the past one

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hundred and fifty years, the principle that the people can govern themselves and of right should. There ought to be words to say not once but many times that this war is a war fought in vindication of the principle of those revolutions and to secure the gains they won and to extend them.

But words alone will not do what must be done. There must be action also. And the acts must accord with the words. The acts must demonstrate that the allied governments are in truth the people's governments, that our armies are in fact the people's armies, and that the principle for which we fight is indeed the principle of the defense and vindication and extension of the people's revolutions of 1775 and 1789 and 1824 and 1848 and the people's years thereafter. For if our words declare, and if our actions demonstrate, that this war is a people's war in vindication of the people's revolutions, then our victory in this war will become what it must become if the war is to be ended and so won. It will become the final and unanswerable proof that the philosophy of our enemies—the philosophy of contempt and cynicism—is itself contemptible and false.

It will become not a military victory alone but a victory in the more enduring world of principle. It will become a victory which not only disarms our enemies, but discredits what they practiced and believed.

To define our victory in these terms, before our victory shall be half won and so irreparably lost, is the desperate necessity of these autumn months.

The Plague of Defeatists in Germany

THE increasing unrest on the German home front, owing to the continuing military setbacks and the intensification of the aerial offensive, is stressed by a growing number of unbiased observers. A revealing picture of actual conditions in Germany is to be found in the latest bulletin of the International Federation of Trade Unions, London. This cites a number of examples demonstrating how far the weakening of the home front has by now gone. The following warning, published in all German newspapers, indicates the enormous shift in public opinion:

> All people who are intolerant and speak to find fault with everything, sin against the community. As long as they act out of foolishness, we must check them. But if it is done deliberately, they must die on the block.

In fact, the number of executions of "defeatists" announced in the daily press has become extraordinary.

> In the Ruhr, a number of grave disturbances and strikes have broken out, which were only aggravated by the transport to the East of materials, equipment, machinery and man-power. In spite of the official veto, workers, in some cases with their families, have fled to other, less vulnerable areas, or they have declined to work on the night shifts. . . . Quite clearly, a planned movement, working on a prearranged system, lay at the bottom of all this activity. Extensive inquiries by the Gestapo have failed to reveal either the persons organizing it or their means of communication. As a deterrent, 180 hostages, including foreign conscript workers, were shot. Grave disturbances of the peace took place, too, in Munich, in the course of demonstrations against the war and against the Nazis. Some Gestapo informers were murdered. The centre of the disturbances was the University. A fairly large number of students and professors was taken into custody, and was to have been publicly executed; but in view of the tense state of public opinion, this was not done, and the executions took place in complete privacy.
>
> This all happened before Italy's surrender.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Whose table earth, Whose dice were human bones"

Byron

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Mathematics of Death

BY ATWOOD H. TOWNSEND

PERHAPS the most dangerous dynamite ever exposed by the Gallup Poll was reported in the *New York Times* of August 22, 1943. The headlines tell the story:

U. S. VOTERS SEEN COOL TO REFORMS

58% Want Pre-War Conditions to Prevail in Peacetime

SHARP CONTRAST ABROAD

57% in England Call for a Sweeping Change in National Life

Allowing for about 10 per cent who were "undecided," this means that Britishers stand nearly two to one for reform while Americans are two to one against it. Most of us, it appears, are smugly satisfied with our world as it has been, complete with depressions and mass unemployment, with corruption and graft in politics and business, with one-third of our nation ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, with a generous allotment to the poor of disease and death. Our Allies, however, are definitely not satisfied with the world as it has been. They want something much better and they intend to get it.

Recent elections in Canada and Australia have swung sharply to the left. Still further toward the radical left, according to various reports, is public opinion in most of the Nazi-occupied countries of Europe, many of which even before 1939 had coalition governments with strong socialist participation. Further to the left is our most important and most effective ally, the Soviet Union. But we Americans, judging by Congress and this Gallup Poll, are marching rapidly in the opposite direction—toward the reactionary right. This direct opposition between ourselves and our Allies is dynamite of the utmost explosiveness, capable of destroying utterly any hope of a decent postwar settlement.

To label the average American citizen who voted against reform as deliberately "reactionary" or "fascist" would be unfair and inaccurate. Rather our people are uninformed, handicapped by sheer ignorance about the hard facts of the world in which we live. Somehow, and quickly, we must learn these basic facts, turn about-face, and join the march of Western civilization toward the better world of tomorrow or else—.

Most basic of all the facts of life is death. Somehow, and quickly, we Americans must learn that, when we declare ourselves satisfied with the world as it was in 1939, we imply approval and support for the murder of millions of innocent people every normal peacetime year. To see why World War II is a people's revolution for a radically better tomorrow, let us consider the prophecy of St. John:

> And I heard a voice in the midst of the four beasts say, a measure of wheat for a penny. . . . And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat upon him was Death, and Hell followed with him. And power was given unto them. . . . to kill with sword and with hunger.

In this Year of Our Lord, 1943, Death and Hell are again riding roughshod over the children of men, slaying with sword and with hunger but chiefly with hunger. The present war has been killing soldiers at about the same rate as the first World War, something like two million a year, making a total of eight to ten million for World War I and about the same total for the first four years of World War II. War-caused hunger, however, which took some ten million civilian lives in the period 1914-1919, has killed at least twenty-five million civilians since 1939, or about six million each year, mostly composed of Chinese,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian, and Jewish women and children.

These are huge and frightful totals, but they need to be considered in relation to the "normal" peacetime balance-sheet of life and death. Each year about forty-one million souls leave this planet and a somewhat larger number arrive. Of these deaths, more than twenty million each year are quite unnecessary, and will be prevented as soon as modern civilization (including enough to eat) reaches everywhere, even into such black areas of ignorance and poverty as the slums of Washington and London.

In calmly scientific language, Merrill K. Bennett stated two years ago in the *Geographical Review*, "About three-fourths of the world's population probably subsists on diets qualitatively inadequate." One of the official conclusions reached by 360 delegates from forty-four nations (tentatively "United") at the recent Food Conference at Hot Springs was "that there was a close connection between many prevalent diseases and deficiency in diets" and that this was particularly effective "in maintaining child-mortality rates at a high level." Such is the decorously diplomatic way of saying that poverty causes starvation, which causes death, especially of little children. Either the present war has no meaning whatsoever, except as a squabble between two packs of wolves to decide which shall eat the sheep; or else it is, as Vice-President Wallace has declared, a crucial battle in the long revolutionary struggle of the common man to secure life, liberty, and a chance for happiness.

Modern science and mass-production techniques make possible a new abundance that can guarantee freedom from want everywhere in the world, and with it the other freedoms dependent on economic security. But freedom from want is still denied to most people in underprivileged nations and to many in supposedly privileged nations. Even in the United States, millions of families are still ill-fed, ill-clad, and ill-housed.

Behind the present war lies a struggle between two philosophies: between generosity and selfishness, between the Golden Rule and the Rule of Gold, between "do-good-ers" and "me-first-ers." This conflict can be expressed mathematically as a war between two formulas: between the new *opportunity of plenty for all*, and the old evil of plenty for a few based on hunger for the many.

The formula for abundance is simple and utterly logical:

$$B \times F = L.$$

This means that all Babies everywhere, given sufficient Food and other necessities, can expect a normal Life of health and happiness. This is the formula of Christianity—doing good unto the needy. This is also the formula of democracy, "of the people, by the people, for the people"—but especially "for the people." Wherever democracy is really working, as in Switzerland, Scandinavia, Australia, New Zealand, the people are well-fed, well-clad, and well-housed by their own co-operative action. Because human nature is imperfect, the formula for abundance can never be made to operate with 100 per cent efficiency, but it can be more and more closely approximated. Since many kinds of special privilege are deeply entrenched, it will take years, perhaps generations, to work our way from the organized hunger of today to the planned abundance of tomorrow. But it can be done, if we decide to do it.

Opposed to the "do-good" pattern for abundance is the "me-first" formula whereby the selfish devour their victims:

$$B \times (F - \$) = L - \$.$$

In this, "B" stands for Babies, "F" for Food (or freedom from want), "$" for Special Privilege, and "L" for Life. Under this formula, the number of babies who can hope to live in health and happiness is reduced by the amount of food deducted to maintain privileges for a few. It is the formula of concentrated wealth and power and privilege, the formula of fascism.

Powerful forces within our nation are fighting the idea of planned abundance, labeling it "communism" and "bureaucratic regimentation" and "starry-eyed dreaming." Because Vice-President Wallace and Wendell Willkie favor planning a better world, they are ridiculed as "impractical idealists" and "crazy altruists." Wallace's concept that our economic system can be so well organized that babies will get enough milk to keep them alive has been called "globaloney." There is even an organized campaign to discredit the Four Freedoms, claim-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing that "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" are impossible dreams and dangerous delusions, that want and fear are desirable and necessary stimuli to that holiest of virtues, "me-first" individual enterprise.

Mass-murder by hunger is a well-established technique. The Japanese have been using it with callous cruelty in occupied China and Korea. The Germans are using it scientifically to reduce the number of Jews, Poles, French, Greeks, and Russians. The South African Boers use it to control their Negroes, the Bantus. For two hundred years many Englishmen have lived comfortably and long because many more Hindus lived poorly and briefly. The final dividend of racial privilege—whether in Warsaw, Singapore, or Harlem—is early death for the underdog.

Nearly every law, tax, tariff, franchise, subsidy, government contract, judicial decision, or administrative regulation arrives at the same final result: that certain cash values must be paid by one group to another, usually by a politically weak group to a few with legalized privileges. Since money means food, and food means life or death, political arguments have always been concerned, directly or indirectly, with the same question: Who shall murder whom? Only in the future, when democratic planning releases the abundance made possible by science, will politics no longer be a way of legalizing homicide.

International politics has always dealt with life and death in wholesale lots—occasionally by war, usually by quieter but more effective techniques such as tariffs, quotas, cartels, loans, concessions, treaty-ports. Every international relationship has brought either benefit or harm to one or more of the nations involved. For instance, during the long armistice between the wars our high tariffs helped to strangle world trade; as a direct result of this strangulation, countless people in many countries (including our own) had less to eat, grew sickly, and died.

National politics also deals in life and death. We saw this clearly during the depression, when federal relief measures transferred billions of dollars worth of food from those able to pay taxes to those who had nothing but empty bellies.

That local politics deals with the legalization of mass-murder, or its prevention, becomes sharply apparent in public health matters. Modern medical science knows how to eliminate some diseases completely and how to reduce others to a minimum, but as yet only a small fraction of our population is fully protected from needless death.

Let us measure as well as we can the mathematics of mass-murder in our own nation. In 1939 the death rate in the United States, whites and blacks together, was 10.6 per thousand. This rate is lower than that of most countries, as is to be expected of the richest nation in the world. It is not the lowest rate in the world, however—as it could be if we so decided. Several nations with resources poorer than our own take better care of their citizens' lives. The League of Nations *Yearbook* for 1931 cites some illuminating figures:

Australia	9.9	Uruguay	9.1
New Zealand	9.8	Netherlands	8.6
Iceland	9.7	Jews in Palestine	7.7
Canada	9.6	Hawaii	7.5

People live longer in such countries, not because of special advantages in climate, but simply because they have less extreme poverty and better health services. They have voted to keep alive a percentage of their fellow-citizens whom we now permit to die. Surely there is no physical reason why Americans could not be as healthy as Hollanders. Our death-rate is 10.6; theirs is 8.6. We are now condemning to needless death two out of every thousand of our citizens each year.

Two deaths per thousand of our population amount to 275,000 unnecessary deaths each year in the United States.

During nineteen months of World War I the Germans killed 53,407 Americans, or 34,000 per year. During the first eighteen months of World War II the Japanese, the Germans, and the Italians together killed only 16,556 Americans, or 11,000 per year. Meanwhile, in peace or in war, we Americans go on permitting 275,000 Americans to die each year, 23,000 each month, 770 each day. These fellow-citizens must die partly because a few enjoy special privileges but chiefly because most of us have been so blindly proud of the American way of life that we have not bothered to keep our neighbors alive.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Death Rates and Annual

Death rates are for 1936 as given in the League of Nations "Handbook" for 1941.

Annual incomes per capita for the decade 1925-34 (stated in purchasing value of 1929 dollars) are

Rich Areas: United States and the British Commonwealths

	Death rate	*Per capita income*
United States	10.9	$516
Great Britain	12.0	465
Canada	9.7	464
Australia	9.5	367
Average	**10.5**	**$453**

Total population, including New Zealand and Ireland, **198 million**

Average expectation of life at birth, 48 years

Prosperous Areas: Western Europe and Latin America

	Death rate	*Per capita income*
Germany	11.8	$261
Sweden	11.7	260
Chile	24.4	222
Italy	13.9	124
Average	**15.5**	**$217**

252 million in continental Europe, from Finland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria westward; 127 million in Central and South America and the West Indies. **Total population, 379 million**

Average expectation of life at birth, 31 years

So much for the mathematics of murder within the United States. Now let us attempt to measure the volume of unnecessary death throughout the world. Table I —"Death Rates and Annual Incomes by Economic Areas"—presents the basic data. Table II—"Per-Family and Per-Person Incomes on Different Social Levels"—translates the data into terms which can be compared with the familiar details of your own family budget.

First, please note that the rather modest kind of civilized living to be had for $3600 a year, or $75 per week, is restricted to a rather thin uppercrust, to the 66 million people in the top third of the richest tenth of the world. If you are on or above this level, you are among the wealthiest 3 per cent of the 2,098 million people on this planet.

Second, families with incomes averaging $17 to $35 per week form the middle third

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Incomes by Economic Areas

taken from Colin Clark, "The Conditions of Economic Progress."

For each of the economic areas, data are given on four representative nations.

Poor Areas: Eastern Europe, Russia, Japan, and Moslem Countries

	Death rate	*Per capita income*
Egypt	26.4	$139
Japan	16.0	116
Poland	14.0	100
Rumania	21.0	78
Average	**19.4**	**$108**

82 million in Poland and the Balkans; 179 million in the Soviet Union and the Baltic States; 70 million in Japan; 87 million in the Moslem countries from Morocco to Afghanistan. **Total population, 418 million**

Average expectation of life at birth, 26 years

Hungry Areas: China, India, East Indies, and Black Africa

	Death rate	*Per capita income*
Philippines	17.1	$150
Korea	18.9	50
India	23.6	40
Straits Settlements	25.1	36
Average	**22.7**	**$ 69**

480 million in China; 386 million in India; 121 million in the East Indies from Thailand to the Philippines; 116 million in Black Africa. **Total population, 1,103 million**

Average expectation of life at birth, 22 years

in the Anglo-American countries and the top thirds in the "prosperous" and "poor" areas—that is, in all of Europe, Russia, Japan, North Africa, and Latin America. These 331 million people, 16 per cent of the whole, must content themselves with such simple food and minor extravagances as can be budgeted on about one dollar per day per person.

Third, 33 per cent of the world's population must live on per-family earnings of $6.50 to $11 per week—per-person spendings of 22 to 53 cents a day. On this poverty level are the bottom third in our own country and in the British Commonwealth, the middle thirds in the "poor" and "prosperous" areas, and the top third in the "hungry" Far East. Nearly all of these 699 million people must be more or less hungry nearly all of the time.

Note that the depressed third of our proud Anglo-American culture has been

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

living on a level even lower than the top third of the backward Orient. Neither in the United States nor in England will a quarter a day per person keep the doctor away—or the undertaker.

Finally, one billion people—48 per cent of mankind (the bottom third in Europe and Latin America, the lower two thirds in Asia and Africa)—must survive as long as they can on starvation incomes ranging from 14 cents a person a day down to 4 cents. It is said that life is cheap in the Orient; it might more accurately be said that death is cheap.

The actual money cost of life itself can be suggested by comparing income and life expectancy in rich and hungry areas:

	Income Per Capita	Life Expectancy
Rich Areas	$453	48 years
Hungry Areas	69	22 years
Difference	$384	26 years

A trifle more than a dollar a day will more than double the life-span of a human being; the price for each added year of life amounts to about $15 additional annual income. In 1943 the United States will spend nearly $100 billion for the waste and destruction of war. If after the war the United States and Great Britain each gave only $20 billion a year for five years to the hungry areas of Asia and Africa, that would amount to $200 billion worth of food and supplies. This could add fourteen years of life, on the average, to a billion people.

Isn't it odd that we readily spend billions to manufacture murder yet hesitate to appropriate money to give life to the starving? Isn't it probable that, if we and the British had been less complacently selfish before 1939, there would have been no war? Isn't it certain that, if we are not more generous and co-operative in our policies in years to come, there will be other wars?

Let us now compute the total of preventable death throughout the world, taking the Netherlands death rate of 8.6 per thousand as a standard attainable by all areas within a generation or less. (Public health experts tell us that a death rate of 7.0, or life expectancy of 70 years, is theoretically attainable with a 100 per cent use of present-day medical science.) The "needless death rate" for each area is figured as the extent to which its death rate exceeds that of the Netherlands. Here are the data:

Each year 23,000,000 individuals are murdered by hunger and preventable disease. During the thirty years from 1913 through 1942 there were 690,000,000 needless deaths.

Some of the worst blots on the map today are areas where the partial and unplanned introduction of modern science (under the control of business interests) has had the effect of considerably reducing the average standard of living. Nations which were definitely prosperous a generation or a century ago, with agriculture and industry on a handicraft basis and with populations relatively stable, have recently become poverty-stricken because our machine industry has taken away much of their livelihood while our medical science, even imperfectly applied, has rapidly increased their populations. Result: more bellies to fill with less food; final result: needless death for millions. In varying ways and degrees this is what we have done to India, to China, and to Puerto Rico on our own doorstep. Each is considerably poorer than it used to be, and very much poorer than it could be.

Don't jump to the conclusion that there are too many people in these "backward" lands, that the answer is birth control, or

	Needless Death Rate (per thousand)	Population (millions)	Needless Deaths Each Year
Rich Areas	1.9	198	376,200
Prosperous Areas	6.9	379	2,615,100
Poor Areas	10.8	418	4,514,400
Hungry Areas	14.1	1,103	15,552,300
Annual Total			23,058,000

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Per-Person and Per-Family Incomes on Different Social Levels (1925-34)

In most countries, as in the United States, the division of the national income gives about eight per-capita incomes to each family in the top third of the nation, three per-capita incomes to each family in the middle third, and one per-capita income to each family in the bottom third.

Average families are assumed to include four persons. Since larger families are usually on the lower economic levels and vice versa, bottom-third families are figured as five persons, top-third families as three persons.

	Annual Family Income			Daily Income Per Person		
	upper third	middle third	bottom third	upper third	middle third	bottom third
Rich Areas	$3624	$1359	$453	$3.31	93¢	25¢
Prosperous Areas	1736	651	217	1.51	45¢	12¢
Poor Areas	864	324	108	79¢	22¢	6¢
Hungry Areas	552	207	69	53¢	14¢	4¢

These figures are not precise measurements but rather the best estimates possible with available data. They are probably accurate within 10 per cent for the upper brackets but the margin of error may be as great as 30 per cent in the lower brackets.

All figures are in terms of actual purchasing power (of United States dollars in 1929).

that starvation is God's way of keeping populations down. Rather we must expect that, as soon as these retarded areas get the *full* benefit of modern science, their populations will increase greatly while their standards of living rapidly rise. This is what happened in Western Europe and the Americas between 1812 and 1914 and in Eastern Europe and Russia between 1919 and 1939. After World War II, modern civilization must begin to happen everywhere in the world.

Finally, let us make the best guess we can as to the actual causes of the 41,000,000 deaths on this planet each average year (1913-1942):

Probably Not Preventable—18,000,000
Inherited physical defects 1,000,000
Diseases and epidemics 8,000,000
Old age—through cancer, heart failure, hardening of the arteries, nephritis, etc. 9,000,000

Mostly or Entirely Preventable—23,000,000
War, men in armed forces killed . 700,000
Accidents, on the job, in the streets, and at home 2,300,000
Starvation in backward areas which have resisted or escaped civilization: Tibet, Upper Amazon, Congo region, New Guinea, Eskimo lands, etc. 4,000,000
Starvation caused directly by commercial exploitation and by dog-in-the-manger privilege (including local priests and rajahs) 6,000,000
Starvation resulting from the partial, faulty, and unplanned impact of modern science upon mankind, and from our failure to distribute the benefits of our civilization equally 10,000,000

Such are the mathematics of death. Certain conclusions follow inevitably from these data:

1) *Customary cruelties of peace kill many more than occasional atrocities of war.* Within one generation, needless deaths took over 8,000,000 Americans, mostly women and children—more than a hundred times the 70,000 men killed (to July 1943) in two great wars. From the whole earth during the same generation,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the "normal" poverty of peacetime took 690,000,000 souls, more than twelve times the human cost—55,000,000 lives—of World War I and World War II. Death is as horrible in peace as in war, killing mostly young people, with suffering just as sharp. If anything, death in war is more merciful, because usually quick and painless. Hitler is kinder to the Jews he kills quickly than we are to the share-croppers we starve slowly.

2) *Hunger is the chief means of mass-murder.* Tabulations of vital statistics attribute deaths to various diseases, but the real cause of most preventable death is simply physical weakness due to lack of proper food—and this is usually due to lack of earnings.

3) *Democratic planning can prevent most needless deaths.* The low death rates prevailing in Australia, Iceland, Uruguay, and the Netherlands were planned and voted and consciously put into effect. Great Britain's war experience is perhaps even more striking. Despite battle losses, bombings, and food shortages, Britain saved more lives at home last year than she lost by enemy action. Rationing, socialized medicine, improved labor conditions, day nurseries, and other measures have raised living standards for British workers so that they eat better and live longer. In pre-war 1938-39 the death rate for England and Wales stood at 11.9; in the blitz years, 1940-41, it climbed to 13.5; then in 1942 it was pushed down to 11.6.

Planned economy under democratic control is the hope of the future. Under it, proposals can be judged, not by propaganda labels and political slogans, but by the acid test of what they actually accomplish for good or evil. Any measure that taxes the hungry many to support the upper-bracket few will surely be counted as evil. Almost any measure that takes from overstuffed bank-balances to give food to empty bellies will be counted as good.

4) *To do nothing is to do deliberate murder.* We are all responsible for killing our fellow-men, not because we voted that such and such people must die, but because we failed so to cast our votes that they could remain alive. Like Cain, we have said, "Am I my brother's keeper?" Unlike the Good Samaritan, we have turned our eyes away from the victim by the roadside.

Out of World War II will come one of two things: either the "do-good-ers" will plan and build a world order of peace and justice—feeding the hungry, healing the sick, bringing long life and happiness to all men everywhere; or else the "me-first-ers," glorifying dog-eat-dog and man-eat-man as the highest virtue, will fight to retain their privileges, with the mathematically certain result that new cruelties and new wars will follow. If we want peaceful prosperity, we must pay for it with generosity. If we want starvation and slaughter, we can buy them with selfishness. Now as always it is true that "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." Two thousand years ago it was told us by Jesus of Nazareth:

> Give, and it shall be given unto you: good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again.

Shall we continue to measure out murder? Or shall we plan abundance, shaken together and running over?

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Where is China going?

By
LI YU YING

AT a time when many sincere friends of China and of her collaboration with the Western world after the war are very much concerned about the impediments in the path of her democratic evolution, we are happy to present the optimistic and highly encouraging words of one of her greatest thinkers and statesmen, Professor Li Yu Ying.

Li Yu Ying can speak for China with full authority. The scion of one of the country's noblest families and son of the last Prime Minister of the Chinese Emperors, he went abroad at the age of twenty-two to work for the establishment of a democratic Chinese Republic. An intimate friend and collaborator of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, he was active in the national revolution and became one of the founding fathers of modern China.

During his entire life, Li has worked for close collaboration between China and the West. For many years, he headed the Chinese Delegation for International Intellectual Cooperation at the League of Nations. He became, to use his own words, a "citizen of China and of the world." But he has remained an immense moral power in China, respected and beloved by both the people and their political leaders.

THERE are a number of anxious rumors about China. I am not angry with those who launch the rumors, even when the rumors are unjust, because it is an essential principle of democracy to discuss the problems of friends frankly, and I am sure the Chinese people are one of the greatest friends the United States has. But some of the rumors are disquieting. It is being whispered that China might become nationalistic or imperialistic, that her government might balk at establishing a complete democracy. It is even said in a low voice that China might get out of the war and make some kind of unclean arrangement with Japan. I shall try to answer these rumors, because we must understand that in a world in which so many events occur with such suddenness, in which so many friendships have been betrayed, there is a sort of permanent anxiety and fear.

But first of all, may this writer be permitted to present his credentials to the readers and to tell them that he has decided to speak the truth, the truth at whatever cost. While I am Chinese, I have traveled for almost half a century throughout China and the world. Many countries, if not all, have become as dear to me as China. France, Great Britain, Russia, America, and Belgium—their peoples and their countries, their governments and their thinkers are well known to me. Together we have created many academic institutions in Asia, Europe, and America, with men of all countries and races, and I have learned from personal experience that there are in all peoples great qualities and great creative talent, and that there is no such thing as a superior people.

China should not be considered as an entity apart. In the final analysis, the attitude of her people and her government will depend upon that of other peoples and their governments. The freedom of the Chinese is dependent upon the freedom of the world. Things are not perfect in China, as they are not perfect anywhere, but I do believe in their perfectability if the necessary conditions obtain in the rest of the world. So far as the specific rumors mentioned above are concerned, all three are false. China is not going nationalistic or imperialistic unless the law of the jungle continues to dominate the post-war world. The philosophy of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Chinese Republic, has deeply penetrated all sectors of the Chinese people. Furthermore, the war has taught China the necessity for international democracy and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international co-operation. As to the Chinese government, I should like to quote a message that my friends and I received recently from Chiang Kai-shek. This message was sent on the occasion of the creation, in New York, of the American section of the Woo Chefee University. This university is now celebrating its twenty-fifth anniversay simultaneously with the eightieth birthday of its founder, the venerable Professor Woo Chefee, China's most famous scholar. Its newly-created American section is under the sponsorship of Free World, World Co-operation, and World Confederation. Chiang Kai-shek's message, written in classic Chinese rhymes and therefore very difficult to translate, reads as follows:

When great ideology prevails,
The world becomes one commonwealth,
Men evolve harmoniously
Toward world community.

This verse, representing the philosophy of the China of today, clearly expresses her humanitarian and universalistic aspirations. It may be useful to remember here that Chiang Kai-shek is Sun Yat-sen's successor as president of China's democratic party (Kuomintang) which has adopted democracy as its basic constitutional concept. So far as the third rumor is concerned, the Chinese people have proved sufficiently well in their six years of war that they will never give up the fight against aggression.

While these lines were being written, extremely important news arrived from China, news confirming the democratic orientation of the Chinese Republic. The first piece of news is that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has been elected President of the Chinese Republic. This election is a renewed expression of the Chinese people's resolve to fight the Axis until all-out victory is won. In electing Chiang-Kai-shek as President, the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Democratic party confirmed its determination to concentrate all the powers necessary for the continuance and intensification of the Chinese war effort.

The second piece of news is that the Central Executive Committee decided that, one year after the end of the war, a National Assembly should be summoned to adopt a constitution for the Chinese Republic. This is a great historical step taken toward the functioning of a democratic way of life in China. Apart from China's decision to resist Japanese aggression and her adherence to the United Nations, no step is of greater importance than this concrete measure, this implementation of the ideals of Sun Yat-Sen and of the Chinese Revolution.

And already more and more devices are being applied to secure a greater degree of participation in the decisions of the government on the part of the people of China. It is quite evident that during the war, while important sections of the national territory are under enemy control, it is difficult to call together a National Assembly; but the Central Executive Committee's announcement indicates that the Government and the Kuomintang party have decided not to delay any longer than necessary—even by one day—consultation with the entire people on the country's constitution.

The Central Executive Committee has also clearly indicated that with the adoption of the constitution there shall be complete freedom—without interference from government—for all parties, groups, and societies throughout China to organize. It has been expressly stated that the Kuomintang will not have, and does not want to have, any special privileges over other parties; that, on the contrary, it will participate freely with other political forces in the shaping of the destiny of China.

The historic decisions of the Central Executive Committee are important not alone for China. They will encourage the forces of democracy throughout Asia and the rest of the world. Furthermore, they are an indication that Chinese foreign policy will throw its entire weight behind the organization of a democratic world order.



PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



From "The Portrait Drawings of William Rothenstein" (The Viking Press).

THE DELIVERANCE OF TUNIS

By André Gide

PAGES FROM A DIARY

ay 7

EXPLOSIONS and fires everywhere on the outskirts of the city. I counted more than twenty. They are not caused by English and American planes; the Germans, hunted down, blow up their supplies before evacuating. It is their way of taking leave. Tragically the thick smoke darkens the sky.

Toward evening the fires become more and more numerous. Great black clouds hang over the city. Running through the incessant noise of the detonations there is, quite close, a strange and incomprehensible rattle of machine guns. Rain begins to fall. The highways crossing within sight of our terrace, so animated the past two days with the passing of armored cars, tanks, and vehicles of every kind, have suddenly become deserted; one is struck by the silence.

May 8

YESTERDAY, while I was writing these lines, the Allies were entering the city. That is what people were telling one another last night. Awakened this morning at dawn by a dull, indistinct noise; it was like the rumor of a river. I dress in haste and soon I see the first armored cars of the Allies which are acclaimed by people rushing from neighboring houses. One can still barely comprehend that what one has so long awaited has finally happened; that *they* have come; one does not yet dare believe it. Is it possible—with no more resistance, no more fighting than that? . . . It is over: they have come. But the astonishment is all the greater when it is learned from the first liberators to be questioned that these armored cars, these soldiers, belong to the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eighth Army, the very army believed held in check before Zaghouan; this glorious army that came from the Egyptian frontier, after sweeping through Libya and Tripoli and triumphing over the Mareth and Oued Akarit lines; this Army whose progress in the south of Tunisia we had followed from day to day. How could they have been the first to arrive—and where had they come from? It was miraculous. In our imagination Tunis had been freed and the city entered in many ways, but never in this way. I quickly close my bags and prepare to return to Roustan Avenue: there are no longer any reasons for hiding. All the hunted men of yesterday emerge today from the shadows. They embrace one another, laughing and weeping with joy. In this district, said to be almost exclusively inhabited by Italians, a French flag flies at nearly every window. Before leaving my hiding-place, I hastily shave my four-week beard and walk with my fellow-captives down to the street, into which they had not ventured for exactly six months. We make our way downtown in a delirium.

A curious fact: in this city where all languages were spoken, only French is heard today. The Italians are silent or remain in hiding, and one meets only an occasional Arab. In the proclamation of General Giraud posted on all walls, one sentence, vague and threatening, fills them with fear; their conscience is uneasy: is this vague threat directed at them?[1] They do not hide but, keeping their silence, they remain in the Arab city and take no part in the celebration. And so the swarming and shouting crowd is composed in great part (in certain districts almost entirely) of Jews. They all cry out, "Vive la France!" As soon as an armored car stops, a horde comes up to surround and besiege it; children climb in and sit beside the conquerors. And, as if by heaven's good will, all of yesterday's clouds have disappeared; the weather is splendid.

May 10 COULD note nothing yesterday. I run here and there, look up friends, mingle with the crowd. In the evening I am dropping with fatigue, and since the electricity is cut off, the Germans having blown up the *Centrale électrique* before their evacuation, I am unable to read and I go to bed at nightfall. The sky is flawless. One radiant day follows the other, the most beautiful I can ever remember, they could not be more beautiful; and never was the sky at night richer in stars. But the city remains under martial law, and eight o'clock curfew is enforced.

Following the Eighth, the First Army has made its appearance in the city, as well as French troops, Zouaves. It seems the Eighth Army outdistanced the First; after leaving Enfida (a part of their forces, however, was left as a blind before Zaghouan) they apparently took advantage of the costly breach at Mateur, made painfully, valiantly, and at great cost by the French infantry and American armored cars. All this will one day become known and I do not have to set down here what history will record.

The Germans were surprised by the suddenness of the last advance. The order to withdraw came as a blow, contrary to all their expectations. They were commanded to take with them only the absolute minimum and to destroy everything the newcomers might use, as well as their papers and souvenirs. There was a wild flight toward Cap Bon; but for many, retreat was cut off; as a result many prisoners were taken, but there were many who died fighting rather than surrender. A desperate stand was made at Hammam-Lif and during the entire morning of the eighth the rumble of cannon could be heard; finally this last island of resistance was wiped out by artillery bombardment.

Yesterday the whole victorious army was drunk. In little improvised shops, which sprang up everywhere, unscrupulous merchants sold out their stocks of adulterated liquor, all decent drinks having been carried off by the Germans. Toward evening trucks went around, picking up and bringing back to their quarters all the men who were no longer able to stand. Victory, coming to earth, soils its wings.

What a beautiful day. A kind of happiness floats lightly through the atmosphere. We take deep free breaths. The daily bread ration has just been raised from two to five hundred grams per person. Milk may once

[1] "As for those who gave their support to the enemy in his wretched work, they will be promptly and pitilessly punished. I formally promise this. There is no place among us for traitors."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more be had. With the prospect of abundant supplies and the ending of restrictions, reserves come out of closets, we open our canned food and venture to satisfy our hunger. Packages of American and English cigarettes rain down, and bars of excellent chocolate. Every meal becomes a feast. What a pity we cannot hear the Berlin, Rome, and French communiqués on the radio. How can this frightful reverse be announced? Official bulletins, as late as last night, maintained confidence and hope, spoke of nothing more than "operations of a local character." I was able to get hold of a copy of the *Tunis Journal* of May 7, of which only a few were printed before the presses were suddenly stopped, and in it I read, "Several Anglo-American attacks against the north and central sectors (*sic*) were repelled, the Berlin communiqué announces." Will they attempt once more to minimize the importance of their defeat, or proclaim a day of mourning as they did when Stalingrad was retaken.[1] In any case this reconquest of the whole African littoral will inevitably demoralize Germany. Already undermined by the Russian victories, it now doubtless senses the collapse of its hopes.

I keep as a cherished possession a stillborn number of *Die Case, Feldzeitung der deutschen Truppen in Afrika,* dated May 9.

y 13 A RADIANT day. . . . With the French window of my room opened wide (it opens onto a narrow balcony), I sleep under a field of stars. Retiring very early, I get up at daybreak. But my rest is somewhat disturbed by mosquitoes.

Day before yesterday, dined at the Ragus with Mme. Sparrow, Hope, and two English officers she brought, charming men whose names it pleases me to write down in memento: Captain Chadburne and Dr. Gidal, photographer of the Eighth Army. Complete and sympathetic understanding, in two languages, with both of them, on every literary matter we touch upon. Dr. Gidal speaks to me, with great perspicacity, of Stefan George, whom he values less highly than Rilke and for excellent reasons. The names of Kafka, Steinbeck, Faulkner, and Aldous Huxley come up for discussion.

The American auto which brings us home, a little before midnight, stops at the crossing where, on the seventh, the first British armored cars broke the final German resistance. The way is barred by an endless procession of trucks and armored cars filled with German prisoners being taken to Hammam-Lif where last night, before the surrender, there was a frightful battle. We get out of the auto to watch this fantastic parade and Gidal takes flashlight pictures of some of the vehicles, German prison vans. It is a case of the trapping of the would-be trapper. I am told that certain groups of prisoners were singing. And why not! Capture was the only hope of escaping from their nightmare and of seeing their families again. Others were said to have cried. I had thought that a greater number would kill themselves or fight to the death, in obedience to orders. The whole Italian army surrendered almost immediately; that surprised nobody. The German troops, in despair, their backs to the sea, without munitions, with no possibility of being re-enforced, of retreating, or of re-embarking, finally made up their minds to surrender. With Rommel gone, von Arnim became a prisoner.

The Berlin or Rome radio, to save face, may very well say that their armies fought to the last man, to the last cartridge, in a final heroic resistance. This would preserve their patriotic pride and honor, but it is not true. However surprising it may appear, the demand for "unconditional surrender" was almost immediately accepted. The fierce struggle at Hammam-Lif was the last battle; after it, all useless resistance ceased and von Arnim announced his surrender.

But, above all, let nothing I write here be taken to disparage the German troops. They gave evidence, until quite recently, of extraordinary endurance, discipline, and courage; and yielded only to superiority of armament and force of numbers. And at the end, doubtless, they gave in because of the suddenness of the attack, which transformed retreat into rout. It is only natural that von Arnim, seeing that all was irre-

[1] Germany is clever enough to pass this defeat off as a victory. "We could not have hoped for more, and we were certain, from the beginning, that we should have to give in to superiority of numbers. We counted on a month's resistance, and we held out for six: this exceeds all our expectations. The Allies congratulate themselves, but we are even more to be congratulated."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trievably lost, wished to avoid an inevitable massacre which could serve no purpose. The only fault I have to find is with the camouflage over the radio.

This African campaign, which was to have been triumphal and triumphant for the Axis, winds up with an enormous loss of men and matériel. Furthermore, confidence in the *Fuehrer,* as well as his self-confidence, will doubtless be badly shaken. On the other hand, the conquered people under the German yoke will draw from this immense reverse suffered by the oppressor, extraordinary encouragement to resistance. It may be taken as the first sign of a general collapse.

Ragu tried to convince me of the important role that I should play here, and which I alone, he says, am in a position to undertake. I believe he is mistaken both about me and about the influence that my voice might have. Even if I were less tired, I should not feel at all qualified for any sort of political activity whatsoever. Not only do I not see clearly enough into the interplay of incipient dissension; but also I am too uncertain in my own mind to propose any settlement presumably based on justice, and I could not speak out without betraying or forcing my thought. As to the struggle for which preparations are already being made, I cannot and will not take part in it. I fear that for quite a long time France will be bitterly divided, at least the liberated part. And I certainly do not see what "declaration" I could make that, if I am to remain sincere, would not be of a nature to displease all parties.

May

ON all sides one hears that the American troops fought admirably, quite as well as the English and French. The delays with which they might originally have been reproached were only temporary measures of prudence, necessitated by lack of munitions. They had to refrain from battle until they could be sure of carrying through to victory. The result dissipated any doubts that might have remained and proved the wisdom of delay. Hasty action would have risked everything.

—Translated by Albert Lippman



PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AN ECONOMY of ABUNDANCE

by Will Arnold Forster

THAT phrase, "an economy of abundance," heads one of the resolutions of the Hot Springs Conference. A similar phrase appears in the famous Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreements, which called for "agreed action . . . open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods."

I believe these declarations are a summary expression of a momentous change of thought. Now, for the first time in history, the great bulk of mankind is beginning to find leadership in the task of planning the use both of nature's resources and of men's capacity to satisfy the material needs of "all the men in all the lands." The present emphasis on an expansionist policy is a new thing. I need not remind American readers of the power of restrictionist ideas in the policy of the United States until recently; but it may be worth recalling the strength of such ideas here in Britain.

In 1919, a Government committee under Lord Cunliffe reported that the prime need was to cut down expenditure in every direction in order to pay off a lump of the National Debt. In 1922 the Geddes Committee reported in the same sense, the idea being that, when prosperity declined and many people became unemployed, the prudent course was not to spend more but less. Where in a time of depression, it was argued, shall we find the money for paying men to work. And so, of course, still more men were thrown out of work. In 1931, the second Labor Government in this country was wrecked because some of its members could not agree with the recommendation of a Government committee, the May Committee, that our democracy was in danger of "shipwreck on the hard rock of finance" if we went on financing part of unemployment benefits by Government borrowing. Consequently, in the name of economy, we allowed thousands of millions of pounds' worth of wealth to run to waste. It is estimated that in 1932 over 25,000,000 industrial workers throughout the world were unemployed. Between 1930 and 1934 the national incomes of the United States, Britain, and Germany lost, owing to the slump, some £22 thousand million—a sum nearly equal to the total cost of the first World War to all the belligerents put together. Certainly mankind has had a grim enough warning of the effects of restrictionism.

Today, it is becoming quite fashionable to say, as the Hot Springs Conference did, that "there must be expansion of the whole world economy to provide the purchasing power sufficient to maintain an adequate diet for all." The other day, the British Minister of Production, Mr. Lyttelton, in a criticism of what was lately orthodox economics, pointed out that the employment of about 230,000 people means, under present conditions in this country, a difference in the national income of about £100 million a year. We are beginning to break away from the conceptions that wrought so much ruin in the years between the wars. But it is not enough to say that an expansionist policy would be preferable. What do we actually mean? Here I can attempt only to set down the chapter headings for a discussion of this great question.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Expansion of Consumption

THE outstanding fact is that a vast proportion of consumers lack enough purchasing power to buy even the necessities for healthy living, let alone the amenities. The effective demand falls far short of actual need. As the Hot Springs Conference said, "the first cause of hunger and malnutrition is poverty." In Mr. Perkins' famous phrase, the pre-war world was "commodity rich but consumption poor." One task, then, is to redistribute the national income by means of taxation, to increase the purchasing power of the poorer consumers, and to supply certain essential goods and services free of cost or at low cost to the poorer consumers. There was a time when such policies were commonly denounced as humanitarianism run mad or "soaking the rich." Today, the Hot Springs Conference commends to all the Governments concerned:

> (a) Adequate social-security measures, such as family allowances, social insurance, and minimum wages;
>
> (b) Some form of direct action to make protective foods available free, or at low prices, to groups with inadequate diets;
>
> (c) Special attention to assisting such groups as pregnant women, nursing mothers, infants, children, aged persons, invalids, and low-paid persons.

It is being recognized, for instance, that putting milk into babies is not just a random splash of philanthrophy but a well-judged investment in good life.

Next, much can be done to reduce the gap between the price the producer must properly charge and the price the consumer must pay. Excessive costs of production can and should be squeezed out. In 1924 the Linlithgow Committee in Britain, reporting to the Ministry of Agriculture on the distribution and prices of agricultural produce, declared that "our investigations have led us to the conclusion that the spread between producers' and consumers' prices is unjustifiably wide. Taken as a whole, distributive costs are a far heavier burden than society will permanently consent to bear." That was in 1924; but in 1938, according to the Ministry of Agriculture's estimate, the wholesale value of the food and feeding-stuffs consumed in England and Wales was about £650 million but the consumers paid £1500 million —more than 2¼ times as much! Surely the distributors raked off an excessive toll. Look at the enormous amount of sterile expenditure on advertisement and showy *salesmanship. It is estimated that £5 mil*lion were spent in Britain in 1936, on press advertising alone, for patent medicines, toilet requisites, and soaps. The producers did not pay that bill; it was all a charge on the consumer.

During this war, the British State has organized the production of "utility" goods, including clothes, furniture, towels, etc., in order to narrow the gap between the consumer's pocket and the producer's price. With costs supervised and production rationalized, prices have in many cases been enormously reduced, with no loss of quality other than that imposed by war conditions.

Finally, there is the toll taken by the idle shareholder. When all producers have been properly paid, and all middlemen whose service is really essential, payment must also be made for use of the capital invested in the manufacturing company. I cannot stop to discuss this huge question here; I merely ask whether the tribute-money the consumer pays to idle investors is not disproportionate to the service these investors now render the national economy?

In short, there are many ways whereby the gap between the consumer's pocket and the producer's price can be reduced, to the general advantage.

Expansion of Employment

NEXT, what can be done, nationally and internationally, to maintain "full employment"? Here again I can only set down the chapter heading, without attempting an adequate discussion. We assume that the State should be preparing plans now, during the war, for dealing with the enormous readjustment of labor and production during the post-war transition.

After that, two continuing tasks will remain. The State will have to deal with "structural" unemployment, resulting from such causes as change of demand; and here unemployment insurance is part of the answer. The State will also have to deal with "cyclical" unemployment, resulting from

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the trade cycle (which we may hope will be less uncontrollable in future). When a depression threatens—i.e. when there is not enough spending—the State can encourage spending by a policy of cheap money. It can lend money cheaply or free of interest to local authorities for such purposes as housing. It can itself put in hand previously prepared plans for capital developments; and this increase of public expenditure, besides creating new assets (not all of which will show a direct economic return), will stimulate the expansion of private investment. Furthermore, if the State is to have adequate power to insure that the productive capacity of the community is fully used, and used to satisfy first needs first, it must extend its control over those industries which are the chief users of capital and of labor. But the controlling authority can do only part of the job; the State is a necessary regulator, but the State's problems will be unmanageable unless industry —including, of course, the trade unions— shows itself highly adjustable to new conditions in a quickly changing world.

To sum up, the community should use its resources to increase consumption by the poorer section of the community. Redundant costs of production and distribution should be squeezed out, thus narrowing the gap between producers' prices and the consumer's pocket. And the State, with other Governments, should take steps to maintain full employment—by increasing expenditure on capital works when a trade depression threatens.

Expansion of Production

THE world needs an immense expansion in the production of goods of almost every kind. In particular, as the Hot Springs Conference pointed out, "There has never been enough food for the health of all people." The Conference underlined the great fact that enough food for all can be produced, not immediately but soon. It emphasized that continued shortage "is justified neither by ignorance nor by the harshness of nature. Production of food must be greatly expanded; we now have knowledge of the means by which this can be done."

Will man's new power to achieve abundance be used; or shall we return to the economic anarchy that led to the burning of mountains of food in a hungry world? Unless the peoples of the world pay the price of economic order, we shall revert to what Mr. Attlee recently called "the artificial creation of scarcity."

I have already referred to expansion of consumption and later on I shall take up expansion of exchange. If we can deal effectively with these two issues, producers will have plenty of business on hand. But something must also be done to stabilize the price of primary products. You know only two well how wildly these have fluctuated in recent years, so that producers have been unable to plan their output with confidence. The League of Nations, in its invaluable report (1943), "The Transition from War to Peace Economy," has summarized the facts as follows:

> During the last twenty years, the price of wheat and of jute has been halved three times within about twelve months, the price of cotton three times in periods of under eighteen months. The price of copper and of lead was halved four times within periods of two years and doubled three times even more rapidly. The price of zinc was halved twice in eighteen months, of tin twice in twenty-four months; zinc and lead doubled in price three times in two years or less; copper three times in eighteen months. On one occasion the price of coffee was halved in eight months, on another the price of sugar trebled in four months. Between 1920 and 1933, the price of crude rubber fluctuated between four cents a pound and twenty-five times that amount, and was on several occasions doubled or halved in the space of a few months.

These fluctuations were owing partly, of course, to weather, in the case of agricultural commodities; partly to changes in demand; partly to misjudgment or to gambling; partly to political causes such as trade barriers. But above all, the instability grew out of the lack of any adequate world organization to regulate the production and marketing of goods at prices which are reasonably stable and which are fair to both producer and consumer.

The Hot Springs Conference began the discussion of international buffer stocks. I think such stocks will prove a necessary and useful expedient, provided (as was empha-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sized at Hot Springs) they are used "to promote the expansion of an orderly world economy." In their management, "Effective representation of consumers as well as producers" must be guaranteed, and encouragement must be given to production—"from the most efficient sources of production at prices fair to both consumers and producers." But I do not believe that price control of itself will suffice to regulate production and consumption. Any scheme for buffer stocks should be coupled with national and international action to plan the world's production, based on a scientific assessment of the world's needs and of what each part of the world can best produce.

If production is to be expanded, agriculture must be reformed with the help of well-directed investment, technical education, and scientific measures to conserve the treasure of the earth. And behind all these technical issues, there lies a great political question. To whom should the land belong? I believe that, at the end of this war, we shall see a resumption of the great agrarian revolution that swept Eastern Europe after the last war. The peasants of many lands will presently shake off the arbitrary control over the land exercised by feudal and imperial masters. And one of the world's great problems will be to insure that this "new birth of freedom" does not carry with it an initial loss of efficiency and an actual reduction of output and standards of living.

One of the outstanding facts about the recent evolution of political opinion in England has been the growing recognition of the need for far-reaching change in the organization and control of our key industries if restriction is to be prevented, efficiency and enterprise insured, full employment maintained, and production directed to those goods which the community needs most. The Home Secretary, Mr. Herbert Morrison, in a speech last April said that "a substantial fraction of British industry" between the wars was "an industry comfortably dying on its feet and carrying with it into unemployment and decay a growing part of the creative energies of the nation as a whole." "Let us face the fact that monopolies such as I have described are restrictive in their very essence. That is their reason for existence. You will never alter their nature by patching and tinkering with them—their whole set-up and relation to the community must be profoundly altered." Mr. Henry Wallace has lately uttered a similar warning. If we want "an economy of abundance," we must face up to the fact that our key industries, in capitalist Britain and America, are now so organized that we shall get much needless restriction, much avoidable inefficiency and lack of enterprise, and much misdirection of production, unless the public interest is adequately represented in organization and distribution. I believe the community as a whole—consumers as well as producers—must acquire an effective voice in the planning of production if there is to be well-regulated employment and the full co-operation of all who are engaged in industry. In a recent statement of policy, the British Labor Party pointed out, "Wherever public interest is powerfully affected, there it should be powerfully protected." Are these words not a sound guide to the community in its efforts to transform monopoly capitalism?

Lastly, if we are to achieve an "economy of abundance," making full use of productive power, we shall have to insure that investment is regulated and directed to socially desirable ends. As the Food Conference put it, there must be "an orderly management of domestic and international investment." We shall have to see to it, for instance, that enough of that precious fertilizer, capital, flows to the backward, capital-starved lands; but in so doing we shall have to find means to safeguard the peoples of those lands from becoming victims of reckless exploitation.

To sum up. The community should take steps, nationally and internationally, to promote the confident production of primary products and by concerted action to prevent a wild fluctuation in prices. Agricultural production can be greatly improved by various means, many of which were indicated at Hot Springs. Public control of the key industries must be so developed as to insure protection for the community against unjustifiable restriction and against inefficiency and mis-direction of production. And there should be concerted action to direct the flow of capital and to prevent abuse of the lender's power.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Expansion of Exchange

CLEARLY, there will be no steady expansion of consumption or of production if we allow the routes of world commerce to be blocked, as they were blocked before the war, by a multitude of trade barriers arbitrarily imposed. The Mutual Aid Agreement calls for "expansion of exchange" and "reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers." That is no new prescription. President Wilson called for it, and for "equality of trade conditions," in the Third of his Fourteen Points. But that counsel was unavailing. The Peace Conference of 1919 never considered the matter; and despite recommendations from International Conferences that trade be made "freer and more equitable," trade barriers were never raised so fast or so high, discrimination was never so general. What was amiss?

For one thing, after the last war no provision was made for any orderly transition from war to peace. The effects of this failure are very clearly brought out in the League of Nations publication (1942), "Commercial Policy in the Inter-War Period." If nothing is done collectively to help the governments of newly-liberated or war-scarred countries to catch their breath, after the fight, and then to put their economic house in order, they will all be compelled to fend for themselves; and their desperate, unco-ordinated expedients will result in economic anarchy and the strangling of international trade. If it is "each for himself and the devil take the hindmost," the devil can make play with the lot —even with the United States.

Efforts, moreover, to reduce trade barriers were for the most part too general. No uniform injunction or formula, such as the all-round reduction of tariffs by a given percentage, could meet the diverse problems of the various countries.

And there was, of course, the crumbling of collective defenses against aggression. As the Food Conference justly said:

> (1) Freedom from want cannot be achieved without freedom from fear;
>
> (2) Policies of aggression and the fear of aggression have induced the uneconomic employment of human and material resources, the development of uneconomic industries, the imposition of barriers to international trade, the introduction of discriminatory trade practices, and the expenditure of huge sums on armaments.

It is an illusion to suppose we can achieve freedom from the consequences of autarchy if the nations which command preponderant power will undertake no commitment to contribute to the prevention of aggression. The history of the efforts to achieve economic disarmament between the wars affords bitter evidence of the futility of trying to divide politics into two watertight compartments, political and economic. A country that says it is interested in international collaboration in the economic and social sphere, but will take no part in political action to frustrate aggression or promote international justice, is doomed to find its intervention in the economic and social field ineffectual. And a country that really means to make itself ready for aggression will assuredly be deaf to any appeal to reduce those trade barriers and exchange controls which it has imposed as a war preparation.

There was a yet more fundamental cause for the failure—a cause we shall ignore at our peril: the economic nationalism which assumes that such functions as tariff-making are matters of purely domestic concern. In October 1918 Wilson was asked to explain how he interpreted the formula in the Fourteen Points about "equality of trade conditions." He replied: "No restriction upon the free determination by any nation of its own economic policy, but only that, whatever tariff any nation might deem necessary for its own economic service, be that tariff high or low, it should apply equally to all foreign nations." The belief that tariff-making was a matter of purely national concern was, of course, not confined to Wilson; it was generally held at that time. But, considering it dispassionately nowadays, would you not say it really makes nonsense of the policy of "equality of trade conditions" and saps the foundations of that confidence upon which any steady "expansion of exchange" must be built? For if each nation has unlimited freedom to impose trade barriers, without regard for the injury that may thereby be inflicted upon others, the weaker economic

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

units must be anxious, being in truth helplessly at the mercy of the mighty.

One of the great tasks immediately before us, in planning the advance toward a free world, is that of devising some acceptable means of limiting the absolute right of nations to be judge of their own cause in this respect.

Perhaps an International Agreement, stating certain principles and standards of economic behavior (The Hot Springs Conference has proposed this for certain purposes), should be drawn up and an international authority charged with the task of directing efforts to achieve the purposes of this agreement and of advising whether particular national measures conform to it. The signatories to the agreement should undertake to respect the injunctions laid down in their agreement *unless an exemption is authorized by the international authority*. There should perhaps be a right of appeal to some other authority.

Unless some standards of economic behavior are accepted, there can be no confident advance toward world order. But, whatever standards are prescribed, some allowance for exemption in special circumstances must be made; otherwise, governments would either refuse to accept the standards, or else would only subscribe to an agreement too limited to be of any value. The essential point is that departures from the broad agreed principles of economic behavior may on occasion be rendered necessary by unforeseen circumstances, but should not in any case be self-judged.

Essential to the recovery and expansion of international trade will be the creation of some kind of international currency such as is proposed in the Plans recently published. The establishment of an International Clearing Union could do much to enable the hard hit countries to restart the wheels of industry after the war.

The expansion of trade is interlocked with the question of eliminating discriminatory trade practices and securing certain standards of equality of access. Unless we succeed in expanding world trade, we shall fail to reduce discrimination. Governments do not impose exchange controls just for fun; and the world after the war will be hungry for one thing that will inevitably be in short supply—I mean the dollar. We cannot get away immediately from exchange controls; nor will it be a simple matter to undo Imperial Preference in the several empires, including the British, which practice it for one reason or another. But all these difficulties will be greatly ameliorated by the "expansion of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods."

Freedom from want can be achieved quite soon for all men in wealthy lands such as Britain and America; it can be achieved presently "for all the men in all the lands"; but it cannot be achieved unless those nations commanding great power will accept their fair share of the responsibility for protecting the world against lawless violence, and unless all nations learn to accept such restrictions upon their absolute freedom. We must, as the Atlantic Charter implied, build up a new kind of collective security—security against the arbitrary use of commerce-prevention as an instrument of national policy. And we must, we can, achieve "an economy of abundance" through "fullest collaboration between all the nations in the economic field."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



By C. BERADT

I AWOKE bathed in perspiration, my teeth clenched. Once again, as on countless previous nights, I had been hunted from pillar to post in a dream --shot at, tortured, scalped. But on this night, of all nights, the thought occurred to me that I might not be the only one among thousands upon thousands to be condemned to such dreams by the dictatorship. The things that filled my dreams must fill theirs, too—breathless flight across fields, hiding at the top of towers of dizzying height, cowering down below in graves, everywhere the Storm Troopers at my heels.

I began to ask people about their dreams.

"I had a dream," Mr. K., a factory owner, told me, "a dream of terror in which no shot was fired, no blood flowed. Goebbels came to my plant. He had the workers line up in two rows facing each other. I had to stand between them and lift my arm in the Hitler salute. It took me half an hour to get the arm up. Goebbels watched my efforts as though it were a spectacle, with neither approval nor disapproval. But when my arm was finally up, he said six words: 'I do not desire your salute,' and went to the door. I stood there in my own plant, amid my own people, my arm raised. Never in my life have I felt so humiliated. I stood there like that—until I woke up."

Mr. K., a man of proved courage and will power, trembled with agitation as he related the dream he had had weeks before. This dream was different. It was not born of fear of brute force. It had arisen simply from the pressure of the dictatorship upon the mind of this man. Were I to find many such dreams of mistreated souls, what a new and explicit proof against dictatorship they would furnish!

Since that night I have systematically collected the reports of dreams under dictatorship. I did not reveal my purpose in asking people for their dreams, for I wanted to avoid replies that were colored. As a matter of fact, it was not at all easy to get replies. Most people wished to forget their agonizing dreams; at any rate, they did not like to speak of them. Some I induced to talk against their own will, by relating dreams of my own or those of others. I wrote down every dream in detail.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Dream of Authorities, Laws, Injunctions

ABOVE all, it is the plethora of authorities and bureaus, of laws, prohibitions, and penalties, which gives rise to the most varied anxiety dreams in a dictatorship. One official, whose daily life was poisoned by fear of denunciation, invented in his dream an "Office for the Control of Telephone Conversations" that worked with subtle methods and proved that he had committed the crime of saying to his brother over the telephone: "I can no longer find pleasure in anything." He begged and pleaded to be forgiven this one time, not to be reported just this once, yet he knew deep inside that he was ruined. A small shopkeeper from Vienna dreamed that the lamp in the corner of his room suddenly began to talk, repeating to the police every sentence he had

ever uttered against the Government, every political joke he had told. He, too, regarded himself as ruined. A woman teacher of mathematics dreamed that it was forbidden on pain of death to write down anything having to do with mathematics. She fled to a disreputable tavern, and there, in mortal fear, among roaring drunks and half-naked girls, she wrote down a few equations that were important to her. A beautiful young woman dreamed that black signs had been erected at every street corner. They contained twenty words written in white letters, which the people were forbidden to pronounce. The words included biblical terms, such as "Lord." The last of the twenty words was "I." Another woman wandered about in her dream day and night, accompanied by her husband, passing through streets and houses without finding lodging, until at last a landlady proclaimed to her, in the form and with the gestures of an imprecation by the Eternal Jew:

> There comes a law: they shall dwell nowhere.
>
> To walk the streets thus, that shall be their life.

Shame Is Coupled with Fear

OFTEN agonizing shame is added to fear in dreams under the dictatorship. Thus a lawyer in whose life the ideal of bourgeois respectability had played a prominent part dreamed:

> There are two benches side by side in the park, an ordinary one and one that is painted yellow. Between them stands a wastebasket. After some hesitation I sit down on the wastebasket and fasten to my neck a sign reading: "If necessary, I shall make room for paper."

A young girl, facing examination as a nurse, dreamed night after night a timely variation of the well-known examination dream. She passed with a mark of "Excellent," and then listened with horror and shame as the examiner passed sentence of death on her in her professional career: "I shall let you flunk all the same, because you are a member of the Confessional Church." (Pastor Niemoeller's church.) Another young girl heard almost every night the voice of her landlady saying words that struck her like the blows of an ax: "My roomers steal like Jehovah's Witnesses." (A religious sect to which the dreamer adhered fanatically.) Deeply hurt, she hoped each time that it was only a slip of the tongue, that the woman would correct herself and say "like magpies," but each time she was disappointed.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A writer who had been in difficulties with the Chamber of Culture (to which he had to belong in order to be allowed to publish his works) dreamed that he had been invited for a few days to the house of one of his best friends, in a little town a few hours away by train. Upon his arrival, a party was given in his honor, the host delivering a speech paying tribute to him and vowing unswerving friendship. Suddenly a neighbor appeared and gave a hint to the host. Parties, she said, were hardly in keeping with the government line—and inviting unreliable elements on top of that, well. . . . Instantly, he was chased from the house, his host not even taking time to tell him about train connections. He stood there on the highway at night in the rain, establishing by his wrist watch that his friend's change of heart had taken just ten minutes. And the humiliating situation was aggravated by his sense of shame for his friend, whom he had loved all his life.

Similarly an old lady, a devout Protestant, mingled shame on behalf of the German people with her own humiliation. She dreamed that she fainted at one of Berlin's busiest corners. None of the hundreds of people who passed by troubled to help her up—none even turned around to look at her. " 'How do these people know that they *must* let me lie, because I believe in my Lord Jesus Christ?' I ponder frantically in my dream. I do not feel easier until I notice that at least the person closest to me, a newspaper vendor, is sitting paralyzed in her wheel chair and thus cannot hasten to my aid."

Not only the method but the ideology of dictatorship, too, gives rise to anxiety dreams of all kinds. Thus, the theory of the superiority of the fair-haired race seeks its victims among the dark-haired. Or, people are wrenched from the population group of which they feel themselves a part and are at random pressed into some other. They respond by making the "group" concept the *idée fixe* of their dreams. One man went to such extremes that in his dreams he no longer spoke alone but only in chorus. But these dreams, typical as they are, are too complicated to be reported here.

Dreams of Underground Workers

THE dreams recounted above have one common characteristic. The principals all suffer without taking any action. The thought of offering opposition does not occur to them—fear is too deeply ingrained. But another man, active in the Underground struggle against the dictatorship, had dreams of a different nature: he went into action, put up a fight. In the first part of his long-drawn-out dream, hectographed handbills, discovery, hours in which he is gripped by fear, play a role. In the second part of the dream, the Gestapo is already coming up the stairs; he locks the doors, but the locks fall off; then he escapes through the window. In the third part, while he is fleeing, he notices two men in front of a famous café, the one whispering to the other, "We must protest." He steps between them, places his hands on their shoulders, and shouts into the café, "We protest." Then he rushes on, dragging the two men along. At the end of the dream all three run side by side, in step, calling out aloud in unison, "We protest."

Another to resort to action in dreams was the wife of a man whose Underground activities had been discovered and who had escaped across the border. In every one of her dreams her husband returned to continue his work, was recognized, and put under arrest. One night she dreamed that he had returned disguised as a German soldier: "I was afraid that he would not behave correctly, since he was unfamiliar with army details. I rushed to some barracks to get hold of the printed service regulations in some way. I wanted to sew sergeant's stripes to the collar of his uniform so that privates would have to salute him first and he would not make himself conspicuous by giving the wrong salute."

This dream, however, soon shifted back from the realm of action into that of suffering; the man was arrested and the woman led into a cellar that resembled a crematory. Built into the wall was a compartment that held the man and bore the inscription, "Forty-seven cubic inches, temperature 167 degrees."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dreams that Anticipate the Future

ANXIETY dreams anticipating the future—this particular brand of dream is reserved for the Jews as the most cruelly persecuted population group. An aged woman of about seventy dreamed: "My husband and I had emigrated to a faraway place. We were quite alone; we had no one to help us. 'Why not draw some money from the savings bank?' I say to my husband. 'We haven't any left,' he replies. 'Well, get some money from the bank.' 'We haven't any left.' 'Take some from the safe-deposit box.' 'We haven't any left.' 'Then take some from your wallet.' 'But we haven't any left!' "

Her husband's nightmares went further. When Hitler grants him one free wish, as in a fairy tale, he replies without hesitation: "A passport for myself and my wife."

Passports, documents, visas—long before they are actually needed, they run like a red thread through the dreams of this group. One man carries his papers in a brief case with him wherever he goes in his dreams. Another, finding himself on a sinking ship, does not stop to consider, "How can I save myself?" but "How can I save my papers?" And his first cry after the disaster refers to his papers!

All the minor and major difficulties—where to and what then?—are anticipated by the frayed nerves of these people. They are stopped at the border; they are forbidden to land; they are laughed at for mispronouncing words, so that they no longer dare talk at all; they are unwelcome guests in the homes of strangers and dare not appear at the dinner table; they sleep six to a room; they are fearful of bleak walls and dark courtyards; they pass through unfamiliar streets, hear a German song and are ashamed of their own emotion. One dreamer chooses as the ghostly setting for his prophetic nightmare a Trappist monastery, evidently fearful of having to remain mute in a strange language. There is a man whose dream takes him to "the last country on earth where Jews are still tolerated." That is the only name by which he calls this country; for him it has no other name. It seems to lie at the end of the world, since he must cross Lapland; no other way will take him there. He is very happy when he reaches the border on foot, loaded down with heavy bundles, leading his blind mother, his wife at his side. Mile after mile of ice and snow are behind him, but before him stands a smiling, polite customs official, rosy as though made of pink sugar candy, asking: "May I help you, sir?" The wanderer hands him his passport, saying: "I am a professor of—" "You are a Jew!" the official roars after a glance at the passport stamped with a large red "J."

That is the most tragic anguish of these people—the fear that the persecutions from their old country will follow them. One man dreamed that he was doing well in the new land, that he was able to afford his first vacation, a mountain-climbing trip. And then it happened: on the highest mountain peak of the foreign continent the guide suddenly threw off his coat and hood and stood before him in full Storm Trooper's regalia.

Dreams of Subconscious Desire

THE counterpart to these anxiety dreams is wishful dreams. Their range is narrower. They express people's natural longing for equality and recognition, their yearning for things lost. These dreams, too, are full of sorrow, although at first glance they may

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appear ludicrous or even repulsive. Like the anxiety dreams, they show how the wounds inflicted by dictatorship bleed and hurt, even though they are not bodily injuries.

An eye specialist who had been removed from his clinic dreams he is treating Hitler. He has been called in preference to all others since he is the only person in the world who can carry out this treatment. A lawyer who had been forced to resign dreams that he is employed in a government bureau; during a personal inspection, Goering singles him out with a nod of satisfaction.

Dozens of women have an almost identical dream. They attend a recital seated in the first row, or they find themselves in a brilliantly lighted box in the theater. Suddenly a nazi leader appears, usually Hitler himself. He shakes hands with them, and when they say that they are Catholics, Jews, Social Democrats, he replies: "That makes no difference to me." Frequently the women react to this double-dealing with a sense of insult and outrage, but there is always some feeling of pleasure. One girl dreamed that at a folk festival Goebbels personally gave her a handbill; she defined her feelings at this point as follows: "I tried just to laugh it off and not to be proud." Another girl thought hopefully, when Hitler in the presence of many people descended a wide flight of steps with her in Munich, her home town, "Now they can all see that he shows himself with me; perhaps he is not quite so bad?"

The rarity of dreams of revenge is notable—additional proof of how deeply fear reaches down into the subconscious. A petty city official, who was dismissed because he refused to enter the SA, dreamed in ever-changing variations that he had to pay double taxes and that the post office would sell him no stamps. By chance a foreigner would then step up to the window and say to the official (who would often wear the hated uniform) what the man in his dream would himself have liked to say, but did not dare: "You are treating this man shamefully and I shall report it abroad."

The only person I know who dared to talk back to Hitler even in a dream is a woman. In her dream Hitler did not resemble his picture but looked rather round and friendly. What she said was merely, "You should have acted differently in this and that respect, then you would have become still greater." Suddenly she found herself in a different room; there were a great number of Elite Guards who nudged one another, pointing to her with great respect, and saying, "That's the woman who gave Hitler a piece of her mind."

When I came to this country, I ran across a girl I knew, who in Germany had suffered from many anxiety dreams. After her rescue, she dreamed of life under the dictatorship only when she was reminded of its methods by concrete experiences. One day, for example, in the subway she openly read a booklet that was forbidden in Germany. That night she dreamed that a child had denounced her on that account. Later on she suffered from only one nightmare: that she might be forced to return to nazi Germany. When she had been in this country about a year, she had a dream in which she wrote a poem of twelve lines in the language of her new homeland. It dealt with a certain book and a certain American scene, both of which were close to her heart. She forgot the first eight lines. The last four are as follows:

I can sit for hours
Calling every tree,
Reading through my window,
America, of thee!

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ROUND TABLE No. 19

Around the table from left to right: Atwood H. Townsend, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, William Agar, Len De Caux, Louis Dolivet, Stanley Young, James B. Reston, Bruce Bliven, Harry W. Baehr, Max Lerner, and Beryl Harold Levy.

Undoubtedly the United States of America at present occupies a central position in world affairs. On its foreign policy will depend, to an important extent, the nature and the stability of the peace to come. But its foreign policy is dependent upon the internal evolution of the country. Therefore, the Editors of FREE WORLD have asked a number of prominent Americans to explore the vital problem of the future of American democracy.

Those who took part in the discussion were: William Agar, formerly professor at Yale and Columbia and now acting president of Freedom House; Harry Baehr, editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune; *Bruce Bliven, editor of the* New Republic *and American correspondent for the* Manchester Guardian; *Len De Caux, editor of the* CIO News; *Max Lerner, professor of political science at Williams College, editorial writer for* PM; *Beryl Levy, member of the executive committee of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace; Edgar A. Mowrer, columnist for the* New York Post *and director of the Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace; James B. Reston, reporter for the* New York Times; *and Stanley Young, author and editor, presided. Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn, radio commentator, later added his own observations.*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

STANLEY YOUNG—The three general points of the discussion are: Is there a crisis in American democracy? What are the prospects of American democracy? What part should the United States play in world organization?

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

1 There is an important, three-fold, crisis in American democracy: *The crisis of faith, the crisis of institutions, and the crisis of economic structure.* Some of the essential symptoms of the crisis are racial intolerance and labor-management relations.

2 A third party on a nationwide basis seems both undesirable and impossible.

3 There is a lack of preparation for the consequences and responsibilities of victory, and no social institutions—in the internal or international field—have been developed as counterparts to the world-wide spread of military technology.

4 Foreign policy has become the crucial policy in the United States, and there are various corporate elements attempting to control it. Certain actions taken in foreign policy are not directly submitted to democratic control; and in some cases the expression of a critical public opinion comes too late. In this area, there has been a failure to offer concrete goals that could capture the imagination of people groping for leadership.

5 There is a deep fissure between democratic striving and a primitive, reactionary, corporate power. And yet, despite the many dangers, the future looks hopeful in that the forces of democracy seem to grow and the general education of the people to progress steadily.

6 It is essential to explain to the American people that their own self-interest is identical with the group interest of all the nations that desire peace.

The first question seems rather self-evident. I myself feel this question to be particularly urgent at the moment, having returned from a large number of extended trips through training camps, and having spent a great deal of time with both men and officers, among whom there is a difference of opinion.

Would you say, Mr. Bliven, that we are facing a crisis in these critical times?

Bruce Bliven—I think I should. I should say that there is always a crisis in democracy; that it is worse at some times than it is at others. The fight for the maintenance of democracy is a never-ending fight.

Max Lerner—Let's change the question and say, what is the nature of the crisis? Let's see if we can define it.

Young—Yes, that is important.

William Agar—Isn't it true, as Mr. Bliven says, that while there is always a crisis in democracy, it is more dangerous at the present time because of the situation in the world. The cleavages are being dangerously widened because of the acceleration due to the war. In other words, we always have an actual crisis, more or less, but now if we can't cure some of the ills which are more or less normal, and which are dangerous, and if we can't cure them quickly, we may lose out.

Young—What are these fissures that are widening?

Agar—There are so many that it is a long subject. But I should put, I think, first and foremost, our racial intolerance and intolerance of all kinds. At the present time, for instance, the Negro very definitely is being regarded as a barometer the world over, so that how we treat him is going to decide for us the result of this war to a large degree. What is normally an internal problem is now an international problem;

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for we face the world with certain things we say we are fighting for and we don't do those things at home.

Another one of the large areas in which we are pretty much open to attack is our labor-industry relations – and you know what I mean there perfectly well: industry's lagging willingness to recognize the necessity, let's say, of collective bargaining as opposed to paternalism and things of that kind; the unwillingness of our industry to admit Government regulation of any kind, when the world has reached the point where regulation is not only necessary but can't be prevented. At the same time, there is the attempt—well, more than an attempt, an actual building-up—on the part of industry of certain types of associations which themselves destroy initiative and become super-governments, not responsible to anyone for their power. To my mind, this is one of the greatest dangers our democracy faces today. It is this sort of power without any responsibility which can lead to fascism in the end.

H. V. Kaltenborn—Without wishing to defend industrial Tories or restrictive international cartels, I should like to point out that the New Deal has done much during the past decade to curb the excesses of industry. It has not been equally successful in curbing the excesses of union labor.

Young—Mr. De Caux, would you speak to that?

Len De Caux—I don't know what Mr. Kaltenborn means by "excesses of union labor." But I would point out that there have long been federal and state statutes under which any illegitimate practices can be prosecuted and punished. Such an expression as he uses is a highly debatable propaganda term, one that has been too freely used in the labor-baiting campaigns which have been so disruptive of our national unity. For every single alleged "excess" on the part of labor, I could point to a hundred excesses on the part of industrial corporations—and these have not been curbed by the New Deal or anyone else.

But I should like to add to the points raised by Mr. Agar, the present conflict between Congress, the majority in Congress, on the one hand, and the Administration and labor on the other. It is extremely shocking to labor unionists at the present time to see the sort of performance that has characterized the past Congress, where a majority dominated by southern poll taxers and northern Tories ganged up on all that we call progressive and win-the-war policies: price control, subsidies to reduce food prices, most of the steps the President has advocated for strengthening our home front in this war. They have voted war appropriations, it is true, but have refused to vote for many measures within the United States that woud really further the war effort and preserve national unity behind the Commander-in-Chief.

This is very shocking to labor and has stirred it into increased political activity —at any rate so far as the CIO is concerned. The same is true to a lesser degree of the AF of L and to a slightly larger degree of the Railroad Brotherhoods. It is an effort to mobilize labor's voting strength, to change the picture somewhat in the next elections, because we all recognize that in 1942 labor did not vote in the proportion it should have—partly because of some five million men who had moved from one part of the country to another, in war jobs, and partly because there were some five million men in the armed forces. Both of these groups would have voted largely for New Deal, progressive, and, in general, Roosevelt policies.

Therefore we consider that those elections have given the majority in Congress a false picture of the actual sentiments of the American people. There were something like twenty-two million fewer votes cast than in 1940, with the more reactionary, isolationist, labor-baiting and other similar candidates elected with smaller votes than their predecessors had received. We must undertake a very vigorous movement, achieve a greater degree of political activity on the part of labor, to change this picture in the coming elections.

Kaltenborn—May I be permitted to interpolate my belief that Congress correctly expressed American public opinion in passing an anti-strike act. It isn't a good act. I hope it will be amended. But some kind of action against arrogant labor leaders was demanded by public opinion.

De Caux—Congress did not pass an "anti-strike" act. It adopted the Smith-Connally Act, despite President Roosevelt's veto

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which pointed out that this Act actually gave legal sanction to strike agitation, and despite the fact that labor exposed the strike-provoking character of this measure and its demoralizing effect on millions of loyal American workers faithfully observing their no-strike pledge. It has since been shown that this Act encourages the smallest handful of troublemakers in any plant to agitate strikes; that it gives them the right to strike-ballots, even in plants where the union chosen by the majority of employes has a collective bargaining agreement forbidding strikes.

I also question whether public opinion demanded any such action, unless you mean by "public opinion" the propaganda campaigns of the big-business and anti-labor press and some radio commentators.

Young—Do you feel, may I ask, that American labor has a really international point of view at this time, a really international consciousness as a group, achieved under the stress of war?

De Caux—It has that consciousness probably to the same degree as most of the American people, which is—

Young—Which is not saying much.

De Caux—Perhaps. It varies, of course, according to the movement you are referring to. The CIO, by and large, is a younger-age group for one thing, made up of more newly-unionized workers, more progressive elements on the whole. There is no question about our official attitude and that of all our unions. It reflects the sentiment of the membership, which is strongly anti-isolationist and marked by a large measure of international consciousness. We advocate international labor unity, for instance, inclusive of all the labor movements in the United Nations.

On the other hand, you have the attitude of the AF of L officialdom, who are balking arrangements for international unity and who include a number of isolationists of the type of William Hutcheson. There the older element is a little less internationally conscious, probably, than the membership of the CIO.

Kaltenborn—But in so far as the international attitude of the CIO left-wingers is communistic, it is not a constructive contribution to the American labor movement.

De Caux—The policies of the CIO, both national and international, are democratically determined by membership and delegate votes. Our unions have the most democratic constitutions there are, and when policies are adopted you can be sure they pretty exactly reflect the sentiments of the American working people who make up our membership. I regret that Mr. Kaltenborn has seen fit to inject this stale "red herring."

Young—I should like to ask what chance anyone thinks we really have of forming a third party, a really progressive party, and of splitting the very old and familiar elements in the Republican and Democratic parties on the sides to which they naturally belong. Mr. Mowrer, have you any thoughts on that?

Edgar Ansel Mowrer—No, because that is not where the crisis is. I think we have a threefold crisis of American democracy. We have a crisis of faith, a crisis of institutions or democratic organization, and a crisis of the development of an economic structure which is not favorable, in its present form, to democracy.

Kaltenborn—My own impression of the crisis in democracy is that it centers on how to maintain a unified national effort in prosecuting the war and making the peace, while permitting free political discussion at home.

Young—That is an interesting point, Mr. Mowrer, the idea of a crisis in faith—because we have nothing in this country so much as a kind of optimistic, if unconscious, faith.

Mowrer—We started our country, as you know, with people who believed in democracy and people who believed in restricting it. So far as I can see, that opposition has never disappeared, and in periods like the demoralized one between the two wars, when undemocratic practices become too rabid (a) the people who do not believe in democracy cast off the mask and come out frankly and say they don't believe in it; and (b) the people, particularly the young people, who know the discrepancy between words and practice, who hear us talk democracy and then look at Mayor Hague or Mayor Kelly, who hear us talk democracy and note how we round up the votes, who hear us talk democracy and then hear many things about all the southern

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states having been fascist since the beginning (in the sense that they were one-party states under an almost oligarchical control of whole states)—some people can't understand why it is said that in Massachusetts a cardinal controls the political machinery, in Georgia the Coca-Cola Company, and in Montana the copper interests. I know from my own daughter's generation. She comes to me and says, "Why don't you make this thing work?"

Then there is the question of institutions. The thing has become so complicated, with long ballots and what not. For instance, you ask the voters in the city of Chicago, where I grew up, to vote for a list of officials as long as your arm, among them such notable creatures as a City Sealer or something of the sort. Many of the citizens don't know what a City Sealer is and don't give a damn about it and don't see why it ought to be electoral. They never heard of Mr. Jones or Mr. Smith and they end up by not going to the polls. We have a lower voting rate than practically any real democracy in the world, and the President himself is one of the instances of our antiquated institutional setup—as we can see in this war. I have been in Washington only three years and it is obvious to me that we could use four Vice-Presidents, as they do in a big company, where the chief executive delegates some of the incredible tasks he has to people with special abilities.

If we accuse the President—I think properly—of neglecting the foreign-political side of the war, or if we accuse the President of not looking after lend-lease or sugar rationing or something of that sort properly, his adequate answer is, "I should have to be four or five people to be able to do even a fraction of this."

Finally, we have another crisis which will threaten or ultimately break our democracy if somebody doesn't do something about it: how do we give to the simple citizen who is increasingly becoming either an employee of a government or an employee of a great corporation that rugged, economic independence which enables him, as a weak man or a not too strong man, to feel strong and individual and a real democrat?

Those questions seem to me much more important than whether we add one party more or less to the two parties or three parties or four parties that we have. I should like to see somebody tackle them.

De Caux—I agree with Mr. Mowrer in general on the points he has raised, and I want to make clear that when we speak of labor political action we do not have a third party in mind at the present time. Our officials are very definitely opposed to a third-party development now as tending to split the progressive and win-the-war-forces.

We regard the immediate issue as one between the generally progressive forces of President Roosevelt and things that are associated with the New Deal and so forth on the one hand, and on the other hand the reactionary, isolationist, anti-labor policies of the opposition.

Kaltenborn—The multi-party system has never worked well in Continental Europe. The two-party system has worked well in the British Isles and the United States. I should hate to see the creation of a third powerful political party made too easy.

Bliven—On the question of the legal basis of a third-party movement, we might point out that it is almost impossible in many states to start a third party, and especially to do so in less than a long period of years. A nationwide third-party movement, really effective enough to count heavily in the national elections, is almost out of the question.

Mowrer—Bruce, what good would it do if we had it?

Bliven—I don't know, but we can't get it. There are some states in which no party can appear on the ballot unless in the last preceding election it polled a certain number of votes. Well, how do you start that process?

Young—Is the group generally agreed that a third party is not necessary?

James B. Reston—I think the question is unrealistic at this time. The crisis, I think we agreed, is great enough and immediate enough, in August of 1943, less than a year before our conventions, to make it unrealistic to discuss a third party at this time.

Lerner—Suppose we follow up Edgar Mowrer's lead and try to make a little more precise the nature of the crisis, if that is all right with the Chair. I like Mowrer's formulation very much and I should like to pick out a similar point, but with a dif-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferent emphasis, because I think most of the things we have been talking about are manifestations of a crisis rather than its intrinsic nature. For example, our attitude on race relations seems to me a manifestation – and similarly our labor-corporate difficulties and our difficulties about the internal struggle within the Democratic Party and probably within the whole party system.

Just as the war caught America unprepared, so victory has caught America unprepared, and it is this lack of preparation for the consequences and responsibilities of victory, military victory, that constitutes the core of the crisis. We are in a position, today, very similar to that of England and France and America at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when industrial technology was first developed. We had new machinery and we had not yet learned how to formulate social machinery to harness this technology.

Today we have new developments in technology—and it isn't only industrial technology but military technology as well. Technology has become military and worldwide. We haven't begun to develop, either within our own country (which is crucial) or between countries, social institutions to tame and harness and domesticate that technology.

Young—Will you give us a concrete example of the kind of thing you mean?

Lerner – Foreign policy has become the crucial policy in the United States today,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as anywhere else, and it has become crucial because foreign policy is the politics of our military technology. Military technology has no meaning except in so far as there is a political policy which is supposed to guide it. Many of us around this table and elsewhere in the country are still thinking in the shadow of a pre-military technological age, when we hadn't yet understood that our foreign policy is the crucial policy.

Mowrer—Does that change the situation or merely make it worse?

Lerner—It makes it much worse.

Mowrer—I am sure of that; but does it change it fundamentally?

Lerner—Well, yes; it changes it in the sense that most of our habits of thought, Edgar, have been oriented toward the question of domestic policy.

Mowrer—You are still following that?

Lerner—and we are caught completely off guard. That is why the question of whether trade unions are conscious of international questions is very relevant. They, too, are caught off guard, completely. The trade unions haven't begun to prepare people either to understand or to direct the questions of foreign policy.

Just one more remark. At the risk of being very heterodox, I suggest that much of our emphasis on economics is proving archaic today.

Mowrer—Very good!

Lerner—For example, someone, a while ago, spoke of the unwillingness of American corporate enterprises to accept Government regulation. It seems to me not terribly important whether or not they accept Government regulation. There isn't a country in the world in which they won't have to accept it, including the United States. But the really important question today is this: who will run the Government? They are going to accept regulation. From now on the struggle is going to be a struggle for the control of Government, because we understand perfectly well that governments are going to control the economy.

Kaltenborn—Mr. Lerner here points out the tremendously important change that has taken place. Too large a part of our international politics has been conducted by private corporations. They have formed cartels to regulate international markets, to control production, to fix prices. They have secured high tariffs to prevent legitimate and necessary foreign competition. They have pooled patents to stifle competition. Their foreign policy has been selfish and secret. International government negotiation on trade, tariffs, patents, and licenses must be less selfish if it is to be successful, and certainly it cannot be secret. So the control by government to which Mr. Lerner refers should certainly represent an improvement.

Mowrer—Hasn't it been the aim of all politics at all times to control the search for power?

Lerner—That's right, but it has now become the conscious aim of the smart people within economic enterprise. Politics has become dominant over economics, foreign policy has become dominant over military technology, and we in America today, as I say, are not yet ready to accept the consequences of all that.

Agar—I placed the emphasis somewhat differently. I think I said that enterprise would have to accept control. It has been recalcitrant but our changing world brings the crisis to a head.

Reston—I want to pick up the point Mr. Lerner has just made and develop it a little. I have been wondering if we couldn't get a basic agreement on the primacy of foreign affairs. I think it must be evident to us, no matter whether we want corporations to run the country or Socialists or Communists or what not, that in order to get whatever we want we must have peace. Therefore, if we could begin with that basic idea of the primacy of foreign affairs, I think we might do something about persuading the farmer in the Middle West or the industrialist in New England that that must be the first aim. Maybe then we go on from there and look at Mr. Lerner's second thought, or rather, Edgar's very good point, about the technique of attaining that end. Personally I feel that at least a part of the crisis in the United States is the unwillingness of our people to take the responsibilities which democracy demands, and their substitution of all kinds of techniques of government (antithetical to democratic action) for taking those responsibilities.

I am thinking of such things as the seniority system within the committees of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress, the ways in which we ignore—the electorate ignores—politics at the stage where candidates are chosen, and so on. First of all, however, I think we must try to get general acceptance of the principle that we must have a reliable foreign policy that will secure peace and honor before we can have any sort of long-range national or domestic policy. It should be obvious by now that war ruins pretty nearly everybody's plans—Democratic and Republican, Tory and Liberal, Left and Right.

Mowrer—I can give you an anecdote supporting that. I was shot down to Spain at the beginning of the civil war and stayed only a few weeks, but long enough to convince me that it was international rather than civil war, that the democracies were menaced by the presence of the Germans and the Italians in Spain, and that they couldn't ignore that, much as they wanted to ignore the Spanish affair.

I came back and discovered that France had accepted the idea of non-intervention, just as a name for it, two days before. I went to see Premier Léon Blum and we walked up and down the garden behind the Palais de Matignon. I said, "M. President, what have you done? Why have you accepted this situation?" After telling me that I always had the Germans too much on my mind and so on and so on he said, "Listen, I am fighting on the internal front to establish the Front Populaire and social reform. I cannot take on a second war, within France, against the conservatives, as I should have to do if I tried to help the Spanish Republic. Therefore, I have saved, or tried to save, the more important of the two."

That seems to me a typical instance of a democratic sacrifice of the greater to the lesser, and it is the kind of thing that maybe we are doing in our foreign political development today.

Kaltenborn—In democratic countries narrow selfish national demands will always interfere with the development of the progressive foreign policy. The only answer I can see is to teach our people that every country, including our own, must sacrifice a certain amount of immediate selfish national interest for the sake of those better international economic relations which are the true foundations of peace.

Reston—After all, we are the people who have the political cliché about politics ending at the water's edge but we just don't put it into operation. The only thing I am asking is that we begin with that premise, and stick to our own declaration or come to some kind of an agreement on that score. The first problem is to attain peace. Then, within that framework, let the Republicans and the Democrats and the American Labor party tear each other apart. I don't want a moratorium on politics but I can't help wishing our two major parties could agree to take foreign policy out of politics and co-operate with each other to secure peace.

Lerner—But, Reston, everything depends on what kind of peace, doesn't it? It is a little difficult for me, for example, to see what the ordinary individual in Indiana or in Nebraska or in California can do about the ousting of Sumner Welles, what he can do about what seems to me the very clear and articulate policy of pursuing a separate Anglo-American war, regardless of the Russian participation. In other words, one phase of the crisis of democracy is that foreign policy is pretty much beyond democratic control today.

Kaltenborn—With all deference to Mr. Lerner I should like to point out that Sumner Welles was not ousted. He resigned. And the President did not need to accept his resignation. We have, after all, contributed close to three billion dollars worth of lend-lease goods to Soviet Russia, and we'd have bombing squadrons in Russia today if Stalin permitted it. There is much justification in past history for Soviet Russia's suspicion of British and American policies. But it is that suspicion more than any recent fault on our part that has prevented closer military and political collaboration with Russia.

Harry W. Baehr—Lerner's remark puts it in a nutshell. The crisis of democracy is being fought out under a system of undemocratic controls at the present time, inevitably so. I don't see how it could work any other way unless we had a cabinet system, which even in Britain doesn't function now as a pure democracy. The real crisis of democracy will follow the war.

Mowrer—It may be too late.

Baehr—It may be too late, but I don't be-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lieve democracy can do very much about that.

Bliven—In other words, it is very difficult for us to act in regard to the democratic crisis in a hurry. If we don't like the foreign policy of one administration, we could conceivably have an election on the issue of foreign policy and get another administration in, but there is nothing you can do—

Young—By that time, you will have done irreparable damage.

Mowrer—Many months after the thing has happened.

Young—To refer for just a moment to Mr. Reston's idea that we as a people are unwilling to accept our responsibility: I wonder, is it so much unwillingness to accept responsibility as a political unconsciousness or lack of information?

Reston—Certainly there has never been a period in the history of the world when communications have been so plentiful and information of every description has just overwhelmed the people. I don't think we have too little information. We may have too little explanation.

Young—As a messianic people we are very nationalistic in a broad sense. Do you think that we aren't politically willing to accept our responsibilities because we simply do not see the crisis—that things have not been tough enough to make us see it?

Reston—There is a great deal in that. People like Mowrer and Otto Tolischus and the reporters in Berlin made it plain to the people of this country—in simple, understandable terms—that there was a crisis, but the people who read them were evidently unconvinced.

Kaltenborn—They realized the crisis all right, but they did not realize the extent to which it affected them or this country. Nor did they know what, if anything, they could do about it.

De Caux—I should like to question Mr. Lerner's point about foreign policy being beyond democratic control. It may be true that you can't directly influence immediate policy of the Government, once it has been elected. But you can influence the political situation. If, for instance, there is a sufficient popular movement for the repeal of the poll tax, such an evidence of popular feeling would tell against the southern wing in the Democratic Party. It would have an indirect effect in that way on foreign policy.

Lerner—In 1960 or 1975; not before that, so far as the actual consequences of any repeal of the poll tax are concerned. I mean, let's be realistic about, first, how long it would take us to repeal the poll tax in the various states, and, second, how long it would take before that repeal begins to make itself felt in the composition of the Congress.

De Caux—No, what I mean is this. Congress is in recess at the present time. The President, like everyone else, is watching political trends with a view to later elections and so forth. If Congressmen and Senators go home and are given sufficient evidence of the sentiment of their constituents in regard to foreign policy and the poll tax and a number of other issues, they will be influenced and the President will be influenced accordingly.

Bliven—On the other hand, if they go home and their constituents do not work on them we are in trouble. It seems to me we have two kinds of serious lag here. One is a cultural lag, in that the people don't realize or haven't caught up with the changing problems with which they are confronted, so that we have people thinking fifty or sixty years behind the realities of the present day. And then, for another thing, there is a definite organization of our society which we must break through—for example, the seniority in the congressional committees. It is quite a problem how to break through these encrusted special privileges which have grown up throughout the country.

Reston—I want to make one point about Mr. Lerner's statement that foreign policy is beyond democratic action. It may be that the people cannot always offset the action taken by the Executive Branch of the Government. But, surely—for example, in forming policy in 1920 in this country—the people definitely did make our foreign policy subject to democratic action. Then we saw one party destroy the whole policy of collective security, and I hope that won't happen again next year. It seems to me that that is the question we must ask ourselves right now perhaps more than the question of AMGOT, or what happened in North Africa, and so on. It seems to me that in a year before election time, you have a very definite opportunity to use the democratic

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

machinery we have to effect foreign policy.

Lerner—Of course, the classic instance of that immediately comes to mind—our policy during the Spanish Civil War. I think there is no question at all that in terms of the polls taken at that time, something like 80 per cent of the people of this country were in favor of lifting the embargo. And yet it was not lifted.

I suspect, myself, that an overwhelming proportion of the American people disapproved the long refusal to recognize the French Committee of Liberation. When you say it is possible that the people, acting through Congress, will make a botch of the peace as they did in 1920, I agree; for what the people do in the matter of treaties eventually presented to Congress depends enormously upon what kind of treaty is presented and upon what kind of propaganda is disseminated at the time to influence them. There was a terrific propaganda campaign in 1920. I think we know something about the State Department's propaganda campaign at the present time; the way in which the Welles resignation is being presented to the people is very interesting. I read Mr. Krock's front-page article in the *New York Times* this morning about Sumner Welles's resignation. Presumably it is an example of news reporting from Washington.

Consequently, when I say that foreign policy is not as subject to democratic control as other parts of the Government, I am not thereby saying that if it were subject to democratic control, all would be well; because then you have another question to tackle—namely, how about the ways in which popular opinion is influenced and affected? At this point the press comes in, and the radio and with it every crucial method for swaying opinion. But I think we ought to take one question at a time.

Kaltenborn—Let me make this one point. To be effective, foreign policy must be long-term policy. You can't change it with every shift and turn of the popular wind. To be effective it must have continuity. Public pressure can and does change its direction at least slightly. Our State Department is sensitive to public opinion—not necessarily to all shades of opinion represented around this table. As for the Administration's Spanish policy, which I did my best to change after spending part of 1936 and 1937 in Spain, I believe that on the whole it reflected American public opinion. That opinion was uninformed or misinformed. But those of us who tried to influence it in the right direction had little success. We made few converts until it was too late.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lerner—We don't have to guess about American opinion at that time. The Gallup polls were very clear about it.

Bliven—We should point out that a national presidential election is a very clumsy and inefficient way of registering the public will on any given issue, because you vote for one party or the other, one man or the other. But a multitude of issues, which have become obscured or concealed, may be covered by that single vote. You might possibly be against a given policy but in the main for the man who expounded that policy.

I am not convinced, for example, that the election of 1920 turned on foreign policy at all, and I am far from being convinced that a majority of the people were in favor of isolationism. The polls taken at that time by daily newspapers over the country registered three or four hundred thousand votes. They were 75 per cent in favor of joining the League of Nations. The election turned on war weariness, on a dislike of the Wilsonian personality. He was old and ill, and the schoolmaster characteristics came out in him more plainly than they had previously. The almost innumerable grievances which develop against a party after eight years in power had also soured the electorate. As registered in an election, it is very difficult to separate public opinion on foreign policy from that on domestic policy.

Lerner—Yes, and I think Mr. Roosevelt is counting on that now.

Beryl Levy—There is just one other angle I think might be worth suggesting. In laying the responsibility, as we have here, pretty much on the inadequacies of democratic machinery for registering the wishes of the electorate, we have not paid sufficient attention to a failure of leadership on the part of the Administration.

I say this as a consistent friend and supporter of the Administration. But the Administration has lost much of its militancy, New-Deal fight, momentum and energy, on the home front and in expounding New Deal values energetically on the international front. On the home front, it need not have caved in because we are waging a war. Canada is experiencing a highly accelerated New Deal at this very moment. It seems particularly unfortunate that we should have allowed ourselves to relax our efforts at democratic reconstruction now, when we are trying to validate the Four Freedoms "for all the men in all the lands," carry the torch, so to speak, to the rest of the world.

By way of relieving the picture, it is worth mentioning that one institution that has functioned admirably has been the United States Supreme Court. It has been holding the fort pretty consistently—in defending civil liberties and the rights of minorities, in going after Hague, in the Schneiderman case, in the recent flag-salute case.

On the international front there has been a failure to offer concrete plans such as would capture the imagination of peoples who hope for leadership from us, recognize our role of leadership, and who find us not exercising that role. There has not only been a paucity of post-war discussion, so far as the public knows about it; more than that, there has not been enough evidence of militantly democratic objectives.

And now just one or two concrete observations.

We might do well to muster as much strength as we can behind the Gillette proposal to amend the Constitution so that a two-thirds vote of the Senate is not necessary to ratify a treaty. That is blatantly undemocratic, because one-third of the Senate may represent a tiny fraction of the population and may thwart the will of the overwhelming majority. A majority vote of both houses of Congress would surely be enough. It should not be more difficult to declare peace than to declare war.

Another suggestion: As I understand it, the Secretary of State is the only member of the Cabinet who does not have to make an annual accounting to Congress. It seems to me something ought to be done by way of making the activities of the Secretary of State more exposed to the surveillance both of Congress and of the public.

Young—I didn't know that. It is a very interesting point.

Levy—That was brought out in Jessup's biography of Elihu Root. Root himself used to appear at the weekly meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and take them into his confidence.

Bliven—The Secretary of State would be sure to say, however, that, in the best interests of the country, anything of genuine interest to the Committee must be confidential. Under that plea, he habitually re-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fuses information to the Congress on all sorts of subjects.

Baehr—He is not responsible to Congress. The thing is differently handled in the British Parliament. When Parliament gets annoyed, cabinets are endangered.

Bliven—Hull is responsible in the sense that Congress votes the appropriations for the State Department, and the State Department is extremely conscious of this fact.

Kaltenborn—I should like to endorse Mr. Bliven's point. Both Mr. Hull and his associates have been extremely conscious of their congressional critics. Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate have told me that in recent years they have had much better access to State Department information. Very little is being kept from them, and congressional checks on State Department policy are constant.

Lerner—I share Levy's feeling about the failure of leadership; and yet, I wonder whether he wouldn't agree with me that to a very great extent Roosevelt, in his present behavior, expresses a deep cleavage within the country itself. America, despite a decade of the New Deal, is still not a New-Deal America. The people who have consistently re-elected Roosevelt have at the same time consistently expressed themselves, in the interim congressional elections, as against the New Deal. And, with respect to our economic system, a decidedly reactionary economic power is still in control.

At the risk of being too simple in my interpretation, let me throw out a suggestion: that what is happening in the State Department today is very largely an expression of corporate desire, of corporate will, in this country. I think the big corporations have come to understand something I'm afraid the liberals haven't yet grasped: that the State Department is the crux of American life today, and because it is the crux of American life today they must control it. And, again at the risk of being too simple, I submit that they do control it. I don't say that the Secretary is in the pay of Du Pont or anything like that. I do say that he and the rest of them express, on a plane of world affairs, essentially the same views which the lawyers and spokesmen of the corporations express on the plane of national affairs.

The real crisis facing America is that we are deeply split between a primitive reactionary corporate economic power and democratic strivings which are as old as American history, and which, may I say optimistically, are probably increasing in strength, but which are not yet powerful enough to tame the reactionary corporations at this crucial time.

Levy—But it still seems to me there might have been more militant leadership in the direction indicated, and I have in mind various parts of the administration.

Lerner—Let's recognize, though, that Mr. Roosevelt is to a great extent a prisoner at the present time. Whether or not he could get himself out of his prison is another matter.

Kaltenborn—But, Mr. Lerner, if he were not what you call a prisoner, he would be what I call a dictator.

Lerner—That doesn't exhaust the alternatives.

Young—Would you go this far, Mr. Baehr? I should think he is a willing prisoner, inasmuch as he is again waiting for public opinion to tell him what to do.

Baehr—That is it, precisely. It is an oversimplification to refer to the corporate mind in control of the State Department. There is a deep-seated belief among a great many people to the effect that when America enters into a foreign agreement, Americans invariably get trimmed—that there is something essentially naive about Americans which makes them very bad bargainers.

Lerner—Do you believe this myth about Americans?

Baehr—I think a lot of Americans believe it.

Lerner—Do you believe it?

Young—That we are bad bargainers?

Lerner—That we are not good at it?

Baehr—Oh, heavenly days, no! But I believe a lot of Americans do.

Lerner—Well, I believe the myth has been spread. The question is, is it true?

Baehr—I don't believe it is.

Reston—Absolutely not.

Kaltenborn—Certainly when President Roosevelt traded off 50 over-age destroyers for 99-year leases on several of the most strategically located points in the Western Hemisphere, he made a good bargain for the United States.

Baehr—But Hull has played up to this

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feeling by saying we can be just as Machiavellian as the next one, if not more so, and consequently lots of people feel we have a very shrewd bargainer in him.

Reston—If there was ever a country in the world that got more in the nineteenth century, and with less, than the United States of America, I don't know which it is.

Baehr—That is perfectly true; but the American myth, spread very largely at the Arms Conference—to the effect that we sank our whole fleet and got nothing for it and so on, and that the very clever British stole everything from us and gave something to the Japanese—has been widely accepted, and is now more important than the forces operating behind it.

Reston—I think Mr. Lerner mixes us up a little by the use of the term "corporate mind." I agree that some heads of corporations have the mentality he refers to, but I wonder if you don't agree that there are just a hell of a lot of Americans making thirty bucks a week who also have what he calls the corporate mind, though they may hate corporations?

Lerner—I used very simple terms in order to get the proposition expressed in a rather naked form.

Now let me go on and say that in its actual operation, in its effect on the mind of the people, economic power throughout American history has always hidden itself. Actually, an awful lot of the dispossessed of this country are led to believe as the heads of the corporations wish them to believe and not as their economic interest would dictate. I do not believe in the theory that men are motivated by their economic interests. I see far too many instances to disprove it: millions of Americans who strangely vote and act and talk against their economic interests. And why? Largely because the issues have been cleverly put to them by those who are, after all, the mercenaries of corporate enterprise—and I am referring now quite clearly to newspaper columnists, to radio commentators, to various magazine writers, and so on (who to a very great extent dominate American opinion) and, of course, especially to very powerful newspaper publishers. It is they who act as the intermediaries between corporate power and the popular mind, and they are so successful that because of them ordinary American people act in terms of the corporate mind.

Kaltenborn—But, Mr. Lerner, you must admit that you were doing your powerful and effective best to debunk the radio commentators and the newspaper columnists and the publishers. I am perfectly willing to agree that some of us ought to be debunked. But is it fair to assume that when large-circulation newspapers and commentators sell space or time to corporations they lose all independence and become mercenaries?

Reston—Doesn't that bring us back to the point you always get back to in all discussions of this kind: that there is something lacking in the basic education of the people?

Lerner—Right, but the trouble is that education lies in the hands of the same people we are talking about.

De Caux—Mr. Lerner, haven't you brought yourself around to contradicting one of your earlier statements, about the supremacy of politics over economics?

Lerner—No. You will notice that I said originally, when I spoke of the supremacy of the political over the economic, that there is no longer any question of whether American economic enterprise can escape regulation and control. It can't. I then went on to say that this is recognized by the leaders of American economic power, and that they have therefore made what is to me a very articulate decision, namely, to control the instruments of governmental power.

It is crucial to them to control the State Department; they know this. They act on the proposition that if they can only control the Government, the rest of their economic power is all right. It used to be true, for example, that the corporations wanted most of all to control the Secretary of the Treasury. At the present time, they have shifted their emphasis from the Secretary of the Treasury to the State Department. It is still true that politics dominates, in the sense that it determines the country's destiny. But who wields the political strength? Ah, there you get the economic power!

Young—Mr. Lerner, it is easy to believe that corporate interests do mislead the people against their best interests or their economic interests; but how do you account for such a demonstration as that, say, of the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

last election where the dominant interests, even of the press, were entirely devoted to backing Mr. Willkie and yet the people continued to support the New Deal?

Lerner—If we had not, at various times in American history, been able to break through this combination of corporate and press power, I should have very little hope for the American future. This brings us, I suppose, to our second question. I assure you I am essentially bullish rather than bearish about the future; and I am essentially bullish rather than bearish because American history offers evidence that, at crisis periods, democratic strength is able to overcome the combination of an economic oligarchy aligned with political ignorance and superstition. This was true in 1932, 1936, and 1940. It can still be made to be true in the period that is before us now.

Reston—Even in foreign policy?

Lerner—Even in foreign policy, yes.

Reston—Isn't that contradicting your previous statement?

Lerner—In the long run, I don't think so, because we are beginning to see the signs of an awakening in the area of foreign policy. For example, there are the little women's clubs and forums all over the country which are getting interested in the question—in Culbertson's plan, say (an elementary form of interest), and in the Free World Association, and in the Shotwell Commission. All these groups indicate that we are awakening, up to a point. The existence of the BBHH group in the Senate is another indication.

Levy—The tremendous sale of Willkie's book.

Lerner—Yes, the tremendous sale of Willkie's book.

Kaltenborn—But that is offset by the popularity of certain isolationist radio commentators, and the big circulation of certain isolationist newspapers. They have ten times Willkie's circulation every day.

Young—Can anyone see clearly a real, positive prospect for an America that seems torn between the idea of an Anglo-American world and a possible commitment to world domination—

Levy—World domination by America, you mean?

Young—And England. Does anyone believe we are really thinking in terms of an international world organization and of participation in an international world organization for future peace? Everything seems to point to our going the other way.

Kaltenborn—I should object to the indication that close working agreement between Great Britain and the United States would in any way contradict an effective international world organization. Close understanding between Britain and this country is essential to any kind of effective league or association of nations. Naturally, I don't exclude Russia or China, or any other country for that matter. But I believe we have a much better chance of reconciling Soviet Russia to the necessary sacrifice of certain points of her ideology if Britain and the United States present a joint position. It is because I believe there is an excellent prospect of continued close co-operation between Great Britain and the United States that I am very hopeful that when this war is over the United States will take a different course than it took in the years following the first World War.

Levy—I am hopeful that America will participate in some kind of world organization. I've done quite a lot of traveling through our country, especially the West, in recent months, and I think the average American now realizes that America will have to see this through. As the taxi-driver said, this time the duration will last longer than the war.

There are various hopeful signs besides intimacy with Britain: the fact that leading Republicans have joined forces with leading Democrats in this matter; the tremendous influence Willkie and Davies have had in bringing us to a closer understanding of the Soviet Union and to appreciation of Russia's military triumphs; the success of Walter Lippmann's book. The reception given Walter Lippmann's limited suggestion of a military alliance of the four powers demonstrates that America realizes she can no longer feel secure in the world by herself. Technological advances in warfare make that evident. No New Yorker, no resident of London or Moscow, can really feel that his own country can secure him against attack. Unless there is some semblance of reliable world organization, he is not safe.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Young—Tell us something about the activities of your Commission.

Levy—The Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace is accelerating its program in various directions to call people's attention to the potentialities of the post-war world. We believe a military alliance is not enough. We are preparing special reports on three basic phases of the peace which were neglected, to our woe, last time. First, the enforcement of peace through international policing, which will take a form based on the role of the airplane. Second, economic welfare. Third, the inviolability of certain civil rights. We shall also issue our conclusions as to the elements which must underlie international organization if we really mean to outlaw war. The reports will be the fruit of four years of deliberation by the American experts on our Commission and they will stress the necessity of America's leading participation.

Young—Americans always like to be told. There isn't a more willing audience in the world than the American audience; but it is willing to listen to both sides, and because its leaders fail to do any follow-up work to support the people in any given role, the audience is enthusiastic for a short time only. A lecturer passing through Walla Walla will get a receptive audience, no matter which side he is speaking on, and it is the last impression that may win; because there is no center in the receptiveness, no focal point, and—I think—no leadership. The educational values which Mr. Reston says we always get down to in the end are at a very low tide. I don't say that we don't have a generally articulate nation up to a point. But it doesn't go beyond that point.

Lerner—May I suggest that despite the large sale of Mr. Willkie's book and Mr. Lippmann's book and so on, most Americans haven't read either of them. Americans are not educated by books like that but by events. The biggest educational factor for Americans will be what happens in Europe.

Young—You mean as a kind of infiltration of an idea.

Lerner—Yes, and as granite bedrock that we can't very well go beyond. This is a fact.

Young—Well, why won't we achieve this constant ourselves if we suffer enough in the war?

Lerner—But we haven't suffered.

Young—No, and we probably won't. That is the problem.

Lerner—There are two big differences between us and Europe: First, the European peoples have suffered for ten years; and, second, the European peoples have a far greater degree of political consciousness about these things than we have.

Kaltenborn—May I suggest that the European peoples will determine for themselves the kind of world they will live in when the war is over. The assumption that the victor powers are going to determine in detail the kind of government, the kind of education, the kind of policy which these peoples will follow is based on a fallacy. We can give them a start in a certain direction; but the less control we impose from without, the more successful we are going to be in securing the acceptance of those ideas in which we believe.

Levy—May I venture to describe what may be called the strategy of the peace during and after this war, as distinguished from the strategy of the last peace. I wonder whether you gentlemen think my analysis is sound. Wilson came to us with a completed plan, a plan from on high. But what has been happening today? The United Nations issued their declaration. To be sure, they have not been functioning as an integrated group as well and as rapidly as they might; but the Food Conference, for example, was a highly successful conference, with an agency created to carry its work along.

It seems to me the strategy of the peace ought to be both from the bottom up and



PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the top down. We want to go on having conferences on vital matters. Set up administrative agencies, get the United Nations into the habit of meeting.

At the same time, I think we should not neglect working the thing out in non-pragmatic terms—both in order to arrive at general directives so that, for example, our trusteeship in occupied areas may not bungle and also in order to give to the world and to our own people a highly concrete alternative to the gospels of the war lords.

Baehr—Doesn't that leave a rather dangerously weak structure, though, for the solution of practical problems? For example, you mentioned the administration of affairs in North Africa—or in occupied territories, rather. This has already created a somewhat dangerous reservoir of ill will for the United States, and will undoubtedly react against us. We are likely to say, "Well, the French don't like us and we don't like the French," and leave it at that. In other words, we should have some framework in which we could function.

Levy—That was my second point—that we should have a sense of direction, a framework.

Agar—Aren't there really two fundamentally important things that we as Americans must do if we are to come out of this war into a peaceful world? In the first place, we must convince other nations now that in the future America is going to take part in the world.

Reston—Hadn't you better do that with the American people first?

Agar—All right; we have to do it through the American people and I am coming to that in a minute. But, all over the world, as we all know, there are two sets of plans for the future. One takes America into consideration and one leaves America out—evidence enough that people don't trust us. They don't think for a minute that we are going to do our job when the war is over. Therefore, somehow or other, we have to convince them we are going to be there. As you were just saying, we have got to make up our own minds. And here lies the duty of everyone who has any chance to talk, write, be in the public eye—and I am not talking of governmental officials now. They must do their part; but everyone else who is convinced of this thing and feels it at all should simplify the problem and make it perfectly clear to the American people themselves that there are only a few simple alternatives in the future. We have always wanted peace but we have had two wars in one generation. Why have we had those wars? Because isolationism has failed, because neutrality has failed, because this and that has failed.

And now, what is left? Some form of military security, call it what you will. And the American people have already signified their intentions through a poll—74 per cent of them signified their intention of backing the idea of a police force and only 14 per cent were against it.

I am not kidding myself that that means much, because we know that when we try to make the idea concrete and show just what it means, it can be sabotaged. But the willingness is there.

We must go ahead of the American people and convince them that their own self-interest is identical with the group interest of all those nations that want peace. We must somehow establish an order in which peace will at least be possible; we must convince our people that by following such and such a course, peace may be won. If we have peace, if we have good will, I think our other problems, economic and so on, can be solved; and I believe that unless we make it as simple as that, the whole thing is lost.



Young—With this concrete suggestion—that we must convince the American people that self-interest dictates strengthening their own democratic institutions, and co-operation with peace-loving peoples—we must call the Round Table to a halt.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

World Scene in Washington

by ***ERNEST K. LINDLEY***

THE choice of Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia was most acceptable to official Washington. The only criticism heard in informed quarters is that the appointment was made a little late. The launching of a campaign in Burma this winter had been agreed upon at the May meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Marshal Wavell's extreme caution, verging on pessimism, did not recommend him for the active command of the offensive operations in that area, and he was promoted to the Viceroy's office. In the absence of an authorized commander for this enterprise, preparations lagged to some extent during the summer months, and now an immense amount of work remains to be done within a few weeks if full advantage is to be taken of the relatively brief winter season of dry weather.

The American Chiefs of Staff were interested chiefly in the designation of a vigorous man who could get what he needed through the British high command in London and obtain the maximum effort from the military authorities in India. Mountbatten appears to meet all of these specifications. In addition, he has had experience with amphibious operations and works well with Americans. As in the Mediterranean theater, American and British officers will be interlarded on Mountbatten's staff and among his field commanders.

American leadership might have been preferred by the Chinese; and it was felt by some liberals that the choice of an American as supreme commander would have been a brilliant stroke of political warfare throughout this area. For even more obvious political reasons, the British wanted a British commander in chief for operations which will be based on India and extend to other parts of the British Empire: not only to Burma, but perhaps eventually also to the Malay peninsula and Singapore.

But the political interests of the British in holding the command happen to coincide with the essential military interests of the American officers who initiated the demand for a Burma campaign this winter and finally prevailed upon the British to agree to it. For most of the naval and ground forces which will be available are British and Indian. An energetic and determined British commander probably would be more successful than an American in directing the enterprise. And if the fact that Lord Louis Mountbatten is a first cousin of the King has a symbolic value to the British in the Far East, it may also have a material military advantage in obtaining from Britain and the Mediterranean—from commanders naturally preoccupied with the war against Germany—the wherewithal for the campaign.

It is understood that Mountbatten's area of command was carefully drawn so as not to infringe upon the East Asian theater in which Chiang Kai-shek holds the Allied Supreme Command. Moreover, it is anticipated that Lieutenant-General Stilwell, the Generalissimo's American Chief of Staff, who has equipped and trained at least two Chinese divisions in India and is supervising the training of the Chinese divisions in Yunnan, will hold an important command under Mountbatten.

The reopening of a route through Burma will not be easy. After the necessary military operations have been completed, months may be required to put a road into good operating condition. Even then, the supplies that can be hauled will be small by the standards of modern warfare. Nevertheless, contrary to some published implications, the purpose of the Burma campaign is not merely to hearten the Chinese. It is

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a carefully calculated part of the whole complex campaign against Japan, involving eventual offensives along three or four lines; and it may well be less sensational than other campaigns in the Pacific war during the coming six months.

Among the military strategists one of the most effective arguments for going into Burma this winter was the simple fact that at the present time it would be impossible to deploy in the Far East and Pacific theater more than a fraction of the American and British air forces now engaged in the European theater. If the European war were to end tomorrow, hundreds of bombers and trained crews would have to stand idle until advanced air bases had been captured and developed for use against the Japanese. I cite this point only to show that it is no longer necessary for the Chinese to plead for help. The British-American command would be preparing to move into China even if no allies were there waiting to join hands with them.

Prime Minister Churchill's proposal to continue the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the post-war period, until a broader international organization to enforce the peace has been securely established, was not original. It was the outgrowth of informal discussions extending over many months. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, as Mr. Churchill has said, has been the instrument for achieving an unprecedented interlocking of the war efforts of major allies. It is regarded in high quarters here as being, in some respects, the most effective international organization of modern times. Its accomplishments can perhaps be fully appreciated only by those who have day-to-day contact with the intricacies of war on a global scale. It is, of course, strictly a British-American body.

Three of the British Dominions and the Chinese and the Dutch have sought membership and been denied it. The official American and British view until now has been: (1) that the decisions must be made by those upon whom victory in both phases of the war primarily depends and (2) that a further enlargement would turn the organization into an unwieldy debating society. It would be difficult to controvert either point. But the two sets of chiefs of staff have now achieved such familiarity with, and confidence in, each other that some of them would welcome the participation of others, if only for the purposes of education and morale. They allude especially to the Russians and Chinese, neither of whom have experts familiar with the logistics of trans-ocean operations, or the tactics and problems of naval warfare, or of amphibious operations, or of the large-scale strategic use of air power.

It has been suggested informally that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be continued for a period of ten years (subject to cancellation on one year's notice by either Britain or the United States); that it should be extended by five-year periods; and that it should be extended in perpetuity, subject to termination on one year's notice. On the American side, there is no way of making a binding agreement except by formal treaty. On the other hand, it is entirely within the province of the President, as Commander in Chief, to maintain American participation in this body without approval of Congress, on a year-to-year basis, at his own will. The important question is not the formal authorization, but whether the idea is acceptable to a large majority of the American people and to both major parties. There are many indications that, under present conditions, it is. Mr. Churchill's trial balloon evoked only a few scattered shots. Governor Dewey's proposal for a formal Anglo-American alliance caused hardly a political ripple.

These reactions probably are indicative of two things: (1) the growth of a hard-headed sense of realism about international relations on the part of the American public (which once applauded the Kellogg-Briand pact), and (2) the realization, out of the experience of two wars, that the defense of Britain is essential to the security of the United States.

In high official quarters, the desirability of a formal Anglo-American alliance is seriously doubted. There it is felt, rather, that this collaboration can be taken more or less for granted without elaborate documentation and that the real effort must be devoted to a more comprehensive organization of the peace. Both the President and Secretary Hull look forward to a world-wide system of security in which the smaller nations, as in the Western Hemisphere,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enjoy their rights as sovereign equals. Yet both realize that such a system must be supported by unchallengeable force and that this must come chiefly from the great powers: the United States, Britain, Russia, and, by transfusion or development, China.

A certain amount of anxiety about this tendency to emphasize the role of the great powers can be noted among some of the representatives of smaller nations. But, it is pointed out, some of these same sources were only too prone to argue that the failure of the League of Nations was due to the absence of the United States. If all nations were equal in influence, this absence would never have been noticed. The critical point, as it is viewed in official quarters in Washington, is not who makes decisions and exerts the power but whether the result is a world-system reasonably satisfactory to the United Nations as a whole. That was the underlying meaning of Secretary Hull's September address, setting forth the principles of world organization supported by the Administration but emphasizing the importance of enforcing the peace.

Mr. Hull spoke conservatively and generally, partly because of the innate character of his thinking, but also because his primary aim is to obtain agreement on an American national policy, standing above party and important factional disagreement. Except when he is angry, he is seldom provocative or inspiring. He leaves trail-blazing to others. His objective is to carry the American people with him overwhelmingly, and this requires the stressing of points which may seem obvious to more adventurous minds.

As this is being written, the attainment of a more complete understanding with Russia is perhaps the most pressing task of the Administration, acting in collaboration with the British. High officials are optimistic, within reason. They admit none of the doubts, felt in some quarters, that the Russians might make a separate peace. The Russians were consulted about the armistice terms offered to Italy. And they accepted membership on the newly formed Mediterranean Commission. For the present, this body will merely observe and inform. It will have no administrative duties and no direct controls over military operations or political decisions. But it will enable the Russian representatives to see everything that goes on and, if they like, to lodge objections or suggestions through Moscow. This is merely an extension of the courtesies which both the British and ourselves had previously extended to the Russians and which, at this time, have been only partially reciprocated. However, the preparations now under way for an American-British-Russian meeting at the foreign minister level are considered promising.

The capitulation of the Badoglio government on terms extremely favorable to the Allies confirmed the original judgment that Badoglio took power for the express purpose of breaking the German alliance. Why did he delay? Possibly in the hope of obtaining favorable political and economic promises. Possibly, in the hope of persuading the Germans to withdraw. Possibly to await the Allied invasion of Italy. The blunt fact is that the overthrow of Mussolini came before the Allies were ready to exploit it by military action; and the balance of military judgment is that we gained more than the Germans by the delay in Badoglio's surrender. It should be noted, however, that the Allied invasion of Italy does not imply an intention to drive the Germans back to the Brenner Pass. As bomber bases, southern Italy would do almost as well as the plains of the north. Italy is not the main avenue to Germany for ground troops.

Eventually the cross-Channel assault will be launched.



PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Walls Turn Outward

by

LIAN SHAIRO



CARL tried to decide whether to sleep for a little while now or put it off until later. For three days any personal decision — whether to have his mouthful of water by itself, or wait for the mouthful of food, whether to put on the ragged shirt against the night chill or hoard it for the cold time before dawn—had been painfully difficult. He thought now about sleeping. It was getting dark, the actual fighting would be falling off, but, on the other hand, they would be moving nearer the crumbling ghetto wall and he must watch. Perhaps he would wait. But until when? For the night was only half friend. It was enemy, too. And the hour before dawn was neutral. He could trust neither. He remembered pondering the same problem at another sunset, it may have been the day before. What decision had he made? He could not remember at all.

He gave orders to three men nearby and they moved slowly away. There was only this time, between sunset and dark, to remove the dead. The Germans, too, were removing their dead, and he knew that his joy in their killed was greater than his grief for his own. At first this realization had shocked and shamed him, but no more. His dead were such already, awaiting only the moment of death. But they out there had fallen to their helpless victims, whom they had themselves trapped, starving, behind walls. And the walls had been made to turn outward, and the death and torture within had reached out to clasp its perpetrators.

Carl stroked his gun, the gun that had

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been part of the garbage once dumped in the ghetto by the Christian wife of his friend Kalman. Yesterday she had tried to bring a gun without garbage and she had died. And Kalman had seized two rocks in his frail scholar's fingers and leaped on his bare, gangrenous feet to the top of the ghetto wall and hurled down the rocks and crushed the skull of the soldier. Kalman fell outside the wall as he died. Outside, at last. He had half-turned as he fell, and on his face was that same smile of glee that Carl felt on his own face each time he killed.

It was for this he hated them most. They had given him an exultation in killing that wiped out forty-five years of learning and wielding men's weapons against disease and death. They had given him three days of joy in slaughter that obliterated the damnation and hell of the months in the ghetto. Their bleeding bodies so filled his consciousness that he no longer remembered the raveling strands of the rope that choked his wife, or his son's empty, insane eyes. It was for this that he hated them most, that they had taken life from him and from his people, and made them live for death.

Carl patted the gun. He was one of the few who had a real weapon, an important man. Then he thought again about when he would sleep.

A girl came up to him and smiled. In one hand she held a knife, in the other, a bucket and a cup. She put the bucket down, dipped the cup, and held it to Carl's lips. No need any longer to decide about the separate mouthfuls of food and of water. Carl wondered how he knew this woman was young. There was no way of telling now, except from memory of the time before. It must be that he remembered then. Yes, she had lived near them in Warsaw, a pretty child, married to a friend of his son. Her husband had been in the Polish Army. Carl remembered more now, the images coming dimly back from far away before the last three days. These two had been among the first to urge resistance; the husband had helped organize into companies those who could walk had drilled them, and taught them the best use of their poor weapons and of their bare hands. Carl smiled at the girl and she went on, the knife easier for her weak strength to manage than the bucket.

The three men came back. Carl looked around and told them where to go. The choice was wide, but three days had taught him much and he selected the weakest spots with a sure and judging eye.

Should he sleep now or later?

"Doctor Carl." It was the little tailor.

"Yes?"

"To whom shall I give Professor Leck's gun?"

Leck was dead, then. This was very important. It was the only other gun in this section, and there was no more ammunition.

"How many bullets are in the gun?"

"One, Doctor Carl."

"Give it to Saul."

"Saul cannot take it. His glasses are broken and he cannot see well. He is afraid he will waste the bullet. He has some bricks."

"Can you shoot it?"

"I don't know, Doctor Carl."

"I will show you. You will not use it on yourself?"

"No, Doctor Carl, thank you. Doctor Carl?"

"Yes?"

"You should sleep a little. You have not slept the three days."

"Yes. Later."

But perhaps now would be better. Darkness had closed down, a cloak and a trap. He would put on the shirt. Though if he were going to sleep a little now, he might as well save the shirt for when, awake, he could enjoy it.

The bones of his hand stroking the gun came suddenly clear against the night. The light widened and brightened over the heaped rubble and the piles of twisted bodies. Carl put on the shirt and smiled, as he had smiled before, as Kalman had smiled.

"Their best troops, and now their brightest lights," he said aloud. "Their brightest lights, by which we, too, can see to kill."

He could not sleep now. He would not sleep at all. For tonight was the last night, and he must not miss a single moment of it. He patted his gun, and smiled, and waited.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CENTRAL EUROPE *after the* WAR

by Fritz Kaufmann

RUSSIA'S adoption of an attitude of outspoken hostility toward political federations in Central and Eastern Europe has come as a major shock to most people here and abroad. More than a year ago the Yugoslav and Greek governments-in-exile on the one hand, and the Polish and Czech on the other, concluded treaties of federation intended to form the nuclei for a Balkan and North Central Federation respectively. The former would ultimately embrace Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania also—all under changed regimes, of course—while the latter would logically attract a democratized Hungary and a reconstituted Austria, which would have to be separated from Germany even if Germany herself returned to democracy.

To all those familiar with the nationalist bickerings in Central Europe, this degree of willingness to co-operate could only be termed surprisingly far-reaching. True, the honeymoon of reconciliation did not last too long. As soon as the official fanfares celebrating the spectacular event had died away, a surprising quiet followed in all quarters where the federations had been sponsored. The Czechs flatly refused to consider Polish invitations to carry on more detailed negotiations on subjects covered by the treaties; the Yugolavs shunned any enlargement of their commitments toward the Greeks; the official announcement of youthful King Peter's engagement to a Greek princess was even delayed for some time for fear of political complications. The treaties of federation themselves, while formally retaining their validity, were relegated to the dustiest shelves of the governmental archives.

It has long been whispered in various diplomatic quarters that the intended federations have not materialized because of the obvious opposition of the Soviets which none of the interested governments could afford to take lightly. The Czechs especially felt not the slightest inclination to compromise their relations with Moscow which, among all the relations prevailing among Central European nations, are the most intimate and the most cordial. They were afraid to reinforce their ties with the Poles at a moment when there is a deep rift between the Polish government-in-exile and the Russian government, lest the latter interpret such a step as backing the Poles in their dispute, and hence as an act unfriendly to Russia.

At last the long-suspected hostility of the Russian government toward the intended federations has received official confirmation. An editorial in the Moscow periodical, *War and the Working Class,* which has come into prominence recently as a mouthpiece of Soviet policy, announced that the Russian government would look with disfavor on a reactionary Pan-Europe or a Europe divided into "various federations, confederations and regional blocs of states."

But Russian opposition, aside from deriving a measure of justification from past experience, was by no means the sole factor

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instrumental in killing the original plans for the North Central and Balkan Federations. Of much more profound importance, these schemes could never have materialized because they could never offer a workable solution for the future of Central Europe. Even before the formal Russian veto was announced, a conviction began to dawn on interested politicians that neither the Balkan Federation nor the North Central Federation was a philosopher's stone wherewith to exorcise their problems.

Though in most cases later figures are available, this inquiry is purposely based on statistics for the year 1937—the last year during which approximately normal peacetime conditions prevailed in Central Europe (Hitler marched into Austria on March 11, 1938). The territorial changes which have supervened meanwhile—such as those between Rumania and Hungary, and Rumania and Bulgaria—have been purposely ignored. Nor could cognizance be taken of the far-reaching changes in social and national structure brought about by war and arbitrary population shifts—in the form of Germanization, forced deportation, emigration and decimation of the Jewish population. The Allies are pledged to the restoration of the status quo as their primary war aim. And, with all its defects, the status quo offers the only reasonably safe starting point.

II

WHEN the statesmen of Yugoslavia and Greece, of Czechoslovakia and Poland, signed the preliminary treaties of federation, they did not envisage a "union" of the states in the sense of the United States of America. They contemplated a customs union; close economic co-ordination of transportation; standardized army equipment (though separate national armies were to be maintained) and a common general staff; co-ordination of foreign policy (to be achieved by regular consultations among Ministers—though the individual governments were to act on their own). The Federations were to be economic rather than military or political units. There was no hint of common citizenship or of a common legislative body.

The advantages accruing to nations participating in such a program depend on prevailing economic conditions. A customs union, for example, fulfills its purpose only when there is a certain self-sufficiency within the area it embraces—or at least when the several member states complement each other in production, so that they absorb most of their partners' foreign trade. This is true to a very marked degree in the United States of America, as it was in the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

But it is not true of the countries that were to enter the proposed Balkan or North Central Federation. A marked economic one-sidedness characterizes the former. All the prospective member states are predominantly agrarian—between 60 and 80 per cent of their total population are engaged in farming. Their agricultural output far exceeds their own needs. With the exception of Greece (which must import wheat and above all corn, but in turn shows a large surplus in oil, wine, southern fruits, and vegetables), cereal production in every one of these countries exceeds 1,110 pounds per capita per year, even in so poor a year as 1937.

On the other hand, they are markedly deficient in the most important mineral resources. True, Yugoslavia has some copper, zinc, and lead; Greece some nickel and chromium ore; both Greece and Yugoslavia some magnesite and pyrites; while Rumania, of course, has the most important petroleum production in Europe. But because of the almost complete lack of coal and iron, there can be no sizable metallurgic industry. This, together with the trifling electric power output, has in turn prevented the creation of virtually any heavy industry at all. Indeed, there are scarcely any industrial units transcending the scope of artisanship.

Consequently, the members of the Balkan Federation compete with one another in the sale of almost the same products—cereals, tobacco, garden produce, fruit, livestock, animal products, oil. These form 94 per cent of Bulgaria's exports, 72 per cent of Greece's, 43 per cent of Rumania's (73 per cent if petroleum is excluded), and 48 per cent of Yugoslavia's. But these countries are now, and will continue to be, dependent on industrial imports from outside the proposed federation. How little a customs

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

union has to offer them is readily seen from the fact, that, in 1937, total trade between the prospective members of the Balkan Federation amounted to but 7 per cent of their total imports and 6.1 per cent of their total exports. But for Rumanian petroleum, which these countries like the rest of Europe use as a matter of necessity, these figures would be considerably lower.

The one-sided character of such an economy would have proven a serious political handicap to a Balkan Federation. And since it would be no more able than its individual members to produce the armaments necessary for its defense, its "independence" would have tended to become something of an illusion.

The group embracing Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria would have constituted a far more favored economic unit. The food supply for the entire population would be more than assured; Poland and Hungary, which are predominantly agrarian, could easily make up the comparatively modest deficit of Austria and Czechoslovakia in wheat, rye, barley, and corn. On the other hand, the area possesses sufficient industrial raw materials—hard coal in Poland and Czechoslovakia, bituminous coal in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, iron in Austria and Czechoslovakia, zinc in Poland, magnesite in Austria—plus highly-developed industry and ample electric power. Within the scope of the contemplated Federation, previous marketing difficulties could be substantially reduced. The occupational stratification of the population is almost ideal. Inter-nation commerce, even today several times that existing among the Balkan states, would undoubtedly be still further increased by a customs union.

Important as these economic factors are, their significance must not be over-estimated. There have been and still are quite a number of states and combinations of states leading a happy life of their own, even without practicing economic autarchy. And to the extent to which, after this war, freedom of trade and movement is restored throughout the world, the question of accidental geographic location of raw materials and production centers will play an ever diminishing role; as will the armament industries under international control.

III

THE greater homogeneity of the Balkan Union, revealed as its economic weakness, would conversely be an advantage from a sociological point of view. The social structure of the individual Balkan states is by and large identical. It shows, so far as statistics are available, a sharp preponderance of small rural landowners. In average schooling and in the level of the standard of living, there is a general homogeneity (as indicated by such important criteria as per capita currency and the number of radio listeners) although, of course, the general level is unpleasantly low. The community of social interests, while representing somewhat of a beggars' unity, could perhaps, in the long run, have overcome those national, religious, and other differences which in the past have given rise to so many disputes and bloody wars.

In the North Central Federation, it would be much harder to overcome national contrasts in a supernational community of interests. From a purely mathematical point of view, the total social picture does not look favorable. It would appear that entrepreneurs and wage earners would be more evenly distributed throughout the Federation than they now are in most of the individual states; that the relation between urban and rural population would likewise be in much better balance; that the educational level of the meanest of the Northern Federation's states is nevertheless considerably higher than the level in the most advanced state within the Balkan Federation, and that the same is true regarding most of the indices for the standard of living.

True, the present distribution of ownership of the soil represents a major obstacle in establishing a successful common agrarian policy, especially a democratic one. Austria and Poland have enough agrarian problems of their own to solve, since 38.1 per cent of the land in Austria and 45.9 per cent of that in Poland is in the hands of large estate owners, who represent only a fraction of one per cent of the total number of farmers. However, well over half of the peasants in these two countries are holders of good medium-sized farms of from 5 to 50 hectares. But in Hungary, 28,146 large es-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tates account for more than 53 per cent of the entire national territory: the 200 largest, of more than 3,000 hectares each, together add up to about 20 per cent of the soil. Worst of all, almost half of the large estates belong to the "Dead Hand." They are Church property. Or, as "Fideicommiss" (a survival from feudalism) of the noble families, they are unsaleable. So far, these institutions have successfully prevented all attempts to divide the property into smaller units. A far-reaching Hungarian agrarian reform would therefore be an imperative prerequisite to a social and economic rapprochement of these nations.

But the real problem lies even deeper. Numerically the Poles would take first place. They would constitute one-third of the total population. Other Slavic groups within the area would form an equally large element in the population. Consequently, the Magyars, and the people from culturally and economically dominant Austria, would be confronted with a compact two-thirds majority of Slavs. And because of the higher Slavic birth rate, the disparity would increase from year to year. It is hardly conceivable that the Magyars and Austrian Germans would voluntarily submit to such a Slavic hegemony; for the possible advantages to be derived from the proposed federation could hardly justify this national self-sacrifice.

Still more important—and this applies also to a Balkan Union—the politically feeble bond between the individual federation members, as envisaged by the federation treaties, would accentuate the old national antagonisms (the dissolution of which must be the fundamental task of the architects of the future Central Europe). The representatives of the four or five states claiming full independence would, at their mutual conferences, concentrate all their power upon getting for their own countries as much as possible within the framework of the union. Their conferences would become places for incessant, violent bargaining, trading, since every representative would try to go home with gains for *his* land, instead of keeping the interest of the commonwealth in mind. Federation or no, the evil of particularism would continue to flourish.

And since the individual states are most unequal in size and population and therefore in power, the bigger partner would finally throw his weight into the scale in order to win special advantages for himself. Constant and growing friction among the federation members would become inevitable as time went by. In addition, every state would regard itself as the natural "protector" of those of its members living in neighboring domains. And these minorities would always and inevitably feel neglected and suppressed in one respect or another.

In short, we should witness a repetition of the kind of strife prevailing in the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy; except that this strife would be much more marked, because each of the nations living within one of the two federations would be "sovereign" and because there would be no over-all authority to reconcile conflicts or to put them down by force. The Hapsburgs, after all, despite all the mistakes with which they must be credited, did serve this useful purpose.

The premature death of the intended Northern Central and Balkan Federations appears, therefore, as not too harmful for the future reconstruction of Central Europe: they would have become unworkable instruments. But our analysis should at least serve as a useful guide toward a better and more constructive solution. It must take into account the following facts, which, in the light of this analysis, may be regarded as definitely established:

1. No solution will be workable unless it is fully endorsed by the Soviet Union.

2. Even with such an endorsement, a mere economic union of a few of the Central European or Balkan states offers no solution for the main problems of that area.

3. A federation of politically sovereign states—which, by the way, is no federation at all from the standpoint of either political theory or experience—would not solve the problems of nationalities and national minorities, especially in the North Central area.

4. All the states concerned, and especially the Balkan states, need additional protection against any urge toward military or economic expansion on the part of postwar Germany.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

SUCH a solution certainly does not consist in the restoration of the status quo of 1938—with those minor readjustments which Russia might claim for her own safety and her allies might be ready to concede—especially if the witches' caldron of Central Europe is once more left to its own fate. Between 1829 and 1919, the nine "sovereign" states forming the object of our study had been successively carved out of the spacious economic co-prosperity sphere represented principally by the two large, though politically weak, bodies, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. They were created because of an ill-conceived nationalism.

The same principal that, elsewhere in Europe, succeeded in forging the unity of the two most aggressive empires in modern history was applied here to the dismemberment of political entities neither of which had waged an offensive war for roughly two centuries. The solution they had offered was by no means ideal. In fact, the First World War was kindled in this region. But the solution the victorious Allies attempted—the 1938 status quo—was far worse. Not one of the nine individual states, either created or aggrandized and confirmed in its nationalistic aspirations by the Peace Treaties, was viable as an independent unit. This was obvious a mere two years after Versailles, Saint Germain, Neuilly, Trianon, and Lausanne. But petty jealousy, nationalist prejudices, and short-sighted chauvinism managed to obscure this truth from the world and even from those most directly concerned until it was too late.

We must rule out any moves toward a division of Europe into two distinct spheres of influence, with Eastern and Central Europe dominated by Russia and the Western European nations under joint British-American influence, for such a division of spoils would make a mockery of everything the United Nations pretend to stand for. It would substitute a continental imperialism for the dying imperialistic control exercised over the hitherto backward countries overseas. It would debase to a definite colonial status the victims of the German "Herrenvolk" whom we are committed to free; and it would spell the end of Europe as an economic and cultural factor in world policies—the real *"Untergang des Abendlandes."*

There remains, therefore, only one real solution. Astonishingly enough, it has not yet been clearly envisaged. The whole troublesome area must forcibly become the common concern of all the United Nations. The evolution of an instrument of their common policy, a United Nations' Council, is inevitable. One of its main tasks must become that of so organizing Central Europe that that area can no longer be a constant menace to the world's peace. The Council will provide the nations of Central Europe with every opportunity to choose their own democratic governments—preferably under their own pre-war methods of election, where these allowed of a free expression of the wishes of the electorate. It will give them a chance to achieve a new and suitable economic integration, or even the political unification which they may themselves desire.

But the United Nations must see to it that this new order, once established, cannot be reversed by any unconstitutional force from within or without. Therefore, the community of the United Nations rather than the national state will be taken as the standard of reference; and it will have to enforce the observance by the individual governments of constitutional principles.

Nobody will maintain that the task confronting the United Nations' Council in Central Europe would be easy. But there are many indications that Russia, which at one time wholeheartedly supported the idea of collective security within the framework of the League of Nations, would be willing to participate once more in a reasonable arrangement for the security of post-war Europe. The question is much less one of how far Russia will be prepared to go in quest of a common ground of policy than of how far the United States will go. Thus far it has adopted no policy for keeping the peace after it is won. If Russia could be reassured in this matter, her suspicions concerning plans for Central Europe would disappear. A foundation-stone could thus be laid for Anglo-Russian-American co-operation in European affairs and for the formation of a United Nations' Council which, in due course, would ultimately solve the entangled problems of Central Europe.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

The average reader would be astonished if he were confronted with a report on the transition from war to peace economy, issued under the auspices of the League of Nations; for he has assumed that the League of Nations has practically, if not legally, ceased to exist. He would doubt, at any rate, its ability to make practical suggestions for the post-war world, since its attempts to guide the world along co-operative lines failed so utterly in the years preceding the war.

But such an assumption, based primarily on the sad record of the League in the domain of High Policy, would be both incorrect and unfair. It would completely ignore the solid work which, in spite of the mighty political obstacles arising from ever-growing autarchic, chauvinistic, and isolationist tendencies everywhere, the League had done in the field of international cultural, social, and economic collaboration during the ten years preceding the outbreak of World War II. The League's suggestions on post-war planning merit, therefore, the closest attention.

XVII—The League's Report on the Transition from War to Peace Economy

THE Report opens with a statement of the objectives of post-war economic policy. It notes war's profound effect on the attitude of society toward the problem of *economic security:*

FREDERICK PHILLIPS, *Chairman*
CARTER GOODRICH
HENRY F. GRADY
G. H. C. HART
ZYGMUNT KARPINSKI
O. MORGENSTERN
G. F. TOWERS

> Why, it is asked, has society been so organized that all can find work to do when the object of that work is destruction, but men and women are unable to find employment when they desire to work to satisfy their own wants? Why can society be so elaborately and so efficiently organized to lower but not to raise the standard of living? We for our part do not believe that men and women, when this war is over, will tolerate an organization of society under which those who are willing and anxious to work, for no obvious or conscious fault of their own—indeed for no obvious cause—are deprived of the opportunity of doing so. They will demand the right to work and to create, because creative work is the very essence of existence, and one of the first objects of policy must be to satisfy that claim in so far as it is humanly possible to do so. To afford unemployment allowances, though essential, is not enough. No self-respecting persons want to live as a charge on their community when capable of useful activity and of contributing to the general welfare. Work is as essential to human well-being as is leisure, and this fact has been learnt during the bitter years of unemployment before the war.

The conscience of the world was deeply shocked by the coexistence in the pre-war world of "large unsaleable stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials (part of which from time to time was deliberately destroyed) and by the want and deprivation suffered by the unemployed and the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

partially employed," and by the realization "that even in the richest countries a large proportion of the population was inadequately housed and inadequately clothed." The Report suggested that in future the economics of consumption must, generally speaking, replace the economics of production; that our economic system must be so organized as to satisfy, above all, the basic needs of the people.

But the Report is well aware that, while production can be greatly increased when governments and public opinion are so resolved, "it is very much more difficult to maintain full employment of all the resources of production when demand itself depends on the aggregate tastes and desires of the mass of the people and is subject to changes in taste and in fashion, than when it is determined by the pre-planned requirements of war. Again it is more difficult to maintain when each individual can exercise his right to work or not to work, to choose one occupation rather than another, to spend or to save." But since this is one of the essential freedoms for which the Allies are fighting, the objectives of economic policy must be achieved within the framework of a social system designed to preserve individual liberty. Moreover, it is no nationalistic doctrine to believe "that we should think in terms of the consumers' needs first and then in terms of our mechanical, scientific and human power to satisfy those needs." And "the war has deepened the belief that the difference in the standards of living of different peoples is a menace to social order and international understanding." A sense of world unity is developing, giving rise to a conception of pooling and sharing available resources in peace as well as in war.

There is no question of returning to the pre-war international economic system, for in 1939 only the ruins of such a system were left. On the contrary, the Report affirms that the objectives of post-war economic policy should be to assure:

(a) that the fullest possible use is made of the resources of production, human and material, of the skill and enterprise of the individual, of available scientific discoveries and inventions, so as to attain and maintain in all countries a stable economy and rising standards of living;

(b) that in so far as possible, no man or woman able and willing to work should be unable to obtain employment for periods of time longer than is needed to transfer from one occupation to another or, when necessary, to acquire a new skill;

(c) that in the use of these productive resources, the provision of goods and services to meet the essential physiological needs of all classes of the population in food, clothing, house room and medical care is a prime consideration;

(d) that society distribute, as far as possible, the risk to the individual resulting from interruption or reduction of earning power;

(e) that the liberty of each individual to choose his own occupation is respected and is promoted by equal educational opportunities;

(f) that the liberty of each country to share in the markets of the world and thus to obtain access to the raw materials and manufactured goods bought and sold on those markets is promoted by the progressive removal of obstructions to trade;

(g) that the benefits of modern methods of production are made available to all peoples both by the progressive removal of obstructions to trade and by courageous international measures of reconstruction and development.

The "Right to Work"

The second objective is discussed at some length in a section of the Introduction entitled "The Right to Work." This term does not, it is pointed out, imply that no person should be unemployed while in search of a job but rather that governments are responsible for avoiding large-scale and protracted unemployment. This they can hope to do only if they have adequate power, the backing of public opinion, and especially the support of employers and workers in checking monopolistic practices.

Owing to the breakdown of the world's economic system in the 'thirties, the statesmen of tomorrow will be faced with a triple task:

(a) of reconstructing a world system;

(b) of assuring as smooth as possible a transition from war to peace economy;

(c) of seeing that forces giving rise to renewed depressions are counteracted.

Although the recommendations advanced in the latter parts of the Report refer primarily to the problem of securing economic stability and full employment in states in which individual enterprise is encouraged, no judgment is thereby passed concerning the value of other criteria. "No assumption is made regarding the socio-economic system or the degree of participation or supervision of the State in economic life that may be desired in different countries." It is, however, postulated throughout the Report that peace will be restored in such a manner as to revive confidence, and that therefore an effective system of collective security will be established.

The Effects of War Economy

The Report goes on to describe those characteristics of war economy and those effects of war itself which are likely to involve difficult problems of readjustment. Among these,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it emphasizes (1) capital consumption and the reaction of the world economy to the sale of foreign investments and the borrowing abroad to which many countries had to resort; (2) excess plants—although "the expansion of the metal, the engineering and above all the machine tool industries during the war should in general prove an asset and not a liability," since this will facilitate the development of industry throughout the world; (3) "increased demand arising on account of the curtailment that has been imposed on consumption by the restrictions on spending, on account of the depletion of stocks of raw materials and of goods in the hands of consumers, and on account of worn-out plant, dilapidated houses, lack of houses, etc."; (4) shifts in demand from the state to the individual; (5) the presence of false capital values, if provision is not made to allow producers to amortize their plants adequately during the war; (6) the possible emergence of "vested interests which may prevent the appropriate adjustments to peacetime conditions from taking place and seek to maintain the excessive capital values at the expense of the whole community by heavy tariff protection, subsidies, etc."; and (7) such various factors as the disposal of government-owned plants, the inflationary peril in the conversion of savings certificates into cash, the danger of prohibitive taxation of risk-capital, owing to the increase in domestic debt, the destruction wrought by war, etc.

Domestic Issues

The next chapter is primarily concerned with the problem of transition in countries where there is little likelihood that full employment after the war will be impeded by lack of raw materials or inability to buy them abroad. It opens with a consideration of the probable nature of post-war demand in these countries and the chance that this may lead to a runaway price boom, with subsequent collapse and unemployment. In view of this risk it is urged that measures taken to control prices and effect an equitable distribution of supplies, whether to the producer or to the consumer, should not be abandoned suddenly but relaxed gradually as shortages are overcome. The different types of control, financial and physical, and the different types of demand—for consumers' durable and non-durable goods, for machinery and other capital goods, for raw materials, etc.—are successively surveyed. In every case the main preoccupation is to get men re-employed and production redirected toward consumers' needs when the war demand falls off, and to do this as rapidly as can be without causing a boom and consequent slump.

Although the major factor in the transition period is likely to be the shift from government to private demand, government orders and public works are bound to play an important role in facilitating or impeding a smooth transition. Two major dangers are foreseen: that projects indispensable for getting the whole national or international economic mechanism to functioning again will not be ready; and that governments will hamper economic recovery by launching too many schemes or launching them at the wrong moment. In many countries, especially in Europe and Asia, it will be urgent to repair the damage suffered during the war. But where possible, such projects should be postponed, governments endeavoring rather to fill gaps in demand than to compete with the market. When the first rush of consumers' demands is spent, postponed government undertakings may exercise a useful stabilizing influence. Stress is also laid on the importance of fiscal policies to encourage enterprise, on government schemes for teaching new skills to meet the new needs that will arise, and on helping workers find employment.

We should like to quote a series of well-formulated statements from this chapter to illustrate various aspects of the problem with which it deals:

> We believe it to be of vital importance that government should prepare in advance; that many of the decisions especially regarding joint international action should have been taken before the termination of hostilities.
>
> It is equally important that the business world should think out its policies for this transition period in advance.
>
> The rapidity with which and the extent to which various controls may be abandoned will depend on the one hand on the general social philosophies of individual countries and on the other on the rapidity with which confidence can be restored, scarcity overcome, and those conditions re-established under which private enterprise may flourish.

The post-war factors of disequilibrium are compactly summarized. They include:

(a) Structural changes, including the "enormous growth of metallic and engineering industries, the growth of new industries in countries previously relying on foreign-produced industrial goods, the development of certain types of labor skills, the concentration of labor and industry for strategic reasons in certain areas, the abnormal price relationships that have established themselves in each country during the war, the growth of independent national price and cost levels.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(b) Post-war consumers' demands: when consumers' goods are strictly non-durable, a sudden increase "is likely to prove permanent and to have a stabilizing effect on world economy. The reverse is true of semi-durable or durable goods. . . . There will be a sudden scramble for these goods, followed later by a scarcely less sudden collapse of demand, and again later there is likely to be a revival of demand less intense than the first and a subsequent falling off."

(c) Unevenness of demand for capital goods and too heavy a concentration of demand for necessary replacements around certain dates.

(d) Indirect effects, through prices, of the release of pent-up demand for all classes of goods.

(e) In certain areas, the lack of means for making payment—a situation as dangerous as excess liquid capital. In this connection, any attempt to meet the needs of impoverished countries by means of loans at a fixed high rate of interest may diminish immediate difficulties only to create still more serious difficulties for the future.

As to the principal remedies for controlling demand, the Report is not too explicit. In the financial field, indirect control consists chiefly of wise publicity aimed at preventing too lavish expenditure by returning soldiers or by the general public. To counter an over-rapid capital investment, reliance must be placed on a system of licenses for the use of certain varieties of steel, on a control of market issues, etc. Fiscal policies ought also to be used as checks: taxes on necessities should be reduced; but if initiative and enterprise are to be encouraged, taxation should fall on individual income, rather than on corporate savings.

In discussing the physical control of demand, the Report makes a distinction between consumers' goods, investment goods, and raw materials. In the first group, there is "no economic reason against increasing consumption as quickly as possible and little risk of such increase having later cyclical effects except through the price mechanism." Therefore, "the right procedure in the case of straight rationing is, gradually and as rapidly as possible, to increase the rations as the supplies coming forward increase. . . . Granted that rations are not raised more rapidly than the supplies, there should be no underlying tendency towards higher prices, but on the contrary, as the needs of one income group after another are satisfied, a tendency for prices to fall. As soon as prices have fallen below the fixed maxima, those maxima may be abolished." If the government, however, has subsidized retail prices, "it is probable that the restoration of the normal price mechanism will have to be begun at the wholesale end and not at the retail."

No general provisions are made for investment goods. But very extensive proposals are made concerning raw materials:

> (a) That the rationing of raw materials not made into rationed goods may have to be maintained for some time after the cessation of hostilities and maximum prices on these goods retained.
>
> (b) That governments may frequently find it advisable to leave each trade to carry out the rationing of individual firms under government supervision, in order both to obtain the active cooperation of the business world in government planning and to make the maximum use of each industry's knowledge of its own peacetime problems. No monopoly is created by such cooperation; but a maximum chance of equitable distribution of these supplies amongst the individual producing units may be assured.
>
> (c) That as soon as there are grounds for believing that the risk of runaway prices is past, such controls should be abolished, commodity by commodity. In this connection we would remark that it will probably happen that, after most of the controls have been abolished, a limited number of goods still continue to sell at maximum prices with every indication that these prices would jump were the control removed. In such circumstances it may well be wise to remove the control and allow the changed price ratios to express themselves.
>
> (d) That to prevent private traders from purchasing for stock, it may be wise, as other controls are being liberated, to demand, before granting an import license, a declaration of stocks held and of the purpose for which the imported goods are required.
>
> (e) That for the same reason, governments should continue to collect statistics of stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials held in all hands and should publish the results.

International Problems of Transition

The last chapter of the Report deals with the international problems of transition and in its first two sections emphasizes the need for government action and internatioal co-operation. The difficulties to be overcome after this war are likely to be even greater than they were in 1918 and the need for an agreed plan of action imperative. Many countries whose needs in food, raw materials, and capital goods for the reconstruction of their economic life are likely to be most pressing will lack adequate means for making payments abroad.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Their problem is obviously an international one and unless it is solved the whole future of international economic relationships may be jeopardized.

It is most essential in a peace economy that individuals and nations should be able to produce, and exchange what they produce.

> Relief, to be effective, must not simply fill the human belly for a short period of time, but must enable the individuals who require it to continue that process themselves in the future. The distinction between relief and reconstruction should not be determined by classes of commodities. The real line of distinction, if there is one, is financial.
>
> Relief is the provision of goods without immediate or postponed payment. But relief is the first step in reconstruction, and if it fails to reconstruct, it is ineffective charity. . . . It is wiser to provide food plus cotton or wool or any other raw material which can be worked up into export goods than food for two years in succession. What is necessary is to ascertain the minimum amounts of goods of all sorts essential to get the economic mechanism of countries functioning again and to compare these *minima* with (a) the assets of these countries that can be immediately mobilized without leading to a subsequent breakdown and (b) the extent to which the borrowing capacity of these countries can be employed without leading to a subsequent breakdown. The difference between needs and these two resources is the amount on account of which there is a claim for relief.

The International Aspects of Rationing

International co-ordination will be imperative if national policies concerning rationing and price control, as outlined in an earlier chapter, are to be effective during the period of scarcity. Otherwise world prices of essential goods will rise. An abstention, moreover, on the part of the wealthier states from absorbing a disproportionate share of scanty supplies would be equivalent to a form of relief not less important than the direct provision of supplies—provided, of course, the recipient country continued its own rationing system and enforced it properly.

The co-ordination of rationing would naturally not imply identity of rations or prices in the various countries, but simply that "initial amounts, once agreed upon, should not be changed except by common consent."

In order to prevent a scramble for raw products, tonnage, etc., it is recommended that governments continue or institute machinery for the purchase and international distribution of such goods and for the joint control of tonnage so long as serious shortages persist. As supplies of raw material become more plentiful, this machinery might be employed to stabilize prices by coordinating supply and demand and, in some cases, by the creation of buffer stocks.

The Control of Inflation

International funds will be needed for a number of purposes. There will be:

> (a) in the first instance, a demand for food, raw materials and certain finished goods to feed and clothe the populations and gradually to restart production in the stricken areas;
>
> (b) a demand for capital, domestic and foreign, to repair the physical damage and make good the wear and tear suffered during the war;
>
> (c) a demand for capital, for the reserves of Banks of Issue and for exchange stabilization funds adequate to permit of adjustments required on account of balance of payments difficulties;
>
> (d) finally, a demand for capital for the development and reorganization of the industrial structure in countries where boundaries are modified, where the existing structure has been rendered inappropriate to the postwar world distribution of productive capacity, in countries suffering from demographic pressure and in countries which are in the process of industrialization and are themselves poor in capital.

The availability of funds is likely to be dependent, *inter alia*, upon such factors as the relaxation of exchange controls and multilateral agreements for clearing monies and conducting trade. But control over exchange will in all likelihood be enforced by most countries. For this reason among others, the recent United States and British Treasury proposals to establish some form of international clearing or an equalization fund are welcomed.

Attention is drawn to the peril that post-war inflation in the war areas may endanger the best-laid plans unless effective steps are taken to halt it. Adequate assistance in the initial provision of foodstuffs, raw materials, etc.; the institution of some mechanism for the revival of international trade on a multilateral basis; and appropriate commercial policies should, it is felt, do much to diminish this danger.

In the matter of the demand for fixed capital, whether for the repair of war damage or for new developments, the Report formulates a certain number of principles concerning foreign long-term investments:

(a) While it is taken for granted that direct government lending will probably be indispensable, it is pointed out that loans extended on an equity basis, or in some form of income debentures, would impose a less severe strain on the balance of payments of the borrowing country when prices fall.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(b) When loans are made to governments, they should be at the lowest possible rate of interest and should allow contractually for the suspension of amortization in bad times.

(c) Preference should be given to capital expenditures required for the purchase of reproductive commodities, such as machinery or locomotives.

(d) When such preference is impossible, careful control should be exercised over the import of what to the receiving country may be fairly classed as luxury goods.

(e) Adequate labor standards in the following countries should be stipulated.

Commercial Policy

However important the contribution of an international clearing fund toward the restoration of world trade, that restoration can, the Report points out, be neither complete nor permanent if commercial policies run counter to the fundamental factors in the balance of payments situation. The war is producing profound changes in the structure of international claims and indebtedness. These can best be met by such changes in commercial policy as will permit a substantial increase in the purchase of foreign goods by those countries whose creditor position has been strengthened. "Governments will find it much easier to effect the reductions that the changes in their balance of payments situation demand during the war when there is no risk of unemployment than later when they may be subjected to the full pressure of sectional interests."

Bilateralism and autarchy have been largely the products of economic and political insecurity:

"An international organ might, we believe, help governments to devise commercial policies conducive to economic stability."

Two points are emphasized in conclusion: first, that means must be found for co-ordinating the policies of the various international organs which may prove necessary; second, that economic policy must be correlated with political. Military security cannot be devised in an economic vacuum nor economic security in the face of the threat of war.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

IN recommending a policy which would simultaneously avoid a repetition of previous mistakes and help to build a new world with a minimum of labor-pains and a maximum of efficiency, the authors of the Report are well aware that the actual policies adopted by individual governments will largely depend upon the kind of governments in power after the war. We feel they may have underrated the likelihood that most of them (not merely in the war-stricken areas of Europe but in the United Kingdom and possibly even in this hemisphere as well) will strive to establish a mixed economy. In this economy, varied types of ownership of the various means of production—private capital, the state, and various social groups such as consumers' co-operatives—will all be represented.

The proposals advanced in the Report seem, therefore, to be rather too conservative, and rely too heavily on *laissez faire* principles which will be pretty much out of date. Perhaps they do not sufficiently emphasize the urgent necessity, and the clear possibility, that entrepreneurs everywhere will have to come to terms with semi-socialistic regimes in Europe, with planned economy in large areas of Asia where a momentous change from the backward, feudalistic, agrarian system to modern industrialization will take place after the war, and even with the state capitalism of Soviet Russia. But the authors of the Report are to be congratulated for their grasp of new ideas in stressing political security as the indispensable preliminary condition to economic co-operation between countries and for the firm rebuke they have administered to the spurious "realism" which ignores the effects that national policies exert on the interests of other countries. While they are sure that "the pressure of special interests in favor of self-regarding policies will again be strongly felt" after this war, they are courageous enough to denounce the possible triumph of these forces. Such a triumph would indeed have the most disastrous of consequences.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Danes say "NO" to Germany

LAST August the Germans couldn't conceal the fact that something was rotten in the state of Denmark, so far as German-Danish relations were concerned. Resistance had spread to all parts of the country and the Nazis began to feel their position crumbling in a country that is a link between the Reich and Norway.

The Danes, who since April 9, 1940 had had to accept the fact of occupation, had never accepted protection and indoctrination. Soon, very soon, the Germans complained that the Danes looked "through them rather than at them." In the summer of 1940, when German censors began to interfere with the freedom of the press, a system of "chain letters," introduced by several young patriots, proved a tremendous success. The "chain letters" published the news suppressed in the papers, kept the public informed about German penetration into the economic life of Denmark, and disseminated the real facts about the Battle of England (which the Danes followed with enthusiasm).

Economic "collaboration" between the two countries turned out to be a policy of spoliation, the protector becoming debtor to the protected people. In 1942, Danish production of food of animal origin slumped 49 per cent from the 1939 level. The credit held by the National Bank in the clearing account (Germany's loot) amounted to 2,900 million kroner.

The Danish government, which remained responsible for the administration of the country, tried unsuccessfully to work out a modus vivendi with the German commander and the German minister. Two revisions of the Danish cabinet gave the post of minister of foreign affairs to Eric Scavenius, a man favorable to the policy of reasonable collaboration with the Axis. But in dealing with Germany, collaboration cannot be held within reasonable limits—something that Scavenius, later appointed Prime Minister by the Germans, learned in 1943.

MARCELLUS:
Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.

HORATIO:
Heaven will direct it.

—Shakespeare, *Hamlet*

The nazi General von Hanneken wanted a complete subordination of the political and economic life of Denmark to the demands of Berlin. General von Hanneken, closely connected with the Gestapo, does not understand the language of diplomacy. With the brutality of a chief of the S.S., his notes to the Danish government have uniformly been couched in the form of an ultimatum. He was chiefly disturbed by the fact that sabotage was not punishable by death and he urgently demanded the introduction of martial law in Denmark. The clash over this issue finally ended with the occupation of the country after heroic and desperate resistance from the Danish armed forces—who knew in advance that they had no chance of success but fought bravely to defend the honor of the country.

The movement of resistance, about which up to now so little has been said, was organized two years ago to hold on and to continue the fight against the invader. It will outlast the occupation of Denmark.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The first underground paper appeared in the spring of 1941 under the title, *Frie Danske* (Free Danes). The underground press now comprises thirty publications with the *Danske Tidende* (Danish Gazette) at the top of the list. On election day (March 23, 1943), more than 50,000 copies of *Danske Tidende* were distributed.

The clandestine *Frit Danmark* (Free Denmark), organ of the united front established between Conservatives and Communists at the beginning of 1942, appeared after a secret meeting between Aksel Larsen and Christmas Moeller, leaders respectively of the communist and conservative parties. For the first number of this illegal paper the chief of the conservative party wrote this introductory article:

We know with absolute certainty that only victory for the Allied Powers, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, and the smaller states associated with this group of great nations, can bring the peace and order required for the work of reconstruction and can restore the rule of law and justice with honor.

The German grip round our throats is becoming tighter and tighter and our country, though more slowly than others, is surely being dragged into the hell of German unification and despotism. The greater leniency of the treatment we receive is closely related to two facts: first, that we were, unfortunately, the only country (apart from Siam) which bowed to the invasion and voluntarily yielded to the yoke laid upon us; and second, and this for Germany is a delicate point, that it is in the interests of the Germans to give us more lenient terms. In this way, Germany obtains more goods, more workers, more of every sort of thing she needs, than she would be able to glean if Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, or Balkan conditions prevailed in this country.



In these words, we can find the explanation of the policy the Germans have followed during the past two years.

The Germans had already protested several times against Christmas Moeller's activities. He had been forced to resign from his post as Minister of Commerce and to relinquish all his responsibilities as official leader of the conservative party. When *Frit Danmark* appeared, it became too dangerous for Mr. Moeller to stay in Denmark. He flew to England and there became chairman of the Danish Council in London. From London, he continued to inspire Danish resistance with the spirit of unity for which he had stood when he reached an agreement with the Communists.

All the underground papers, from the communist *Land og Folk* (Land and People) to the local *Aarhus Ekko* (Aarhus Echo) published in Jutland, are permeated by one single purpose: to get rid of the invader. No specific political propaganda is to be found in these publications; it is simply understood that democracy is the great principle for which the Danes are fighting.

Of course, it should not be implied that the free press has been giving no thought to the future. Last June, the representatives of the underground movement met in Copenhagen and decided to continue cooperation after the war, as a non-political organization. In the meantime, these members decided "to bring home the responsibility of those Danes who had acted counter to the interests of Denmark during the occupation."

Since very few Danes sold out to the Germans, this problem is not so acute in Denmark as in other countries. However, the Danish Underground has compiled a complete "black-list" of traitors, whose activities have been made easier by the total occupation. From now on, the underground will have to deal more harshly with collaborationists, for it is a question of life and death.

Nothing can give us a better account of the conditions surrounding the underground press than a report written by the editor of the illegal *Frit Danmark* and sent to London a few months ago. We quote from it extensively, for no document could carry more authority.

We have *printed* our paper *Frit Danmark*—yes, *printed*, though it is perhaps one of the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

most expensive printing enterprises in the country. Six typographers were taken by the Germans, lots of types and newly printed editions were requisitioned during the night, but each time we succeeded in saving some material. What is funny amidst all the serious business is that people prefer to see our paper mimeographed rather than printed: they find it more of a mystery with a mimeographed sheet. And to us it is, of course, less dangerous, and so we mimeograph *Frit Danmark* once more.

FRIT DANMARK

Our propaganda for an active contribution toward fighting German suppression has had two aims: First, to make all of us realize that freedom is a thing which must forever be defended—defended again and again. Second, to weaken the Germans at the only point on which we unarmed and militarily ignorant people can hit the German Achilles heel—GERMANY'S LACK OF MANPOWER. Whether it is a question of soldiers, police, or labor, the Germans at present are in such dire need of men that it cannot but give them a serious headache at Berlin; and every time they are obliged to send people up here to watch us, they can't help but feel it on some other front. It took some time before the majority here at home understood that that was a fact. But if you listen to our radio you will, although it is controlled by the Germans, have got an impression of growing resistance and sabotage. The Germans really tear their hair now.

The German commander in Denmark, General von Hanneken, was on the point of having a fit of rage in January as a result of the growing sabotage. He suddenly called in all the newspaper editors—not the underground, though—to reprimand them. They obeyed Scavenius, you see, who had forbidden them to write about sabotage. But Hanneken was of the opinion that it would be of value if something was written about it, all the same. He gave the message in the usual German tone of command, threatened death and shooting of hostages, giant fines, etc. which the municipalities in the towns where sabotage took place would have to pay. Since this peculiar press meeting took place there has been an increase in sabotage, although the papers have obediently protested against sabotage. And the Germans who would not willingly have another Norway, Holland, or Belgium . . . alternately threaten and entreat.

Gradually, we who do our work underground have become quite a goodly number. I can hear you ask—how can anyone hide in Denmark? Or do you take the word "underground" to be a technical exaggeration?

But it is really true that there is an underground network of centers of resistance. I am ashamed to say that we have learned much from the Communists, although that of course would be used by the Germans to scare all peaceful, law-abiding citizens. Danes were certainly not fitted for underground activity, and it took some time to learn, particularly to learn to keep our mouths shut.

One of the most difficult things to learn was that one may not say anything even to a real friend, even to one to be trusted.

But we are tough and that is cheering. For instance, "The Free Danes"—the first Danish underground paper (in a couple of months it will have been in existence for two years) is still going strong, though nearly 100 collaborators and helpers have been imprisoned. The other day the Germans thought they were finally getting at it; they attacked a flat in Vestergade (Copenhagen), took the owner and his lodger to the police station, and declared that at last they had found "the Free Danes" headquarters. But in two weeks they will find that the paper is still at it. The editors have lived underground for nine months. The other evening I met one of them in the street.



Where does he hide? That, of course, I cannot reveal. But I can assure you that it will be a long time before the hiding places are exhausted, and there is such a thing as sticking together.

"Sticking together"—this is the secret of Danish resistance; and the German forces of occupation will never be able to undermine it.

PIERRE DUPONT

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United France Awaits the Allies

by
GEORGES BUISSON
Secretary
of
The French Confederation
of
Labor

THE Russian Campaign has tremendously depleted the human reservoir behind Hitler's armies. The Fuehrer has even had to draw workers from warplants to cast them into his furnace.

In a lachrymose speech over Radio-Vichy, Pierre Laval asked the French workers to assure success to the German labor levy. The levy was presented as allowing the liberation of war prisoners, Hitler having generously promised to grant one prisoner in exchange for three specialized workers to be sent to Germany. Official propagandists were mobilized for the purpose, and the press received an order to depict the German labor levy under the most favorable colors.

But this powerfully orchestrated campaign failed utterly. French workers, backed by their labor organizations, categorically refused to go to Germany to work against their own country and to feed the enemy's war. They resisted all pressure and preferred risking their lives to becoming traitors to the cause of national liberation.

Today it is no longer a question of releasing prisoners, although the term "levy" is still in use. It is a real industrial mobilization on behalf of the Reich, a veritable deportation of Frenchmen.

More easily to discover the men trying to defraud the government, a decree was issued recently, stipulating that all Frenchmen between eighteen and fifty years of age should carry a "working card," an identity card giving the occupation of the bearer. Under the pretext of finding out which of the young men who in normal times would have been called to the army were idle, Laval ordered the mobilization of the classes of 1940, 1941, and 1942. If, in the first two classes, some exceptions should be granted for agricultural and railroad workers, every man of the class of 1942 would be compelled to go to Germany. In *L'Oeuvre*, M. Marcel Déat expressed his lively satisfaction: "The watchword of total labor levy which we boldly launched and which, a year ago, appeared utopian, will be quite naturally translated into fact."

Germany, whose defeat is now only a matter of time, is thus able to aggravate the martyrdom of the French people. But how justifiably contemned are those Frenchmen willing to collaborate in this crime that destroys families, enslaves the French people, and ruins France by the destruction of her industry.

The manner in which the workers responded to Hitler's orders, transmitted by the Vichy government with the approval of Marshal Pétain, is well known. From the very first, their resistance has been spirited and courageous. They have categorically refused to heed the summons to the so-called labor levy. They have left their homes and lie hidden in the country in order to escape participation in the war against their own country that Vichy wants to impose on them. The French working class has remained true to its glorious past and to its fine traditions of independence. In the same manner in which it took part in the activities of the underground movements of resistance to the enemy and to Vichy, it has replied vigorously to the first attempts at deportation.

Numerous strikes, ruthlessly repressed, have broken out. But the fiery manifestations of an indignant populace have time and again snatched the victims from their tormentors. Often the government, dreading such incidents, closed the plants and sent the police by night to the homes of those who rebelled against deportation. Many who resisted fiercely were led manacled to the cattle cars that were to carry them into exile. Even among these men, some found a way of escape. Sometimes the Germans take matters in hand. One day, at Villeurbanne, enemy soldiers encircled one section of the town, post-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing machine guns at the street corners; then they searched all the houses, taking all the healthy men they could lay hands on. Those who tried to escape were shot.

Involuntarily, the men of Vichy and their nazi masters have created a unity of the French people, directed against them. For propaganda purposes, they tried to make the peasants believe that their sons remained prisoners in the *Stalags* because of the selfishness of the workers who refused to go to Germany. But today, peasants of France, resisting Vichy and the Nazis as the workers do, are hiding the workers evading the labor levy. For those men, deprived of their food cards in a country where all food is scarce and rationed, the problem of food is vital. It is the peasants who, with the admirable solidarity of all the French people, feed them in their hiding places, heedless of the danger incurred by this patriotic action.

Today, M. Laval's hypocrisy has been unmasked. He had promised the peasants that the labor levy would assure the return to the country of a considerable number of agricultural prisoners. Very few were freed. One member of the Government, M. Bonnafous, had to admit that they numbered not more than 13,000. And among these, many are incapable of work, ill, exhausted by the atrocious life led in the prison camps. And now, with the mobilization of the young classes, deportation will exact a heavy toll from the peasants also.

But the lies emanating from Vichy no longer deceive anyone. The unity of the nation, farmers and workers, rich and poor, manual laborers and intellectuals, has been sealed in their magnificent resistance to the enemy. By the thousands, with the aid of patriots, workmen have escaped slavery. They form the valiant soldiers of the civilian army of liberation that holds itself in readiness. Hundreds of them have risked death to cross the border and join the fighting armies.

As for those who were unable to escape and who are now working in German plants under the constant threat of aerial bombardments, they have not lost their courage. They are doing the job of patriots as best they can. The nazi leaders can no longer conceal their fear of the ill will of these forcibly enlisted auxiliaries. One of their reports recently admitted that when the French are left alone for a moment, the factory ceases to function.

This fierce struggle against deportation is only one aspect of the ceaseless and secret battle heroically carried on by the French, who use every means within their power to oppose, disorganize, and destroy the enemy's effort to carry on war.

Liberties have been momentarily destroyed. Patriots are snared, hunted down by Laval's police or the Gestapo. Arrest, torture, murder, are everyday affairs. But nothing can stop the patriots. They resist; sustained by the hope—and today by the certainty—that the day is coming when the Allies will make France once more mistress of her own destiny and when she will find herself again a civilized and free nation.

Nazism is not an article suitable for import into France.



The underground is the advance army of the United Nations on the continent.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moral Indebtedness

by Orson Welles

TO be born free is to be born in debt: to live in freedom without fighting slavery is to profiteer.

By plane last night I flew over some parts of our republic where American citizenship is a luxury beyond the means of the majority. I rode comfortably in my plane above a sovereign state or two where fellow-countrymen of ours can't vote without the privilege of cash. Today I bought my lunch where Negroes may not come except to serve their white brothers, and there I overheard a member of some master race or other tell those who listened that something must be done to suppress the Jews.

I have met Southerners who expect and fear a Negro insurrection. I see no purpose in withholding this from general discussion. There may be those within that outcast 10 per cent of the American people who some day will strike back at their oppressors. To put down the mob, a mob would rise. Who will put down that mob?

We speak here of the peace. Black and brown and yellow men must vote freely in that peace. We speak of the Great Powers. But we have a brave ally in this war, seldom mentioned in these speculations. If Europe's Underground is kept from the Peace Table, a simpler peace can be agreed upon. That peace, however, will be very short.

The scaly dinosaurs of reaction (if indeed they notice what I'm writing here) will say in their newspapers that I am a Communist. Communists know otherwise. I am an overpaid movie producer with pleasant reasons to rejoice—and I do—in the wholesome practicability of the profit system. I'm all for making money if it means earning it. Lest you should imagine that I'm being publicly modest, I'll only admit that everybody deserves at least as many good things as my money buys for me. Surely my right to having more than enough is cancelled if I don't use that more to help those who have less. This sense of humanity's interdependence antidates Karl Marx.

Man admitted his responsibility to man when the first murderer cried out to God, "Am I my brother's keeper?" However, those in the current plot against liberty would drive all social virtues underground by calling its simplest expression communism. The war news suggests that there are worse terms of abuse. Still, the proud citizenry of our own democratic persuasion do not credit to the Russian Soviet the authorship of the proposition that all men are created equal.

My subject is the question of moral indebtedness. So I'd like to acknowledge here the debt that goes with ownership. I believe—and this has very much to do with my own notion of freedom—I believe I owe the very profit I make to the people I make it from. If this is radicalism, it comes automatically to most of us in show business, it being generally agreed that any public man owes his position to the public. This is a debt payable in service and the highest efforts of the debtor. The extension of this moral argument insists that no man owns anything outright—since he owns it rent free.

A wedding never bought a wife. And the devotion of his child is no man's for the mere begetting. We must each day earn what we own. A healthy man owes to the sick all that he can do for them. An educated man owes to the ignorant all that he can do for them. A free man owes to the world's slaves all that he can do for them. And what is to be done is more, much more, than good works, Christmas baskets, bonuses and tips and bread and circuses. There is only one thing to be done with slaves—free them.

When all the fascist armies have formally surrendered, the end of fascism will still be out of sight. This world fight is no melodrama. An armistice is no happy ending. The people know well that peace is harder won than war.

Soon we shall hear much favoring the sort of statesmanship which is termed "realistic." We heard much said in defense

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of expediency, even cleverness, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia. France marched on democratic Spain and, finding it politically advisable, the hardheaded men of the world stood by and lost the world. China was raped and these political realists winked. Idealism would have been more practical. A measure of courage. But cynicism supports no courage.—Some small faith in decency at least. A very qualified expression of men's responsibility to each other.—These are such stuff as dreams are made on. But they would have saved the world from bankruptcy and spared some twenty million lives.

No, giving the world back to its inhabitants is too big a job for the merely practical; too brave a task for pessimism. The architects of an enduring peace must be capable of hope. They must believe in people—all the people. They must face the unimaginable vistas of man's destiny. God grant them steadfast hope—and the rest of us enduring patience. For we must not expect from any leadership a shiny, ready-made millenium in our time. No one of us will live to see a blameless peace. We strive and pray and die for what will be here when we're gone. Our children's children are the ancestors of a free people. We send our greetings ahead of us, to them.—To history yet unmade, our greetings. To the generations sleeping in our loins: Be of good heart! The fight is worth it.

The Secret of Russia's Success:

Co-ordination

by COLONEL V. VORONIN

EXPERIENCE has proved that the degree of fighting efficiency the modern army can attain is directly related to the co-ordination of all its elements and to the co-operation between these elements. The battles of today are won by the unified effort of all the branches in the armed services.

Since the co-operation of the various elements should be based on the complete co-ordination of their action, it is essential first of all to allocate the jobs to be done by each branch—an allocation clearly determined in advance by the peculiar characteristics of each branch.

It has been proved in action, for instance, that tanks lose the benefit of this co-ordination if they are used on ground unsuited to them, if they are launched in an attack on strong enemy positions before adequate softening by artillery and the air force, or if they allow themselves to become dispersed during an infantry attack. If they fail to utilize their great maneuverability and their speed, their efficiency is lessened.

If the infantry, depending entirely on the firing power of the artillery, planes, and tanks supporting its action, fails to make active use of its own firing power, the means placed at its disposal by the army are not fully utilized and the pressure on the enemy is less than it could be.

Finally, if the tanks, instead of destroying the enemy infantry and silencing its artillery batteries, machine gun nests and mine throwers, seek combat with enemy tanks, they assume a task that could have been more effectively handled by the artillery and the anti-tank corps.

The practice of war constantly brings out new elements in the art of using the various engines of war to their utmost efficiency; and these new elements may radically alter former conceptions. Each part of the whole that constitutes an army must therefore be so utilized

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as to capitalize its very highest potentialities.

There is no unalterable law governing this co-operation and co-ordination. There is only one rule: in order fully to develop the striking power which crumbles enemy positions and opens the way to rapid advance—not only for one particular corps, but for the entire army—all of the corps should be so organized as to assure the maximum efficiency of each component part.

Motorization, mechanization, and the massive use of tanks and planes have considerably increased the maneuverability of troops and have effectively created the war of movement.

But today, as in World War I, if a war of movement is to be openly launched against a long and uninterrupted enemy front, the front should be pierced over a wide area. Piercing the front is almost prerequisite to offensive operations. The brunt of such an operation should be entrusted to the infantry. It is generally admitted that a tactical break-through is obtained by its co-operation with artillery, tanks, and planes.

A definite advance by the infantry settles the issue of a battle; and experience has proved that the co-ordination of all the various corps should be organized around the support of the infantry. The artillery, the air force, and the engineer corps should facilitate a break-through by infantry and tanks, the seizure by these elements of the first line of enemy defenses, and their follow-up attack in depth. This co-operation should be complete, from the first to the last minute of battle. It can be obtained only by the steady reinforcement of infantry with tanks and by assuring support to the infantry from all the corps *directly included in its ranks and forming a whole with the infantry.* Once the first break-through is effected, the character of the co-ordination changes. At this spot in the enemy line, the artillery, the tanks, and planes must now try to bring into action a mobile group usually made up of tank detachments and mechanized troops. Mobile corps from all the services liquidate any nucleus of enemy resistance which may have been left behind, and in co-operation with the air force destroy the bulk of the enemy forces.

Co-operation during the break-through should be such, therefore, as to assure—through the unified action of all corps—an advance of the mobile group behind the enemy communication lines that will cut the enemy off from his main bases. Once this has been accomplished, the mobile group and the main forces will try to encircle the main forces of the enemy and destroy or capture them.

A classic example of the organization and execution of such a plan is furnished in the battle of Stalingrad—a battle planned by the commander in chief, Stalin.

The speed and the depth of the attack carried out by the mobile group are determined by various factors, chiefly by the extent of its co-operation with other corps and especially with the forces effecting the break-through. This collaboration should be so organized as to hold the mobile group in reserve until other forces have reached deeply into the enemy's defense.

If the mobile group comes into action before this time, it helps, of course, to carry out the break-through, but it is prematurely weakened. But it is equally detrimental to delay participation of the mobile groups too long, for this allows the enemy to bring up his reserves, regroup his forces, and plug the gaps in his line or organize a new line of defense.

Co-ordination of the activities of mobile groups and larger units within every branch of the armed forces, and organization of their co-operation on the battlefield—such are the factors determining victory.

The Red Army has acquired a wealth of experience enabling it to carry out operations under a variety of conditions. The art of war has no immutable laws; the forms and techniques of battle change constantly. But we have learned that co-operation and co-ordination are the main elements in successful warfare.

To organize this complex and vital task, a commander has to synchronize all of the armed forces under him. For this purpose a general staff, and officers from each unit, are at his disposal. The commander must work out plans for the most appropriate use of each branch of the armed forces, the place and the time for its use, and the sustained co-operation of all elements throughout the battle.

This commander must know the general situation, the terrain, the main features of the enemy defenses, and the fighting potentialities of all the reinforcements entrusted to his command. The problems of synchronization should not be solved by looking at maps; the commander should be on the field with the officers in charge of the various units.

Since the commander draws up plans for all corps, he must work in conjunction with the staff officers from the various branches. The commander must make sure, during the battle, that the assignments given to each branch are carried out exactly. He must also foresee possible changes growing out of battle conditions; and see to it that, despite alteration in plans, his subordinates continue to work in concert with him.

The cogs in the machine should function perfectly. Mastery of the complicated art of co-ordination: this is the explanation of our success.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS

Foreign Correspondents On Global Fronts

MEDITERRANEAN ASSIGNMENT, by Richard McMillan. 332 pages. Doubleday, Doran; $3.00

THE TOUGHEST FIGHTING IN THE WORLD, by George H. Johnston. 240 pages. Duell, Sloan and Pearce; $3.00

JOURNALISTS, whether working or retired, can take a just pride in the quality of writing done by members of their craft in this war. Even a cursory comparison of the eyewitness accounts on today's global front with similar books of twenty-five years ago, or farther back into the Richard Harding Davis era, shows how greatly individual correspondents' horizons have widened and their understanding of the world and its people have deepened.

Two of the best recent books to come from the typewriters of these soldiers of the press are "Mediterranean Assignment" by Richard McMillan and "The Toughest Fighting in the World" by George H. Johnston.

McMillan's title is somewhat misleading since his principal subject is the British Eighth Army and its superb 51st Division (Highlander) which recovered from defeat to break the Axis African back at El Alamein. Yet Mr. McMillan, who went through the agonizing days in Greece, the Balkans, and Crete from 1940 on, contrives some chapters on those tragedies that are first-rate writing in sympathetic, sensitive description.

Summing up an Italian air-attack on the "Ark Royal": " 'Nothing to write home about,' said the commander [of McMillan's ship], which about summed up the Italians as airmen. They might be all right against naked Ethiopians, but they showed up poorly in real war."

McMillan is a veteran correspondent with sixteen years' experience, more than a third of which has been spent in and around the Mediterranean, so that his background for the subject is thoroughly established.

To Americans, perhaps the most interesting chapters of the book are those which treat of the great commanders of the Eighth: Sir Bernard Montgomery and Sir Harold Alexander. McMillan makes no effort to conceal his intense admiration for these two, both as men and as soldiers, and successfully shows why they are admirable by any yardstick of human measurement. Without seeming to make a point of it, the fact is made clear that both these men are of the class which has come in for some not-always-justified razzing as wearers of the "old school tie."

General Sir Bernard Montgomery is the son of the late Anglican Bishop of Tasmania and was educated at St. Paul's School, London, and Sandhurst, England's West Point. As McMillan says in his preface: "This book deals . . . above all with the man who, in six months, changed the war map of the entire North African Continent in our favor—General Sir Bernard Montgomery, the Desert Cromwell." Like the great Puritan Commander, Sir Bernard reads a chapter of his Bible every day, neither smokes nor drinks and personally lives a rigidly Spartan life. Being an Englishman, however, he does not impose his own restricted regimen on the off-duty hours of men under his command.

Some of the battlefield vignettes are as good as anything reported in any war. During the El Alamein operation, McMillan, lost in the smoke and ruck of battle, was suddenly confronted by the bayonet of a British soldier aimed right at his stomach and only a few inches away:

" 'Password!'

"I have been scared in the course of this war—very scared—but never so much as in that instant when I faced death from a bayonet, a bayonet wielded by one of our own troops.

"I did not know the password! . . .

"I kept my head. I realized the challenger spoke in broad Scots. So I answered him in

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

similar strain, in my best Doric, and with no lack of emphasis: 'Don't be a bloody fool,' I said, 'I'm a war correspondent. I've just left your brigadier.'

"He dropped his rifle. 'Well,' he said, in a tone of mild admonition, 'you're a fool to be wandering about in the midst of a battle without knowing the password. You're in danger of getting some lead or some steel through you.'

" 'You're telling me!' I answered, as I wiped beads of cold sweat from my face. 'By the way,' I added, 'What is the password?'

" 'It's *uncle*. And if I say a number you say a higher one. Where do you come from?'

" 'Glasgow,' said I.

" 'So do I,' he answered, with as much of a chuckle as such a canny little Scot was ever likely to permit himself. 'What about some machonochies?' asked my newfound pal, who had almost bayoneted me.

" 'It would be fine,' I declared. 'I'm hungry.' "

Johnston's book, "The Toughest Fighting in the World," got its title not only from Mr. Johnston's own opinion of the New Guinea terrain but from the remarks of the Australian ground soldiers who had already looked at death on the beach of Dunkirk and the deserts of North Africa.

As the introduction points out, while Americans were numerically stronger in the air-fighting, in the ground-fighting the great bulk of the forces were Australian, and it is with ground troops that correspondents habitually travel. Mr. Evatt, Australian Foreign Minister, wrote the Introduction and pays Mr. McMillan a tribute which the volume itself completely justifies.

This story of day by day and moment by moment experiences in the steaming jungles of the South Pacific where enemies are ever-present, not only in Japanese uniform but in the very nature of a countryside teeming with insects, bacteria, and malign vegetable growth, will be must reading for anyone who wants to share, vicariously, in the efforts made by Americans and their allies in the whole area that must be won before the immense manpower of China can be brought to bear against Japan.

There is little difference in the kind of danger and discomfort met in New Guinea, which Mr. Johnston describes, and those to be overcome in Burma, and in Malaysia on the road to Lashio, and in building a railway into Chungking.

Particularly valuable, and comforting, are Mr. Johnston's descriptions of the natives and the gradual swerve from credulous acceptance of the "Asia for Asiatics" slogan of the Japanese invaders to a wholehearted hatred of the kind of barbarism the Japanese display. The Islanders have plenty of native cruelties—the country itself being cruel; but they are not the arrogant inhumanities brought in by Japanese troops which have made the rather lax "White Man's Rule" seem benign by comparison.

Chronologically, this book covers only the New Guinea operations up to January of the present year; but as factual description of jungle fighting the book is timeless. Once again, and with every detail to back up the warning, Mr. Johnston reminds us that the Japanese cannot be judged by any standards of Western conduct or psychology, and that precedents of surrender which may be set in Europe will have no meaning in the Orient. Any idea that may still linger, or have been revived, in an American mind that Japanese occupation will be easy to eradicate from the Islands or the Peninsulas of the South Pacific will be corrected by Mr. Johnston's factual statements:

> The war out there is hard and tough. It will be hard and tough until the final blow is struck. It won't get any easier until we are, at length, able to hurl the full great weight of the United Nations against this common enemy of all mankind.

BURNET HERSHEY.

A Pattern for Tomorrow . . .

The Pillars of Security

***By Sir William H.* BEVERIDGE**

THESE twenty-two wartime essays and addresses by the author of the Beveridge Plan throw considerable new light on his famous Report. Here are concrete, practical and judicious proposals by a man deeply concerned with the ideal of the greatest good for the greatest number. "No serious student of the problems and challenges of the post-war world can afford to miss it."—Philadelphia Record.

$2.50

THE MACMILLAN CO.
60 Fifth Ave., New York 11, N. Y.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Check List of Forthcoming Books on International Affairs

THE AIR FUTURE: A PRIMER OF AEROPOLITICS, by Burnet Hershey. Duell, Sloane and Pearce. A general survey of the future of the air by a leading foreign correspondent. It includes an inquiry conducted by the author into the plans being made by the United Nations for post-war settlements and reconstruction, and answers such basic questions as: What will Russia do? How do the British feel about American competition? Wouldn't complete "Freedom of the Air" be the easiest way to bring about world unity? Will the U. S. retain its present military air bases? Will aviation replace railroads and ships as carriers of express and freight? Will it be possible to fly private planes to foreign countries? Mr. Hershey presents a picture of the most debated subject in the world today, and how it affects the United States politically, economically, and as a "Good Neighbor" to the world.

TRIUMPH OF TREASON, by Pierre Cot. Alliance. At Riom in February, 1942, Blum, Daladier, and other leaders of fallen France, were summoned before a Vichy tribunal. The trial was a farce. The Accused became Accusers; Hitler hastily ordered Pétain to call the whole thing off. But the damage to Vichy and the New Order had been done, even though Blum and Daladier were sentenced to imprisonment. They have been silenced until the war is over, but Pierre Cot, France's Minister of Aviation who was tried in absentia at the same time, now speaks for them and for himself.

BEYOND VICTORY, edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. Harcourt, Brace. This book is concerned primarily with those basic problems which the post-war planners must face and solve if we are to create a free and orderly world. The subjects range from the economic and political bases for a lasting peace to the role of religion and education, and the interplay of cultures, each discussed by an authority of world-wide reputation.

THE GENTLEMEN TALK OF PEACE, by William B. Ziff. Duell. The author of "The Coming Battle of Germany" discusses the mechanics of peace. He deals at length with post-war international relations of the major powers, with the paradox of the present German economic picture, with the acute problems of race and empire and technics.

U. S. S. R., by Walter Duranty. Lippincott. How and why the U. S. S. R. came to its present stature is the theme of this new book by Walter Duranty. Beginning with the causes, meaning and aims of the Soviet Revolution, the epic development of Russia unfolds through each successive crisis down to the present day.

THE NETHERLANDS: HOMELAND OF A FREE PEOPLE, by Hendrik Riemens. A comprehensive story of the Dutch people, the modern kingdom of the Netherlands, and its highly developed dependencies abroad. Dr. Riemens is at present Commercial Secretary of the Netherlands Embassy in Washington. His book reveals how the Netherlands government-in-exile has maintained close bonds with the Dutch people since the Nazi invasion.

THE AMERICAN SENATE AND WORLD PEACE, by Kenneth W. Colegrove. Vanguard. Plans for a just and lasting peace can be blocked by a minority consisting of one-third of the United States Senate. This minority block might represent only a tiny fraction of the people of this country, yet they would be able to nullify the will of a majority of the voters, of a majority of both Houses of the Congress, and of the Chief Executive. Professor Colegrove raises the question whether any minority group should be permitted to retain this power.

COMPASS OF THE WORLD: A SYMPOSIUM ON POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, by Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. Macmillan. The work of some twenty leading authorities in the fields of geography, political geography and political science, which seeks to make clear the importance and implications of the abolition of distance and the new close contact between countries, and of the resulting change in our conceptions of business, government and international co-operation.

FREE WORLD
8 West 40th Street, New York City

☐ **Send me the next three issues of FREE WORLD at the special introductory price of $1.00.**

☐ **Enter my subscription for one year at the regular price of $4.00.**

☐ **Payment enclosed.** ☐ **Bill me later.**

Name .....

City .....*State*.....

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Radio Commentator Reviews History

PREVIEW OF HISTORY, by Raymond Gram Swing. 278 *pages. Doubleday, Doran;* $2.00

THE bulk of this book consists of selected broadcasts and excerpts from broadcasts delivered by the author between December 8, 1941 and the fall of Tunisia on May 10, 1943. It lives up to the title in that Mr. Swing writes as a current historian: if the classic historian reviews history, the current historian previews the history that will later be seen in perspective by others. It would be superfluous, almost impertinent, to summarize here Mr. Swing's widely known and lucidly expounded views of the world we live in. For those who want them restated and crystallized in his own words, he includes in this book an original opening essay, "Realities of a Power Peace," as well as a collection of addresses delivered at various colleges and universities before and after America entered the war.

Three features of Mr. Swing's book especially impress a fellow-laborer in the luxuriant radio vineyard. First, the style that he has mastered for radio purposes loses none of its effectiveness on the printed page. It is a style of short sentences, clear pictures, and firmly knit argument. The result is that it speaks to the inner ear with a persuasive magic that the man who writes for the eye and mind alone seldom masters. In the second place, Mr. Swing brings to the smallest daily events the painstaking, respectful attention of the historian with a conscience. He does not pretend to give the background that the future historians of this period will bring to bear, but his respect for his public and the sense of responsibility that weighs upon him in his work give this book an integrity the future historian may well emulate. In the third place, Mr. Swing—like most American commentators on the war—lives in a Europe-centered universe. Hitler receives more than twice as much space in the index as any name or topic. The background of our involvement in the Asiatic war zone receives no such detailed attention. The counter-revolution we are fighting in Europe overshadows the Asiatic revolution toward which we still take a somewhat equivocal position—although it was by way of Asia and the Pacific that we entered the war. But Mr. Swing's function has left him little choice in the matter. He must mirror as faithfully as he can what his listeners want to hear about, and if the issues in the European war still seem more important than the issues in Asia, that is the fault of history and the men who make it.

QUINCY HOWE

Starred by FREE WORLD as one of the best books of the year

QUINCY WRIGHT'S

A STUDY OF WAR

MAX LERNER says: ". . . if ever a book deserved to be called 'monumental' both because of its physical properties and because of the weighty and judicious quality of its conclusions, this is it."—*The Library Quarterly.*

NORMAN ANGELL: "Here is ammunition for knocking over many a false theory."—*American Historical Review.*

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN: ". . . completely documented, admirably organized and extremely readable. It is likewise a contribution of major importance to the winning of the war and the peace."

2 vols., over 1500 pages, boxed, $15.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Italy, Testing Ground for Allied Policy

WHAT TO DO WITH ITALY, by Gaetano Salvemini and George La Piana. Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 295 *pages;* $2.75

WHEN the complete history of anti-fascism has been written, high honors will be accorded to Gaetano Salvemini as a true exponent of the liberal thought of our time.

Salvemini's innate qualities predestined him for democratic leadership. His strength of character, which accepts no compromise with the fallacious, supposedly "realistic" diplomacy of the last twenty years; his extraordinary culture, which gives him a profound historical perspective on every problem of contemporary life; his youthful, refreshing literary style; his subtle, keen intelligence, make him a politician in the noblest sense of the word, and one whom I should like to see contributing actively to the molding of the new Italy.

All these qualities are apparent in "What to Do with Italy," written in collaboration with another distinguished scholar, George La Piana. The book is most opportune, appearing at the very moment when Italy's surrender was announced to the general public. But it is more than timely. It throws a strong light on the disparity between the remarkable military successes of the Allies and their too-frequent political failures. More than that, it points out how, in the case of Italy, that disparity can be overcome.

Fascism is visualized in all its aspects—from its inception in Italy to its inevitable international consequences. Responsibility for its continuance is justly divided between those within Italy who believed that, despite its illegal origin, fascism would re-establish internal prosperity, and those abroad who supported it even after the Italian people had looked it in the face and seen it for what it was.

There is overwhelming documentation to substantiate the charge that Italian fascism received support from abroad. The ecstasies into which international finance, the high-ranking Catholic heirarchy, post-war diplomats, the press (and many of its respected columnists, both in England and America) went over Il Duce and his system are abundantly described in two chapters, "The Responsibility of the Italian People" and "The Vatican." There may be people who consider these chapters superfluous. I do not. On the contrary, I believe them absolutely imperative reading; for the same forces which fostered Italian fascism from 1922 up to the eve of the war are now resuming their sinister work to frustrate a real victory for democracy in the post-war world. These pages make not merely painful reading; to refresh the memory of the American public may serve as a preventative measure.

The last part of the book, which includes "Italy of Tomorrow" and "Church and State in Post-War Italy," presents a highly concrete program, applicable both to the Italian people and to the governments of the United Nations. Policies followed in Italy will serve to indicate the direction American and British policy will take after the war is won. In North Africa, the political possibilities were somewhat limited. People of good faith believed that the United Nations could not have done much more than they did to promote democracy in France. I need not say that I disagree entirely with such a benevolent interpretation. Italy is another question. It is a nation to which, for the first time, the United Nations can apply the principles for which, presumably, they are fighting. Italy will offer the supreme testing ground for the sentiments of the leaders of the United Nations—whether they seek a democratic Europe or a reactionary Europe.

"What to Do with Italy" marks the road to follow. It is indispensable reading for anyone concerned with the building of a Free World.

J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO.

●

THE EDGE OF THE ABYSS, by Alfred Noyes. 172 *pages. Dutton;* $2.00

Political theory and literary criticism are inextricably intertwined in this strident protest against tendencies that the author condemns. The criticism, unfortunately, is not reasoned analysis, but arbitrary culling out of the saintly sheep of the great tradition (Longfellow, Dickens, Tennyson, above all, Kipling) from the nefarious goats of the "pseudo-intellectuals" and intelligentsia: Arnold Bennett, Proust, Mencken, James Joyce, and Ezra Pound. The political theory of the book is never formulated, but verges toward the idea that the recent literary "degeneracy" is at least the symptom, if not the cause, of what has brought us to the edge of the abyss. The point is debatable, the argument high-pitched and inconclusive, and the remedies proposed vague and unsatisfactory.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

SIR NORMAN ANGELL is absent on a visit to Europe. Upon his return, he will resume his commentary, *Progress of the Struggle.*

As a free-lance, anti-nazi journalist in Germany, *C. BERADT* wrote on social and psychological subjects for various newspapers and magazines. She is now living in the United States with her husband, the well-known German writer, Martin Beradt. *Dreams Under Dictatorship* is part of a larger collection which she plans to publish as a book-length study of the psychology of fascism.

Among the younger men in Great Britain, *WILL FORSTER* ranks as an outstanding thinker on world affairs. He was for many years closely associated with the League of Nations Union and the International Peace Campaign, and he is now working with the committee on reconstruction of the British Labor Party. In the course of his wide travels throughout Europe, particularly western and northern Europe, he observed the functioning of various economic systems, and devoted special attention to the co-operative movements. He is the author of many books and treatises on international affairs, his latest being "The Freedom of the Seas."

For the first time since the fall of France, *ANDRE GIDE* writes again, in the only way possible for him—as a free man. For years, his voice could not be heard; and thousands of admirers of the greatest French writer of today impatiently looked forward to the time when *GIDE* could again express himself with the complete sincerity that characterizes his writings. Once, under the Vichy regime, in an "imaginary interview" published in *Figaro, GIDE* tried, under an Aesop's cloak, to tell France to maintain her traditions of liberty. It created quite a sensation. When World War II broke out, *ANDRE GIDE* was publishing his *Pages de Journal,* a diary filled with the most pertinent and fruitful remarks on art and politics. We have been sure that *GIDE* has gone on setting his thoughts down on paper throughout these tragic years. Before the invasion of Africa, *GIDE* went to Tunis. Well known liberal, he was, of course, forced to hide when the Germans seized power after the Allied landings in North Africa. Day after day, *GIDE,* in his secret shelter, noted down his impressions. Then came the liberation. How did *GIDE* see the liberation of Tunis, which was also his own liberation? We are glad to welcome back into the ranks of free writers our friend, *ANDRE GIDE.*

CARL A. HATCH, Democratic Senator from New Mexico, began his public career as assistant attorney general of New Mexico in 1917. He served subsequently as collector of internal revenue for the district of New Mexico and as district judge. Since 1933, he has represented his state in the United States Senate. He is one of the four Senators who framed the BBHH bill, which seeks to insure international collaboration and the maintenance of an enduring peace.

A native of Vienna, *FRITZ KAUFMANN* has been known throughout Europe for twenty years as a political writer, correspondent, and editor of democratic newspapers. Last year, he came to this country from France where, since 1939, he had been successively interned, allowed to join the army, and finally forced into a labor gang by the Vichyites. *MR. KAUFMANN* is now a member of the staff of the "World Encyclopedia Institute," located in New York City.

When *LI YU YING* speaks about China, we listen respectfully to one of the great voices of the Chinese Republic. One of the founders of modern China, he is President of the National Academy of Peiping, and can justly be hailed as an inspiration to the new generation now carrying on the heavy burden of the war against Japanese aggression. *LI YU YING,* a member of our honorary board and a founder of the World Confederation of International Groupments, has devoted much of his life to bringing about a better understanding between the West and the East. Always he has thought in terms of international co-operation, the true language of FREE WORLD.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH needs no introduction to our readers. This distinguished poet and former editor of *Fortune* who is now Librarian of Congress has long anticipated the dangers of totalitarianism. Today, in the midst of the disorders and complexities of a world at war, he indicates with clarity and perfect

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logic the real issues involved in the present struggle.

Before Mussolini came to power, *COUNT CARLO SFORZA* was Foreign Minister of Italy. Foreseeing that the personal regime of the Duce would bring disaster upon his country, he threw his entire weight into the struggle against fascism, and has continued the crusade, during all his years in exile, into his seventy-second year. As a refugee in Paris, he won the respectful admiration of the democratic countries. Incessantly, in writing and by word of mouth, he stressed the terrible dangers created by the new regime. But his ardent appeals met with aloof politeness from world diplomacy which continued, in unruffled calm, to do business with Mussolini. Neither Mussolini's pact with Hitler nor Italian intervention in Spain could change the minds of appeasers. Traitors such as Georges Bonnet pursued Sforza with unrelenting hatred. And when the Duce stabbed France in the back, it was too late. With his great diplomatic experience in Turkey, China, England, and France, *COUNT CARLO SFORZA* today stands before the world as one of the rebuilders of a new and free Italy. This citizen of the world is at present living in the United States and is a member of our Editorial Board.

Last April, in the Warsaw ghetto, starving, diseased, practically unarmed Jews fought so valiantly against the Nazis that their rebellion was crushed only after three hundred elite German troops had been killed and two thousand wounded. *LIAN SHAIRO,* a contributor to various national magazines, *The Nation* among them, tells this story in *The Walls Turn Outward.*

The activities of *ATWOOD H. TOWNSEND* have been diverse. He was an ambulance driver in the A.E.F. in World War I, studied at the University of Dijon, and was for a time an efficiency engineer for Thomas A. Edison. Since 1922, he has been a member of the faculty at New York University. He has also been active in the co-operative movement. As Chairman of the Committee on College Reading, he edits *Good Reading,* a biennial publication recommending books for college students. Our readers will clearly remember his first article to appear in FREE WORLD, "Ankle Deep in War."

COLONEL V. VORONIN, a member of the Russian armed forces and well known military critic, is an authority on the techniques used in modern warfare. As such, he has written for various Moscow publications.

When *DOROTHY DE ZOUCHE,* among other things a teacher and frequently a contributor to the *Christian Science Monitor,* writes about a better understanding among people, she has a right to do so. She has known all sorts of people in the United States. Born close to Chicago, she studied in Iowa, spent a year tutoring in Wyoming, another in a mining town, another in a mountain village in the Ozarks. St. Louis is now her home. She thinks that people should not be content to send out baskets of food on Christmas and Thanksgiving, but should rather be aware that we ought to create a world in which the distribution of baskets would be unnecessary.

At the last moment before going to press we received *ORSON WELLES'S* piece, based on an address delivered in Chicago at the Mass Rally to Win the Peace. The name, *ORSON WELLES,* and his brilliant career in the theater, in radio, and in motion pictures as actor, writer, and producer are well known to everyone.

Readers wanting to know something about *THEODORE BRENSON,* who drew the frontispiece for this month's *Round Table,* should turn to our "Who's Who" for September, 1943.

The political cartoons scattered through the *Round Table* were drawn by *STAN FRAYDAS,* a Belgian citizen who is now in the United States Army. Two days before the Germans entered Brussels, he left the city, and was with the Belgian Army in France during the brief interlude before the Armistice. Since his arrival in the United States in 1941, he has worked almost exclusively in the political field, with political cartoons, "spots," or illustrations published in the *New York Times, PM, American Mercury,* and *La Voix de France.*

●

Our Book Review Section

J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Spanish Republic, has written an analytical study of Gaetano Salvemini's and George La Piana's "What to Do with Italy." No one is better qualified than *BURNET HERSHEY,* well-known foreign correspondent, executive director of the Overseas Press Club, to speak about his fellow-correspondents' books. It needed a keen radio commentator like *QUINCY HOWE* to analyze a volume from another radio commentator, Raymond Gram Swing.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED